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Abstract
Since 2012, scholars have taken a renewed look at the philosophical and political ideas of 
Eurasianism within Russia to explain President Vladimir Putin's conduct and the Russian public's 
response to it. Eurasianism in its current form posits that the Russian state plays a unique role in 
the history of the world in opposing the avaricious, agnostic, and culturally oppressive “West,” 
while uniting and elevating the peoples of the Eurasian continent in a peaceful, organic and 
spiritual “Eurasia.” Indigenous peoples play a distinctive role in this narrative. Both the United 
States and Russia have Indigenous populations that have been subjected to both passive neglect 
and active violence over the past several centuries and currently suffer from poor social conditions 
compared to the dominant ethnic groups of their respective countries. This thesis addresses the 
question of how the Russian media's portrayal of Native Americans diverges from that of its own 
Indigenous peoples in order to perpetuate this Eurasian narrative. Articles were collected from 
various news outlets in Russia, coded for Eurasianist themes using the Atlas.ti program, and 
analyzed by news outlet, date published, and topic. The analysis finds that the Russian media 
portrays Indigenous peoples in Russia as largely having constructive working relationships with 
the Kremlin, while they depict Native Americans as striving towards secession and mired in 
constant conflict with the U.S. government, but having surreptitious affinities towards the Eurasian 
civilizational model.
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Chapter 1 History of the Development of Eurasianism
1.1 Introduction: the Question
In December 2004, in the midst of nationwide confusion about the country's role in the 
post-Communist, twenty-first century world, Russia's President Vladimir Putin and the national 
legislature passed an inconspicuous rebranding of a long-celebrated national holiday. November 
4th, henceforth, was to be celebrated as the “Day of National Unity” in honor of a little-known 
historical defeat of Polish and Lithuanian forces who had been occupying Moscow in 1612. 
According to official government news outlets, the holiday celebrated the day that Novgorodian 
leaders Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky finally ousted the European invaders, restoring 
government to the land after a decades-long stretch known as the “Time of Troubles” in which 
the population was ravaged by disease, violence, and political uncertainty. The next year, in 
1613, the national assembly elected Mikhail Romanov as the Tsar of Russia, establishing the 
Romanov dynasty that survived until the Revolution in 1917. The official Kremlin line 
emphasized the nature of Minin and Pozharsky's army, which it portrayed as a ragtag crew of 
diverse social, religious, and ethnic backgrounds. “In this period, known as the Time of 
Troubles, the entire country lacked a government, and Russia was plunged into a civil war, 
nearly in danger of collapse with a loss of independence and autonomy,” says Newsru, a 
prominent online newspaper, “And it was in that very time that the people themselves stood up 
in defense of their fatherland, realizing the necessity of uniting their strengths before internal and 
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external enemies . . . Representatives of many other religions and peoples fought side by side 
with the Russian Orthodox people.”1
1
“V Rossii Vpervye otmechaetsa den' narodnogo edinstvo.” (“In Russia for the first time is celebrated the Day of 
National Unity.”) Newsru. November 4, 2005, accessed October 30, 2018. 
https://www.newsru.com/russia/04nov2005/edinstvo.html2
Mariya Omelicheva, “A New Russian Holiday has more behind it than national unity: the political functions of 
historical commemorations.” Australian Journal of Politics and History 63, no. 3. (September 2017): 432, accessed 
October 23, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1111∕ajph.12375
3 Ibid 432
4 Ibid 432
Despite the inspiring and patriotic rhetoric, little of the story neatly aligns with the 
historical facts. While the Novgorodian militia certainly helped free Moscow, a rival Cossack 
army had already done most of the heavy lifting; while the Romanovs eventually brought the 
civil war to an end, it raged for years after 1612; and while Orthodoxy was the predominant 
religion in the area, historians still cannot determine the religious makeup of the citizen army.2 
Indeed, even the date of November 4 resulted from a miscalculation by the Russian legislators 
when they translated from the Julian to the Gregorian calendar.3 As scholar Mariya Omelicheva 
notes in her article about the holiday, “all in all, there was little ‘national' or ‘people's' unity 
behind the events of November 1612.”4 The question of how this loose-ended battle clouded by a 
haze of historical uncertainty became a beacon of national unity for modern Russia is even more 
interesting when viewed from the perspective of Indigenous Peoples. Russian media, seen by 
many as an arm of the Russian government and its foreign policy, pays particular attention to the 
Indigenous groups of Russia in their coverage of nationwide celebrations of the Day of National 
Unity. TASS, the official wire service of Russia, published an article in 2017 on the eve of the 
celebration entitled “Representatives of the Indigenous Small-numbered People to Widely 
Celebrate Day of National Unity,” in which it quotes the current president of RAIPON, the 
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umbrella advocacy group for forty-one Indigenous groups in Russia: “Russia is perhaps the most 
multi-ethnic country in the world.” he says, “This holiday is dedicated to the unity of peoples and 
our nation, and we will celebrate it with widely.”5 Articles in different media trumpet Indigenous 
Peoples dance performances, cultural exhibitions, and parades.
5
“Predstaviteli korennykh malochislennikh narodov shiroko otmetyat Den' Narodnogo Edinstvo” (“Representatives 
of Indigenous small-numbered people widely celebrate the Day of National Unity”) TASS. November 3, 2017. 
Accessed November 15, 2018. https://tass.ru/obschestvo/4701838
6 Forsyth, James. A history of the peoples of Siberia: Russia's north Asian colony, 1581-1990. (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 38
This integration of Indigenous Peoples into the Day of National Unity is particularly 
interesting when considering that in 1612 Russia was a fraction of the territory of what it would 
eventually become. Western Siberia was only just beginning to be subjected to the Russian 
imperial yoke: in 1620 Russia extended approximately to the Yenisei River valley, which makes 
up only about half of modern day Siberia.6 Indigenous peoples such as the Yakuts, the Korak, 
and the Chukchi were only peripherally exposed to the Russian government, if at all. Even those 
who were, such as the Khanty, Mansi, and Tungus, had only recently been conquered, and were 
not fully integrated into Russian society, paying only tribute in furs to the unknown tsar in 
Moscow. It is in many ways confounding that a holiday established in memorial of military 
victory could be reconstrued as a day of “unity” among the diverse people who inhabit the 
expansive territory of the modern-day Russia, many of whom later violently resisted the 
expansion of that country.
The triumph of Eurasianism as a ruling ideology offers a compelling explanation for the 
apparent adoption of this historical narrative. Eurasianism is a complex philosophy and narrative 
that originated in the emigre community in 1920s Europe that re-orients Eurasia as the center of 
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global history as opposed to a backwater of Asia or Europe. While recent interest has surged due 
to Eurasianist philosophers' celebration of chauvinistic and expansionist foreign policy, the 
philosophical roots of Eurasianism have much less to do with expansionism and more with the 
origins and mutual cooperation of the diverse peoples who inhabit the lands from the Volga to 
Vladivostok. It is a territory that encompasses an ethnically, historically, and religiously diverse 
group, including forty officially recognized Indigenous “small-numbered” peoples, as they are 
called in Russia. Eurasianists, both early and current, have obsessed over the idea of what a 
people is, how they come to be, and what role Russia has in uniting the people of Eurasia. Their 
answers sometimes venture into the absurd, but understanding the depth of the intellectual 
energy devoted to this concept can help elucidate how and why Russians see themselves as a 
great power worthy of respect, and why they believe this vast and diverse country is destined to 
be united under one government.
1.2 The History and Development of Eurasianism
Born from the passions and patriotisms of Russia's top academics who had been forced 
into exile by the Bolshevik revolution, Eurasianism blurred the line between science and 
storytelling, making it all the more intriguing. Nikolai Trubetskoy and Roman Jakobson, two 
pioneering phonologists who developed an early idea of phoneme shifts that would define 
twentieth century linguistics, were some of the first to propose a scientific basis for the future 
greatness of their lost country of Russia. Trubetskoy, in particular, argued that the phoneme 
shifts he had documented across the vast expanses of the Eurasian continent proved a common 
direction of the diverse peoples that had previously made up the Russian Empire. Petr Savitsky, 
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another prominent intellectual of pre-Soviet Russia, applied his geographical background to what 
he saw as near-perfect geological symmetry of Eurasia to explain the Russian Empire's long 
history of trade between the fur hunters of the North, the pastoral nomads of the steppes, and the 
agriculturalists of the Black Earth zone, and which predicted a natural and inevitable political 
integration in the future. Savitsky also drew on British philosopher Harford Mackinder, who 
popularized a view of the world in which the economically advanced sea powers vie for global 
dominance with the more agriculturalist land powers, and he suggested that Eurasia, embodied 
by Russia, was the scion of the global heartland land powers. Russia's geopolitical role, in this 
view, was the counter pole to the West, a claim Savitsky made in the first official Eurasianist 
publication, Turn to the East, published in Sofia, Bulgaria, in 1921. Was this really science 
though, as Trubetskoy and Savitsky suggested, or was it a story the embittered exile-scholars told 
themselves to grieve the loss of their motherland? Was it, as journalist Charles Clover suggests 
in his book on Eurasianism's influence on Russia, a story that was “more therapy than 
scholarship” for early proponents and a “repository for their bitterness”? The Eurasianist 
movement flourished for several years, but in the late 1920s imploded from internal personal 
tensions between members that were exploited by agents of the Soviet secret police. Trubetskoy, 
the leading intellectual force of the movement then renounced his earlier manifestos on the 
movement as harmful demagoguery without scientific merit,7 making any continuation of a 
serious movement unthinkable.
7 Charles Clover. Black wind, white snow: The rise of Russia's new nationalism. (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2016), 10.
5
But the 1980s saw another unthinkable development: the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union. As republic after republic broke away from the central government of Moscow, the old 
Marxist ideology that suggested that national differences would eventually be annihilated by a 
realization of a utopian socialism no longer held any credence. Not only was the Soviet Union's 
existence threatened but so was Russia's, as regions strived for more and more autonomy from 
Moscow led by autonomous ethnic republics like Yakutia and Tatarstan. It was unclear whether 
Russia could survive as a united political entity, in large part because of ethnic nationalist forces.
From the ashes of the Marxist narrative rose the voice of Lev Gumilev, a historian of the
Scythian civilization and former Gulag prisoner, as he asserted a new raison d'etre for Russia. 
Casting aside the old ideological tenets of Marxist universalism, Gumilev asserted that Russia's 
existence had a biological and cosmic foundation in his theories of ethnogenesis. Civilizations, 
according to Gumilev, are biological organisms that are born out of a burst of some sort of 
cosmic energy, live out their lives through expansion, and eventually die out after a life of 
approximately 1,200 years. Russia's civilization was in the middle of its lifespan having been 
born in 1400 C.E. during a Mongol yoke battle. To deny Russia's right to continue to exist as a 
vast, multi-ethnic polity would be to deny the laws of physics and biology. Gumilev, who died in 
1993, became a legendary and prophetic figure in social sciences in Russia and former Soviet 
countries, despite ignorance of him in the West. The Russian regime's ill-fated adoption of 
principles of Atlanticism and free market Liberalism in the 1990s gave way to the Putin era of 
the 2000s, which quickly pared back Yeltsin's reforms and appeared to adopt concrete tenets of 
Eurasianism into its governing philosophy.
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More specifically, Russia asserted itself as an antipode to the West's hegemony and a 
geopolitical actor in itself. Aleksandr Panarin and Aleksandr Dugin, whom Woodrow Wilson 
Center scholar Marlene Laruelle would name the neo-Eurasianists, propounded these views to a 
twenty-first century audience that had lived through the cruel experiment of “Shock Therapy” of 
the 1990s, which had resulted in food shortages and social disruption across the country. In 1999, 
Aleksandr Dugin authored an book entitled the Foundations of Geopolitics, which would go on 
to be used as an influential textbook in some of the top military colleges in Russia, and which 
called for the dismemberment of Ukraine and the revitalization of Russia's unique geopolitical 
role in opposing the United States and its ideological hegemony. Dugin and Panarin argued that 
the Western model of “nation states” had resulted in the oppression or eradication of countless 
cultures under the dominance of the ethnic majorities, and that their colonization of the world, if 
unchecked, would eventually result in a cultural genocide of unprecedented proportion. At the 
same time, Dugin and others proclaimed that the era of traditional warfare had passed and that 
the new battlefield in our “Era of Information” was a corresponding “War of Information” waged 
through twenty-first century media. Dugin's prescription fit in well with processes that had been 
ongoing in Russian society, politics, and media.
1.3 Russian Government and Media
Dugin's synthesis of an active information campaign and a strong story of Eurasianism 
lie at the heart of this thesis. Mass media serves as an indirect entry point for analyzing the often 
inscrutable thinking of the Kremlin under the Putin regime. The current mass media landscape, 
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while not under direct censorship as it was during the Soviet Era, is still precisely orchestrated to 
advance certain themes such as the territorial integrity of Russia, the uniting force of a strangely 
secularized Russian Orthodox Church, and the supreme patriarchal infallibility of President 
Putin. These concepts have been reinforced through violent intimidation, including the murder of 
several journalists who questioned the basis for Russia's intrusion in Georgia in 2008, for 
example. Russian journalists, following a Soviet tradition of searching the top for hints of the 
official party line, largely follow in step in a process of self-censorship that bypasses any official 
regulatory agency. Journalists become (sometimes unwitting) agents in their civilizational 
mission of Eurasianism established by the central government, a role that puts them in opposition 
to their western counterparts, who see themselves as a check on the power of the government.
In fact, this media intimidation plays a role in a broader history of what many view as the 
large scale information war between the east, embodied by Russia, and the West, most 
prominently embodied by the United States. The official Russian National Security Concept, as 
well as Russia's Arctic Strategy, emphasize the use of mass media to highlight Russia's common 
values. According to Russia's National Security Strategy, these values are “the family, creative 
labor, service to the homeland, the norms of morals and morality, humanism, charity, fairness, 
mutual assistance, collectivism, the historical unity of the peoples of Russia, and the continuity 
of our motherland's history,”8 which will oppose nefarious efforts by an unnamed enemy 
(though presumably the United States) to introduce corrupting values to Russian society. The 
Russian government views its forty-one Indigenous groups, despite their differences, as 
8
Russian National Security Strategy to 2020. Adopted December 31, 2015. Section 78. Accessed December 1, 
2018. http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security- 
Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf
8
embodying these traditional, communitarian values in concert with the dominant Russian 
ethnicity.
Russia's information strategy is not just defensive, however. Russian media also gives 
inordinate attention to the Indigenous Peoples of another continent that has a similar history of 
interaction between the peoples and the national government: the United States. While giving the 
poor material conditions of Native Americans their due, Kremlin-aligned media pay particular 
attention to the political disenfranchisement of Native Americans. News items covering 
secessionist movements, in particular, draw attention of the Russian media, who paint an 
America at the verge of implosion, largely due to Native American discontent.
1.4 Research Methods
The research component of this thesis analyzed five separate Kremlin-aligned print news 
media sources, and two independent sources, to identify how Eurasianist themes are or are not 
actualized in the context of Indigenous peoples. I collected data (print, Russian-language news 
articles) through a Google site search in April and May of 2018 using different variations on 
common terms in Russian that refer to Indigenous peoples. I gathered the top fifty results from 
each of the five Kremlin-aligned news sources, as well as from two independent news sources. 
Drawing on Chapter 2 of this thesis, which analyzed the intellectual history of Eurasianism as it 
relates to minority nationalities, I developed general themes for coding individual units 
(sentences or paragraphs, depending on the context). Then, in a preliminary analysis, I sharpened 
and expanded on these themes to create a comprehensive code list with detailed criteria for 
identifying the codes. Finally, I used these codes to mark themes in the articles. I used the
9
Atlas.ti program for the thematic coding which allowed for quantitative and qualitative 
exploration.
In general, many components of the Russian media's portrayal of Indigenous peoples 
resembled Soviet era depictions: happy, empowered Natives in Russia counterposed with the 
impoverished and oppressed Natives in the U.S. But other unexpected contrasts emerged in the 
Russian media's portrayal of Russian and American Natives. One of the most unexpected 
findings, Kremlin-aligned sources hinted at underlying affinities between Native Americans and 
the Indigenous Peoples of Russia. United by cultural attributes including language and 
communitarian values, Native Americans are suggested to be a latent force of the Eurasian 
civilization, from genetic studies that tie Native Americans to a Siberian homeland (although not 
to a specific modern Siberian people), to the prevalence of Russian Orthodoxy and language in 
Alaska (which is actually quite limited). While short on hard evidence of political affinities, 
Russian media sources suggest that Native Americans and Alaska Natives desire to join the 
civilizational model of Eurasia, which, while patriarchal, offers protection instead of 
exploitation. The media coverage suggests an imaginary expansionism of the Eurasian idea, 
fulfilling Eurasianists' insistence on Russia's destiny of territorial expansion without physically 
expanding borders through invasion.
The narrative of an organically unified people of the continent of Eurasia resonates with 
both Indigenous and the majority Russians by conveying a sense of trust and a sense of worth, 
which political scientist Roger Smith argues are the two necessary ingredients for a successful 
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political narrative.9 The Kremlin's political narrative gives minorities in Russia a promise that 
their cultures will be protected from the destructive forces of western globalism. The Kremlin 
conveys a sense of worth through Eurasianism's vision of a larger civilizational project that 
supersedes their individual cultural uniqueness through the power of working together. Still, 
empowering narrative is largely realized on paper only. Indigenous peoples in Russia suffer from 
some of the worst rates in the country of alcoholism, poverty, and political disempowerment in 
the last decades,10 as well as ongoing language and cultural loss among Indigenous minorities in 
Russia.11 The suspension of RAIPON in 2012 was particularly troublesome for Indigenous rights 
activists--who saw it as an attack on the political standing of Indigenous peoples in Russia--but it 
was entirely unreported in Kremlin-aligned media. Coverage by more independent and western- 
funded media was accessible, but lacked depth in outlets such as Radio Svoboda, a U.S. State­
Department-funded, and independent Russian language news agency. Furthermore, the U.S. 
Agency for Global Media Funding, through which Russian-language agencies are funded, only 
in 2016 launched its first television channel in Russia.12 The Russian language service of the 
U.S. Agency for Global Media funding continues to see its budget decrease13 amid larger-scale 
cuts to the State Department. More information on the shortcomings of the Russian government 
9 Roger Smith. Stories of Peoplehood: the politics and morals of political membership. (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) 58.
10 Johannes Rohr. Indigenous Peoples in the Russian Federation. International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. 
Report 18, 2014. Accessed November 8, 2018.
https://www.iwgia.org/images/publications//0695_HumanRights_report_18_Russia.pdf
11 “Vladenie yazikami naseleniem korennykh malochislennykh narodov Rossiyskoi Federatsii.” (’’Fluency of 
language of Indigenous, small-numbered people of the Russian Federation,”) Russian Census 2010. 2120-2031. 
Accessed October 26, 2018.
12 Broadcasting Board of Governors FY 2019 Congressional Budget Justification.” February 12 2018, 1, Accessed 
December 1, 2018. https://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2018/02/BBGBudget_FY19_CBJ_2-7-18_Final.pdf
1313 Broadcasting Board of Governors, FY 2019, 56
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in its treatment of Indigenous Peoples could pressure the Kremlin to improve political and social 
conditions for Indigenous peoples.
In a more academic sense, this thesis challenges readers to consider how Russia views its 
minority peoples differently than the West, which can help elucidate the divergent paths that 
Indigenous rights have taken in the two hemispheres. Whereas Indigenous peoples in the West 
are seen as semi-autonomous political entities who forcibly or voluntarily were submitted to the 
trusteeship of the U.S. federal government, in Russia they are viewed as an integral part of the 
fabric of society. While placed below ethnic Russians in the hierarchy of peoples, they are 
nonetheless historically, economically, and spiritually part of Russia's society. While they often 
suffer from poor social and economic conditions, their sacrifice is seen as a precondition for the 
future greatness of the Eurasian civilization. This study will thus contribute to the understanding 
of how governments build stories of nations and peoples in the context of increasing 
international consciousness of Indigenous people's rights.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review on Eurasianism and the Ethnos
2.1 Introduction
Various scholars and advocates have described Eurasianism as a “worldview,” a 
“movement,” a “philosophy,” a “science,” or a “pseudo-science.” A highly complex ideology 
that both explains and is explained by geography, politics, cosmology, linguistics, and 
ethnography has only started to be appreciated by Western Kremlinologists largely only focused 
on it as a economic alternative to a European and North American focused Atlanticism. Its 
official beginnings date back to the 1920s in the Russian intellectual emigre community in Sofia, 
Bulgaria, when Russian academics, exiled by the new Bolshevik government, used their 
newfound theory as a “repository for their bitterness,” and as a large-scale “therapy,” in the 
words of Charles Clover,14 to come to terms with losing the country they loved. Seventy years 
later, Eurasianism enjoyed a Post-Cold War resurgence during perestroika, when the next 
generation of Eurasian ideologues faced similar feelings of disruption and loss when the Soviet 
Union disintegrated. Eurasianism is specific to space as well. Focusing on the continent of 
Eurasia, it celebrates and explains the complexity of and predicted a great destiny for the 
supercontinent, while ignoring other geographic areas. In this way, its abstract ideological tenets 
must be balanced with an appreciation for the specific time and place in which it operates.
14 Clover, Black Wind, 10
Nonetheless, Eurasianism has identifiable ideological underpinnings. Most 
fundamentally, it posits that the continent of Eurasia plays a special place in the development of 
civilization, that the Russian people play a special role in uniting the diverse peoples of that 
continent, and that Eurasia has a special duty to oppose the “West's” hegemony. It is a “Manifest 
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Destiny” for Eurasia, but in the context of a continent already explored and colonized and based 
not on the spirit of the Old Testament, but on foundations of supposedly empirical evidence. 
Using validated scientific principles of twentieth century structuralism applied to social topics, 
Eurasianism created a framework with which to understand social processes that Eurasianists 
believed were universally applicable, but that pointed to an exceptionalism of the historical 
residents of the Eurasian continent.
But “Eurasianism” as a structure is also hard to define. There is no founding text of 
Eurasianism to which we can return for clarification or confirmation; instead, proponents 
advocate for their own versions, using whichever past thinkers best suit their purposes. Indeed, 
some who are identified as Eurasianists in fact are ambiguous about whether they subscribe to 
the philosophy, although others may celebrate their writings as such. From the very beginning, 
thinkers argued over whether the uniting force of Eurasia was geographic, linguistic, or even 
cosmic and asserted that their understanding was the most up-to-date and scientific. It has thus 
been a protean ideology--an empty signifier that could easily soak up the vicissitudes of the time. 
It can be an easy vehicle for racism and nationalism (pejoratives with which it is usually 
associated in the West), but is egalitarian and inclusive at its core. In any case, internal Russian 
discussions of Eurasianism's true nature are far from trivial and are often acrimonious. 
Nevertheless, scholars have asserted that Eurasianism merits study as a cohesive, if sometimes 
fought-over, ideology, and one that has become increasingly relevant in recent years.
Despite internal tensions, Eurasianism asserts broad implications for society, and to 
proponents it functions as a meta-philosophy of sorts. Not only does the ideology contain a 
specific way of understanding the nature of Eurasian society, it encompasses spirituality, 
14
cosmology, and politics, and contains prescriptive suggestions for geopolitics, economics, and 
nationalities policies. It also asserts, at least to most proponents, an almost theological 
naturalness of and inevitability of Eurasia. Russia, the flag-bearer for Eurasia, is destined to 
become a great power standing in opposition to the “West” to preserve a certain set of (more 
righteous) values in a sort of Manichean struggle. Some of the arguments may seem 
contradictory to the close reader, leading some scholars to label it a “pseudo-science,”15 but 
adherents in Russia interpret the theory as an established fact. Proponents thus can argue that 
standing in the way of the inevitable drift of the Eurasianist current runs contrary to Nature, and 
thus any means are justified to remove the obstacles.
15 Laruelle, Marlene. Russian Eurasianism : An Ideology of Empire. (Washington, D.C. : Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press: 2008), 10.
Clover, Black Wind, 145.
Schmidt, Matthew. “Is Putin Pursuing a Policy of Eurasianism?” Demokratizatsiya 13, no. 1 (Winter 2005), 94, 
accessed September 15 2018. http://demokratizatsiya.pub/archives/13_1_Y35592282447U832.pdf
Finally, it should be noted that the goal of this analysis of Eurasianism and neo­
Eurasianism has been to elucidate the role of nationalities within the Eurasian/Russian polity and 
their perceptions of nationalities/ethnicities in the rest of the world, particularly the West. As 
such, many interesting aspects of Eurasianism have been condensed or omitted in order to focus 
on Eurasianism's conception of nationalities and civilizations.
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2.2 Early Eurasianism
2.2.1 Nikolai Trubetskoy
Nikolai Trubetskoy, one of the founders of ur-Eurasianism, was born in 1890 in Moscow 
to one of the wealthiest aristocratic families in tsarist Russia. He immediately showed a keen 
intellect, publishing his first academic paper by the time he was fourteen, and at seventeen he 
began more serious comparative historical-linguistic study of Northern Caucasian and Chukotka- 
Kamchatka languages. By the time he was twenty-four, Trubetskoy taught linguistics at Moscow 
University while pursuing the then-novel discipline of phonology. He was developing a 
revolutionary theory about the nature of language evolution, when his studies were put abruptly 
on hold by the rattlings of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. He was first forced into the 
Caucuses, and in 1920 was deported to Bulgaria along with his family, where he struggled to 
find an outlet for his intellectual energies.
Despite his trouble securing an academic base from which to conduct research and 
analysis, Trubetskoy's passion for his phonological studies was strong, and he continued to 
develop his new model of phonological evolution. In letters to his friend and fellow Eurasianist 
Roman Jakobson, Trubetskoy attacked the idea that languages change only when acted upon by 
an outside force (i.e. migration from outside, a geographic separation, or political conflict), and 
instead posited that languages follow a natural progression independent from outside forces. He 
saw this in his field of phonology, which focused on the relationships among different sounds 
(phonemes) instead of viewing the phonemes as units in themselves. When a language changes, 
Trubetskoy suspected, the individual phonemes shift in a certain, predictable direction within 
each system. Instead of studying the new sounds as individual units in themselves, Trubetskoy 
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focused on the relationship of the first sound to the second sound--where it was produced in the 
mouth or its voicing--which could be analyzed itself.16 The relationship of the sounds thus 
became the unit of analysis instead of the sound itself. As Clover explains in his study of 
Eurasianism, language “moves on a completely separate plane of existence from history, 
changing, spreading, expanding and dying out according to its own internal ‘systemic' logic.”17 
Like a river flowing towards the sea, languages have directionality, and while they can braid and 
diverge, they also can merge from separate sources, according to Eurasianism.
16 Clover, Black Wind, 45-47.
17 Clover, Black Wind, 46.
18 Clover, Black Wind, 35
19 Clover, Black Wind, 47
While Trubetskoy's ideas “would revolutionize twentieth century linguistics,”18 
according to Clover, they also led Trubetskoy to ponder the broader consequences this principle 
might have on societies as a whole. In letters to his friend Roman Jakobson, Trubetskoy 
speculated on possible applications to other fields of study, such as literature, art, mythology, and 
culture, each bound by a unique internal organizing system19 with laws analogous to those he had 
found in linguistics. Trubetskoy thus endorsed a similar structuralism that social scientists such 
as Claude Levi-Strauss and Noam Chomsky popularized later in the century. In Trubetskoy's 
musings, the history of art, for example, could be seen not as a celebration of the DaVincis and 
Picassos of history, but as a natural progression of some internal logic towards an equilibrium. 
Individual actors, in this view of history, dissipate into the larger forces of “natural” progression 
bound by mathematical laws subject to the system in which they operate. In this sense it was 
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similar to the Marxism that was gripping the Soviet Union, though it lacked the economic 
determinism and replaced it with a culturally based understanding of political entities.
But if all of these fields in global human society were bound by the same “systemic” 
rules, wouldn't all differences--linguistic or otherwise--among the diverse peoples eventually be 
washed away by the equilibrium-seeking forces? Trubetskoy here made an interesting 
supposition to arrive at the opposite conclusion. Suggesting a sort of geographical determinism, 
Trubetskoy posited that subtle variations in DNA caused by interactions with landscapes explain 
how some cultures become distinct while others converge. If a group of people inhabits an 
organic geographic whole, it will necessarily result in a unique system bound by its own unique 
systemic rules that will gradually lead to the convergence of underlying cultural attributes. If the 
groups span unbridgeable geographic barriers--as in the case of the mountainous Caucuses--the 
culture can never truly coexist as a cohesive social unit. Therefore, according Trubetskoy, certain 
Slavic countries such as Poland and the Balkans operated within distinct systemic laws from 
those of Eurasia.
Trubetskoy saw language as a lens through which to understand how these systems 
function independently. Drawing on his knowledge of the diverse languages of Russia, 
Trubetskoy developed an idea of a widespread group spread across the continent, which he 
called the “Eurasian Language Union,” whose cultural analogue he called the “Eurasian Cultural 
Conglomerate.”20 Trubetskoy's work in linguistics with phoneme shifts illustrated his concept of 
common systemic laws binding the outwardly diverse Eastern Slavic, Turkic, and Finno-Ugric 
languages of the Eurasian continent and gradually bringing them to a common destiny of 
20 Clover, Black Wind, 47
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grammatical and phonemic parallels. Moreover, by analyzing these rules, Trubetskoy claimed he 
could determine that the subconscious system of the Eurasian continent “imparts a cultural 
stability and force to the nation, upholds cultural and historical continuity, and creates the 
conditions for an economy of the nation's strength.”21
21 Trubetskoy, quoted and translated by Laruelle Russian Eurasianism, 37
22 Nikolai Trubetskoy. “Verkhi i nizhy russkoi kultury” (“Highs and lows of Russian Culture”), in Iskhod k vostoku. 
(Turn to the East). Sofia, Bulgaria: 1921. Published online at Gumilevica. Accessed September 19, 2018. Translated 
by author. http://gumilevica.kulichki.net/TNS/tns09.htm
23 Trubetskoy Verkhi 1921
24 Trubetskoy Verkhi 1921
25 Trubetskoy Verkhi 1921
Culturally, Trubetskoy used dance patterns (unlike European folk dancing; Russian folk 
dances historically lacked a male-female coupling)22, religious etymology (which Trubetskoy 
identified as having more in common with Proto-Iranian than with Indo European languages)23, 
and music (Trubetskoy claimed that Russian folk music until recently used a pentatonic scale 
borrowed from China)24 to argue for a shared destiny of nations.25 Although he noted several 
instances of Russian folk culture adopting European cultural characteristics, he tellingly ascribed 
them not to a shared cultural destiny with Europe, but to prove that European civilization was 
using its superior technology and economics to upend the natural inclination of the Eurasian 
civilization.
Importantly, this new idea marked a shift away from the usual nationalism and racism 
that informed earlier ideologies. One ideological precursor was the Pan-Slavic movement of the 
nineteenth century, which propounded a uniquely racial conception of a Slavic state that would 
unite the Slavic people of the Balkans, Belarus, Ukraine, with Russia at the center. Trubetskoy 
explicitly denounced this view. A civilization is formed not from a common genetic origin, but 
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from an essential convergence of cultural and linguistic characteristics, he claimed. “In the 
Russian educational community, there is a widespread conviction that all of the unique 
characteristics of this image are ‘Slavic.' This is incorrect,”26 he wrote in an essay in Turn to the 
East, a collection of Eurasianist essays published in Sofia, Bulgaria in 1921. Instead, the Russian 
cultural space receives at least as many of its cultural identifiers not through a shared language 
with the Slavs of the Balkans (not to mention a shared Europeanness), but through its physical 
connection to the East, particularly with the Turkic people of the Southern border and the Finno- 
Ugric peoples farther North. Trubetskoy acknowledged some cultural similarities with the 
Balkans of Eastern Europe, but argued that this is as much a result of the shared influence of 
Turkey, not a more deep-rooted historic cultural affinity.27 “The Russians, together with the 
Finno-Ugric peoples and the Volga Turkic peoples make up a unique cultural zone,” he 
concluded.28
26 Trubetskoy Verkhi 1921
27 Trubetskoy Verkhi
28 Trubetskoy Verkhi
29 Lasha Tchantouridze. “Eurasianism: In Search of Russia's Political Identity: A Review Essay.” 
Perspectives, no. 16 (2001): 76. Accessed September 25, 2018 http://www.jstor.org/stable/23615879
30 Quoted in Tchantouridze, Eurasianism, 76
Despite his celebration of the unique cultural contributions of Finno-Ugric, Turkic, and 
Turanian people, Eurasianists were not calling for movements for self-determination within a 
Russian imperial system.29 “National liberation movements,” he wrote, “often contain socialism, 
which always contains elements of cosmopolitanism and internationalism.”30 Trubetskoy's 
linguistics showed him scientific proof of the common destinies of the peoples of Eurasia, and 
any effort to disrupt this natural drift through political movements was an upending of a natural 
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order of things, equivalent to suggesting that one should try to stop a river from flowing into the 
sea. Trubetskoy's Eurasianism represented an inevitable result of systemic laws at work, as well 
as a justification for imposing those laws.
2.2.2 Peter Savitsky
Petr Savitsky, one of the exiles who published essays in the Turn to the East in 1921, 
shared this view of the special character of the Russia/Eurasia, but he combined with it a more 
explicit, geological justification of Russia. Also from an aristocratic family, he arrived in Sofia at 
the same time as Trubetskoy. Savitsky studied geography and soil studies in Saint Petersburg 
University, which led him to speculate on the nature of the Eurasian polity from a geological 
standpoint, though he also claimed aesthetic and anthropomorphic justifications for Russia. In his 
article, “The Geographic and Geopolitical Foundations of Eurasia,” Savitsky explained how 
Russia acts as a bridge between the West and East, calling Russia the “torso” of the Old World. 
Unlike the rugged coasts and the steep granite aspects of Europe and Southern Asia, Eurasia 
forms a united geographic symmetry, suggesting that despite its distinct geographic zones, the 
gradual nature of the change in terrain makes it a more organic whole. “Nowhere,” he wrote, 
“are the transitions between zonal systems more [...] symmetrical than in Russia-Eurasia.” Even 
the chemical composition of the soil provided evidence of the wholeness of Eurasia, he wrote: 
“the amount of calcium and the percentage of humus symmetrically decline as one moves to both 
North and South of the black-earth zone,” located in the middle of the country.31
31 Petr Nikolaevich Savitsky. “Geograficheskye i geopoliticheskye osnovy evraziistva.”
(“Geographic and geopolitical foundations of Eurasianism”), in Iskhod k vostoku (Turn to the East). Sofia, Bulgaria:
1921, accessed September 18, 2018. Translation by author. http://gumilevica.kulichki.net/SPN/spn05.htm
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Because of this geographic unity, Savitsky assumed a natural and pragmatic political 
unity. Unlike Europe where the “mosaic-fragmented geography promotes the development of 
isolated, closed-off little worlds,”32 Eurasia's “nature is not conducive to various forms of 
separatism.”33 Savitsky argued that Eurasia's geographic wholeness, as well as pragmatic 
economic considerations, contributed to its natural unity. Savitsky pointed out that the peoples in 
the boreal forest had to rely on produce from farther South, since there was no arable land for 
thousands of kilometers of forest and that conversely, the people of the Mongolian desserts relied 
on the people farther North for timber and furs to create a historically integrated economic 
system. To Savitsky, this “brotherhood of peoples” profoundly shaped Eurasia. “Here there is no 
opposition between the ‘higher' and ‘lower' races”; he writes in The Geographical and 
Geopolitical Foundations of Eurasia, “Here the mutual attraction between races is always 
greater than the forces of division--here it is easy to awake the ‘will to accomplish a mutual 
goal.'”34 The diverse peoples needed to submit to the more central, though ill-defined, messianic 
mission of the Russian Empire.
32 Savitsky, Geograficheskie
33 Savitsky, Geograficheskie
34 Savitsky, Geograficheskie
35 Savitsky, Geograficheskie
In addition to the geographic, cultural, and economic unity of the diverse peoples of 
Eurasia, Savitsky also stressed a spiritual unity, though with a special patriarchal touch. “In the 
Russian peasant masses, one finds a noticeable sympathetic draw towards the peasant masses of 
the East, an organic brotherhood between the Orthodox and the nomadic or pariahs of Asia. 
Russia, in its core is an Orthodox-Muslim and an Orthodox-Buddhist country.”35 The high level 
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of spirituality among the Russian peasantry and attraction towards the ritual were evidence of an 
affinity towards what he perceived as the East. Savitsky viewed Orthodoxy's draw towards the 
ritualistic and mystical as an influence from the Eastern Civilizations, but was careful always to 
place Orthodoxy first in the hyphenation.
Savitsky also popularized a geopolitical prescription for the fulfillment of the Eurasianist 
vision. Using the theories of the British philosopher-geopolitician Halford Mackinder, who 
posited that global geopolitics had been dominated by “Rimland” states bordering the oceans, 
while the global “Heartland” lagged far behind economically and politically, Savitsky suggested 
Russia has a special role in global history. To Savitsky, Russia's geographic positioning, while 
inconveniently offering minimal ocean access, also reaffirmed its special place in the world's 
geopolitical balance, since it gave Russia a chance to conceive of a unique identity separate from 
the “Rimland” powers.36 Savitsky lived through the better part of the twentieth century to see 
Mackinder's theories manifested during the Cold War, and he planted the seed of Eurasianism's 
anti-Westernism that would flower in the twenty-first century.
2.2.3 Georgii Florovski
Although he was not especially prominent among the original Eurasian philosophers and 
left the movement early, Georgii Florovski made some interesting points about the nature of 
Indigenous Peoples (in his parlance, ‘non-historical peoples') that touch on the spirit of 
Eurasianism. In his essay “On non-historical people,” Florovski divided the different cultures 
into ‘historical peoples'--those responsible for the bulk of the events of world history, and the 
‘non-historical peoples'--those who were overlooked in world history and/or were new to it.
36Tchantouridze, Eurasianism, 76.
23
Florovski emphasized the prevalence of non-historical people in Russia, whom he foresaw as 
overtaking the staid, aging historical cultures, of whom, he wrote in 1921 “all strength is 
expended on their grandfathers' riches and the upkeep of the museum's treasures.”37 It was the 
“young,” “non-historical” peoples, then, who would inevitably leap over the progress of the 
“historical” people in order to complete what Florovski called the “only ‘law' of life: that the 
young should always push out the old.”38 3940Florovski implied that the ethnic Russian people are 
young, at least compared to the cultures of Europe, but that an even greater power in the future 
will be the “non-historical” people of Siberia and the Russian North. These groups thus play a 
vital role in the future of the Russian civilization on a global scale, in his vision.
37 Georgii Florovski “O narodakh ne-istoricheskikh” (“On non-historical peoples”), in Iskhod k Vostoku (Turn to the 
East). Sofia, Bulgaria: 1921, accessed September 18, 2018. http://gumilevica.kulichki.net/SPN/spn05.htm
38 Florovski, O narodakh.
39 Tchantouridze notes that this multi-ethnic character is in fact historically correct of Russia, where leaders and 
visionaries of different nationalities had played a large role in the historical narrative, though he points out that 
Florovsky ignores the role that European figures had in this development
40 Tchantouridze, Eurasianism, 75-76
Florovski was also keen to emphasize the role that non-ethnic Russians had played in the 
formation of the Russian identity, a novel concept at the time of rising nationalism,3940 and ties 
this in with the idea of the “young,” rising peoples of Siberia. Florovski suggested that societies 
and nations are essentially larger scale embodiments of individuals, and that their youthful vigor 
will inevitably and viciously overtake the aging elders. The article implies that Russia has both 
an altruistic and a pragmatic duty to protect these “non-historical” peoples and integrate them 
into the larger civilization so that when their time comes, the entire entity will rise. If the Russian 
nation could succeed in protecting its minorities, the minorities would become the drivers of the 
next era of historical action. Interestingly, Florovski also included the peoples of Far Western 
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America--apparently the Western frontiersmen, though he did not elaborate--who had freed 
themselves of the grasp of Romano-German culture that to Florovski embodied the old and 
rotten world of Europe. While this idea can be seen to vindicate the American project, it does not 
preclude antagonism between the rising fortunes of the “non-historical” peoples--Americans and 
Russians. Later, Eurasianists would expand on these antagonisms between the West and the East, 
which they would see as equally powerful in an archetypical clash of civilizations. Florovski's 
focus on “non-historical” peoples established the importance of Indigenous Peoples within the 
Russian polity within the Eurasianist paradigm.
2.2.4 Analysis of Early Eurasianism
Because scholars, particularly Laruelle, have emphasized the discontinuity between the 
original and post-Soviet Eurasianists (whom she calls the “Neo-Eurasianists”), it is important to 
appreciate the significance of the original Eurasianists. Their ideas proved, at least to some 
extent to be true, as Tchantouridze and Clover argue. These early theoreticians correctly 
predicted the rise of America as a superpower, the rise of Russia (despite their misgivings about 
the Soviet Union), and the ultimate incompatibility between the atheistic Soviet Union and the 
essentially spiritual Orthodox Russians.41 The realization of their predictions surely confirmed to 
later Eurasianists the righteousness of their path, as well as a feeling of the inevitability of an 
even greater Russia, now that it had shaken the strict ideological yoke of the Soviet Union and 
could return to its essential, organic nature. Moreover, early Eurasianists established a rigorous 
scholarly groundwork for a philosophy that would later be used to justify Eurasian mythology 
and occultism, lending it an air of academic credence.
41 Tchantouridze Eurasianism, 78, and Clover, Black Wind, 29
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More ideologically, the original Eurasianists were the first to break the strict ethnic or 
racially prescriptive form of the Eurasian polity that earlier Pan-Slavists propounded. Instead of 
insistence on a Pan-Slavic brotherhood that would include the Balkans, Belarus, and Poland, 
among others, the Eurasian definition absorbed the Finno-Ugric and Turkic peoples of the 
Eurasian continent, celebrating their unique national characteristics and contributions to the 
history and future of Russia. Florovski's inclusion of “non-historical” peoples in his writing 
further emphasized the diversity of cultures and their development within Russia. Although these 
writers always placed Russians as a binding force within this polity, the new idea was 
progressive in theory and was explicitly created to stand against the colonial nature of Europe at 
the time, which they saw as violently conquering non-dominant cultures in a Darwinian struggle. 
The early Eurasianists, although less prone than today's neo-Eurasianists to cheap jabs at the 
West, laid the groundwork for subsequent re-interpretations that emphasized a global struggle 
between holiness and godlessness on a global stage. During Russia's twenty-first century 
rebranding, it drew on Eurasianism to claim a holy calling juxtaposed with the West's 
godlessness.
2.3 The bridge Eurasianist: Lev Gumilev
Lev Gumilev, the son of the celebrated poet Anna Akhmatova, was not particularly fond 
of calling himself a Eurasianist, but a new generation of Russians view his ideas as the foremost 
academic vindication of the current Eurasianist movement. Gumilev's popularization of the 
terms ethnos, superethnos and passionarnost', among others, have been adopted into mainstream 
political and academic discourse, while Russians and residents of other former Soviet republics 
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celebrate his image. Gumilev, according to Marlene Laruelle of the Woodrow Wilson Center for 
International Scholars, “occupies a colossal place in school and university textbooks” in Russia 
as well as in autonomous regions of the Russian Federation and former Soviet Republics, and his 
ideas are seen as above reproach and in themselves the justification for research institutes and 
scientific articles.42 His elevated status puzzles Westerners, but the historical environment in 
which he lived explains much.
Born in 1912 to famous parents, Lev ran crossed the Soviet regime in 1937 when he 
approved of a subversive poem and was torn away from a heartbroken mother and sentenced to 
ten years of hard labor in Siberia. While Akhmatova mourned her lost son in one of her most 
famous poems ‘Requiem,' Gumilev was laying the foundations for a new paradigm in thinking 
about cultures as he observed his fellow inmates interact in the Spartan conditions of the Siberian 
North, deprived of any comforts and short on food. Despite the Darwinian conditions in the 
camp, he noticed that his fellow convicts, instead of reverting to self-interested greediness, 
formed into bands of just four or five men, whose members seemed willing to give their last 
crust of bread to failing comrades even when it diminished their own slim chances of survival. 
The willingness for self-sacrifice struck Gumilev, who saw that the more each band was willing 
to sacrifice for one another, the more likely it was to survive the harsh winter. In fact, it was not 
the individual who was fighting for Darwinian survival but the band of prisoners who had 
formed naturally without kinship or racial ties and without direction from above. In principal, he 
reasoned, this illustrated the same bonding impulses that larger societies exhibited.
42 Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism, 50-55
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Gumilev wondered what made certain societies, like the Macedonians under Alexander 
the Great, set out to conquer most of the known world, when clearly they could not hold that 
territory—and they had no incentive to suffer such hardships for relatively little reward. 
Gumilev's “eureka” moment came when he realized there must be some internal impulse 
motivating certain people--like Alexander the Great--to sacrifice their beings in the name of a 
higher cause, namely “posthumous honor.”43 He gave this impulse a name, passionarnost, which 
is usually translated in English as passionarity, a word that would later acquire “dog whistle” 
status under the Putin regime.44 To Gumilev, the key to understanding the rise and fall of 
civilizations was to understand that they arose when a high amount of passionarity was 
concentrated in one single band, igniting the impulse for self-sacrifice as a means of achieving 
eternal recognition, as Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan had done. From this idea Gumilev 
began to analyze the history of the peoples of the Eurasian steppe, on whom he had focused 
previous academic research, and--in a rather reflexive argument--justified the existence of the 
Russian/Soviet state, essentially arguing that we are great because we are destined for greatness, 
and we are destined for greatness because we are great.
43 Clover, Black Wind, 94
44 Clover, Black Wind, 94
Without initially knowing it, he had stumbled into the paradigm of Savitsky and 
Trubetskoy, with whom he could not communicate due to his imprisonment. It was not until 
1957, after Gumilev had been somewhat politically rehabilitated and was working in the library 
of the Hermitage in Leningrad, that he met Savitsky who introduced him to Eurasianism (though 
Laruelle claims that Gumilev had discovered some of the theories through a former professor at 
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university in the 1930s).45 Savitsky had been impressed with a Gumilev article from 1949 in 
which he found an inherent “Eurasianness” in Gumilev's celebration of the Mongol and Turkic 
people. According to Clover, Gumilev “eagerly adopted virtually all of the old Eurasianist's 
views,” possibly in order to compensate for psychological trauma caused in the prison camps.46 
His writings, which until then had been politically neutral, began to take on distinctly anti­
Western views.
45 Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism, 57
46 Clover, Black Wind, 115
47 Alexander Sergeevich Titov. “Lev Gumilev, Ethnogenesis, and Eurasianism.” (PhD dissertation,
University College, London, 2005). Accessed September 19, 2018. 59-62. 
http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1446515/1/U602440.pdf
In 1970, Gumilev submitted perhaps his most influential piece in his dissertation, 
Ethnogenesis and the Human Biosphere, which would create a new lexicon for Russia to discuss 
states and people. Disregarding previous conceptions of “ethnicities” and “races” so prevalent in 
Europe, Gumilev instead proposed the term ethnos, which, though occurring naturally and bound 
by a uniting force of energy, lacked any sort of racial basis, just as he had seen with his fellow 
prisoners in the Gulag. Previous Soviet scholars had suggested that ethnos was wired into 
genetics, or that the concept was entirely socially constructed, with no basis in reality. Gumilev 
essentially split the difference between the two, arguing that although ethnos was a naturally 
occurring, inescapable, and essential part of one's identity (i.e. you could not join another 
ethnos), it was determined by behavioral conformism in the early stages of one's life.47
He also rejected the Soviet idea of ethnos as a people bound with some uniting 
characteristic--language, genetics, or a cultural tradition--and instead emphasized the 
relationships of people within the ethnos to one another, and their dialectic development with the 
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natural environment around them.48 In Ethnogenesis, Gumilev sought to explain how such an 
ethnos can form and develop, theorizing that when put into contact through a shared geographic 
landscape--as was the case with the Eurasian landmass, or in his Siberian Gulag--a group 
naturally forms bonds of fraternity and is willing to sacrifice for the other. The only difference 
between the micro and macro examples were the units of collectivization: in the Gulag the units 
were individuals, while in Eurasia, the units were different peoples. Correspondingly, he gave 
the terms ethnos and superethnos. In both, bonds formed not as a result of ethnicity or race but as 
a consequence of the unique geographic conditions of a space, forming a unique “rhythm” of 
shared history and destiny.49 They were in this sense the real units of the social sciences, akin to 
an individual in Western thought, with immutable bonds that could only be broken through 
dying. Gumilev also posited a sub-ethnos, which corresponded to smaller groups who shared 
manners and traditions, such as the Old Believers, the Cossacks, and presumably the Small- 
Numbered People of the North, though he did not name them specifically. He did, however, 
assert that the more subethnoi, the stronger the superethnoi would be.50
48 Titov, Lev Gumilev, 62-63.
49 Clover, Black Wind, 135
50 Titov, Lev Gumilev, 71
Gumilev's argument explained Russia's greatness and its destiny to endure. Given an 
injection of passionarity at founding, he posited that a superethnos would expand until its 
psychological energy was exhausted in its lifespan of approximately 1,200 years. The basis for 
the creation of these bonds was a burst of cosmic energy, a proposition that would earn Gumilev 
the scorn of colleagues and undermine his legitimacy as a scientist to Western researchers. 
Gumilev traced the founding of the Russian/Eurasian ethnos to Russia's battle with the Mongol 
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horde at Kulikovo in 1380, which he reinterprets as a civil war of the Mongols in which the 
Russians joined the victorious side. Of course, this conveniently placed Russia at the height of its 
1,200-year lifespan during the twenty-first century.51
51 Clover, Black Wind, 139
52 Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism, 54
53 Delineated in Stalin's 1936 Constitution of the three separate stages of peoplehood--progressing from a “tribe” to 
a “people” and finally to the status of “nation,” before being dissolved by a recognition of the worldwide unity of 
social classes.
54 Clover, Black Wind, 141
Although the word ethnos had arisen in the Soviet Union before his dissertation, 
Gumilev's work made the word ubiquitous during the 1980s and 1990s as the Soviet Union fell 
apart. Even though his dissertation was officially attacked in the press and banned from 
publication, his monograph, after having been deposited in the Institute for Scientific and 
Technical Information, became the most requested in the Soviet Union before it was published in 
1989,52 despite the fact that his theory flouted the orthodox Marxist view of the progression of 
people.53 Gumilev's ideology, as many have noted, “seems to have grown in direct proportion to 
the waning appeal of communism,”54 which ironically coincided with the ultimate refutation of 
the veracity of his arguments, as republic after republic declared independence.
Gumilev's importance to our purposes are twofold: his popularization of the Eurasianist 
idea of a unified continental civilization, and his consolidation of a lexicon for their expression in 
public discourse. As mentioned above, Gumilev's ideas were widely requested by academic 
journals, and began to take the place of the rigid Marxist ideology in the waning days of the 
Soviet Union. In the 1980s, as the Soviet Union began to disintegrate with centrifugal forces of 
nationalism, Gumilev's theories offered a “scientific” justification for the polity's continued 
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existence as a cohesive unit. As republics began to declare independence, Gumilev began to 
appear on TV programs extolling the virtues of the multi-ethnic Soviet Union, and he became 
“one of the heroes of perestroika”55 as patriotic citizens grasped for reasons to preserve the status 
quo. It was a bitter irony for Gumilev that as his ideas gained wide acceptance, the polity his 
theories justified was crumbling. Nonetheless, today the publics of Russia and the former Soviet 
Republics widely revere him, particularly in Kazakhstan, where President Nursultan Nazarbaev 
(who also pursued a project aimed at the economic integration of Eurasia) named the country's 
main university after Gumilev, as well as in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan.56
55 Clover, Black Wind, 144
56 Clover, Black Wind, 145
57 Clover, Black Wind, 145
58 Clover, Black Wind, 2
59 Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism, 62
Meanwhile, nationalists adopted the vocabulary Gumilev had championed, and the rest of 
the population followed suit; the terms ethnos and passionarity remain in wide use today. The 
terms were “absorbed into the political mainstream and his theories today stand at the nexus of 
politics and power”57 used by professors and the president Putin, whose use of the term 
passionarity in 2012 signaled to many Russia's willingness to pursue a more aggressive, 
expansionist foreign policy.58 Gumilev's scholarship, at least to adherents, defined the nature of a 
people, establishing them as more concrete entities in contrast to the European view, which saw 
the individual as atomized unit of a society.59 As a prominent personality in public discourse 
until his death in 1991, Gumilev inspired a new group of intellectuals in the new post-Soviet 
Union who treated his ideas not just as science but as a quasi-prophetic groundwork for twenty- 
first century worldview.
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2.4 Neo-Eurasianism
The new ideology would come to be called “Neo-Eurasianism,” and, though it follows a 
rather tenuous line from the founders, it nonetheless shares the supposition that Eurasia is and 
must be a united ethnos that has a special mission in the history of civilization. To these original 
tenets, Neo-Eurasianism would fuel anti-Western Manichaeism, and bring in specific 
geopolitical prescriptions, while shoring up its influence over the ruling elite, particularly in the 
foreign policy realm. The two most influential and prominent proponents of Neo-Eurasianism 
are Aleksandr Dugin and Aleksandr Panarin. Dugin is the more public figure, cultivating an 
image of a mystical advisor and scholar with shrewd geopolitical acumen and an ostentatious 
commitment to Orthodoxy. Nonetheless, his writings are widely cited in foreign policy circles, 
where he has cultivated solid relationships with people in power. Panarin, meanwhile, is less 
charismatic, but his anti-Western views seem to have been adopted widely by politicians keen to 
establish a new national ideology.
2.4.1 Aleksandr Dugin
Born into a Moscow military family in 1962, Dugin rose to prominence in the capital's 
intellectual scene publishing translations of European works in right-wing journals. Clearly 
influenced by the Nouvelle Droit or “New Right” in Europe, which sought to recast Nazi and 
fascist ideas in a non-racial context, Dugin personally befriended Alain de Benoist, the 
Frenchman most identified with the movement. The New Right, while maintaining historical and 
intellectual ties to fascism, rejected ethnic based-definitions of nation-states that they believed to 
be a dead end, and instead proposed a radical, reactionary vision of the future of political 
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organization: the empire.60 The empire, as they saw it, would be ethnically heterogeneous, but 
united by a commitment to a common cause, a “vehicle for an idea, a project, a principle,” and 
led by an authoritarian leader whose vision transcended the whims of the individual nations.61 In 
the late nineties, Dugin arranged a roundtable between De Benoist and senior Russian military 
figures, after Dugin met him while traveling in Europe,62 and later co-opted (and distorted) many 
of De Benoist's arguments.63 One can note the similar visions of De Benoist and his vision for 
multi-ethnic, imperial projects, united by a certain, almost intangible reason, and the earlier 
Eurasianists, who had the same pseudo-imperial ambitions, but from the perspective of the 
Eurasian heartland.
60 Clover, Black Wind, 177
61 Clover, Black Wind, 177
62 Alan Ingram. “Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and neo-fascism in post-soviet Russia.” Political
Geography 20 (2001): 1031. Accessed September 25, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0962-6298(01)00043- 
9
63 Clover, Black Wind, 176
64 Clover, Black Wind, 236
65 Clover, Black Wind, 179
66 Anton Shekhovtsov. “The palingenetic thrust of Russian neo-eurasianism: Ideas of rebirth in
Aleksandr Dugin's worldview.” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 9 (2008): 491. Accessed September 
25, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1080/14690760802436142
Without a doubt, Dugin's most influential work has been his book The Foundations of 
Geopolitics (hereafter referred to simply as Foundations), a sprawling treatise published with the 
(disputed)64 patronage of a prominent military figure, that reads sometimes like a textbook and 
sometimes like a manifesto. Adopting Mackinder's Heartland vs. Rimland dichotomy (which 
Savitsky also used, although evidently Dugin had not read the early Eurasianists)65, Dugin more 
explicitly prescribes actions to be taken to make Eurasia a manifest entity, liberally using 
overlaid arcane cartograms and symbolism to prove his points.66 Dugin emphasizes the
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“ceaseless duel of civilizations” between the economically advanced powers of the United States 
and Britain on the one hand, and the more spiritually advanced heartland of Eurasia on the other. 
While he bases his arguments on Nazi philosopher Carl Schmitt, Dugin's arguments echo the 
Eurasianists' supposition of the naturalness of Eurasia, led by the Russian ethnos, and the
Eurasian superethnos, that has a cosmic role in opposing the West.
Figure 2.1: Map of civilizational zones including “Strategic addition,” of Baltics, Finland, Ukraine, and
Belarus.67
67 Aleksandr Dugin. Foundations of Geopolitics. Ebook. Chapter 2. Moscow: Arctogaia Center, 1997. Accessed 
September 21, 2018. https://www.geopolitica.ru/bind/geopolitika
35
In Foundations, Dugin more explicitly develops the opposition between the avaricious 
West, to whom money is the ultimate measure of success, and Eurasia, to whom territory is most 
important. Dugin relates this to the essential nature of Russia's geography, which, unlike the 
West with its sea-based international trading economy that values opening new markets for 
economic exploitation, is based on internally focused cultural and spiritual development. As 
Alan Ingram explains, “space in [Dugin's] geopolitics is analogous to money in liberal 
economics.” 68 Because of simple geopolitical misguidance, especially during the Soviet project, 
Russia/Eurasia had failed to live up to its true potential. Dugin therefore calls for a unification of 
not only the people of the former Soviet space but also of the entire bloc of “Anti-Atlanticist” 
countries whose strategic command would be centered in Moscow. Delineating the axis of power 
between Moscow, Tokyo and Berlin that would stand together against Western power, Dugin 
turns his archetypal vision of civilizations into tangible, geopolitical prescriptions that he 
advances throughout the text. Dugin continuously emphasizes the duality of his vision, claiming 
oppositions between Earth and Water, Space and Time, Tradition and Modernity, and Traditional 
Religion and Antichrist, all embodied by Russia on one hand and the U.S. on the other.69 In this 
sense, Dugin combines the mythical with the pragmatic in a way that emphasizes an inevitable 
expansionism in Russian foreign policy.
68 Ingram, Aleksandr Dugin, 1034
69 Ingram, Aleksandr Dugin, 1034
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Figure 2.2: Axis between Moscow, Ankara, Tehran, Islamabad, Deli, and Beijing.70
Although he rarely writes about Indigenous Peoples, comments to news media shed light 
on some of Dugin's views. In 2008, a few years after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine that had 
led to a pro-Western government, Russian news media began reporting on increasing nationalism 
and fascism within the government, particularly in the western Ukrainian city of Kiev. Media 
reports suggested that the Kievan government was intent on denying the rights of ethnic Tatars 
as well as Russians, both of whom were concentrated in Eastern Ukraine close to the border with 
Russia. During this time, Dugin was interviewed as a quasi-political representative, as he 
asserted a sort of super-governmental authority to protect the Tatars whose rights ostensibly were 
being violated in Ukraine.
I met earlier with the leaders of the Crimean Tatars who are living now in Turkey, and 
they told me that the Ukrainian government is creating the most unfavorable conditions 
for the preservation of the Crimean-Tatar ethnos, and asked me the question of whether *
70 Dugin, Foundations, Chapter 4.
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Russia could step in and guarantee their existence. Therefore the pro-Russian tendency 
among the Crimean Tatars is very serious.71
71 Alexander Dugin. 2014. "Sud'ba vsekh narodov v Krymu, kak krymskikh tatar, tak i russkikh, nakhoditsya pod 
ugrozoi” (“The Fate of all of the people of Crimea, Crimean Tatars as well as Russians, is under threat”) News 
Agency: “Crimean News” September 19, 2008. Accessed September 19, 2018. http://qha.com.ua/ru/politika/ 
aleksandr-dugin-quot-sudba-vseh-narodov-v-krimu-kak-krimskih-tatar-tak-i-russkih-nahoditsya-pod-ugrozoi/21650
72 This Eurasianist inspired fear of genocide helps explain why the ruse of a “genocide against ethnic Russians in 
Ukraine” was so effective in inspiring patriotism and approval of Putin's actions in taking Crimea in 2014.
73 Samuel Osborne. UN Accuses Russia of Multiple Human Rights Abuses in Crimea. Independent. November 16, 
2016. Accessed September 20, 2018. 2016.https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-ukraine- 
crimea-putin-human-rights-abuses-un-accusations-claims-a7421406.html
74 Dugin, Foundations, Chapter 5.1.
Dugin's remarks display a patriarchal attitude towards the “small numbered peoples,” 
particularly those of Turkic blood, whom Gumilev was earlier fond of writing about. In Dugin's 
and Gumilev's vision, Russia stands as the military and cultural protector of the smaller ethnic 
groups of Eurasia. Russia's ability to do so is only threatened by the cunning and manipulative 
West, which Dugin argues leverages its economic superiority to attract feeble-minded peripheral 
countries, despite their natural affinity for Russia. Should the West be allowed to win this fight, 
its essential exploitative nature will then destroy any traces of national distinctiveness through a 
physical or cultural genocide, he warns.72 Through the Annexation of 2014, the media continued 
to interview Dugin as an expert on the Ukraine situation that, ironically, also led to reports of 
human rights abuses against the Crimean Tatars perpetrated by the new, pro-Moscow 
government.73 Dugin repeatedly claimed in interviews that Ukraine historically had no standing 
as a country. This contention echoed his decades-old argument from Foundations: “She 
[Ukraine] doesn't have any cultural uniqueness of universal meaning, no geographical 
uniqueness, nor ethnic exclusivity.”74 During the crisis in 2014 in an apparent attempt to 
disseminate his ideology abroad, he repeated the claim in an open letter to the people of the
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United States published on the American right wing pundit Alex Jones' Infowars website and in 
other locations.75
75Aleksandr Dugin “Letter to the American People.” Infowars, April 27, 2014. Accessed September
19, 2018. https://www.infowars.com/letter-to-the-american-people-on-ukraine/
76 Clover, Black Wind, 174
77 Clover, Black Wind, 296
Revealing the imperial nature of his vision, Dugin's view of Ukraine's purposelessness as 
a state lies in the fact that it masquerades as a homogenous nation state based on an ethnic idea 
of Ukraine, despite the fact various peoples Indigenous to the region live there. Dugin attributes 
Ukraine's existence to the European nation-state model, which espouses a celebration of only the 
dominant ethnic group, while oppressing minority groups for the ultimate goal of economic 
exploitation. Whereas the Western-oriented Ukraine oppresses its small-numbered peoples 
culturally and politically, Dugin suggests that they see a path to self-empowerment through the 
Russian state and its imperial structure. Tatars, in Dugin's view, could become integrated into 
the Russian empire as natural aspirants towards a great Eurasian civilization, while they would 
eventually be annihilated by the Western-oriented Ukraine.
While it is impossible to quantify Dugin's influence, his reach appears to be wide. While 
he does not wield an official position in the current Russian government, many scholars view his 
influence as profound. Clover, an adherent of this view, writes that after Dugin's publication of 
Foundations, his ideas “would revolutionize Russian politics over the next two decades,”76 and 
that his vocabulary, though “watered-down,” had infiltrated throughout the Russian ruling 
class.77 His cultivated air of mystique combined with understanding of policy and influence on 
the elite have led Sean MacCormac, writing for the Center for Security Policy to dub him
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“Putin's Rasputin”; MacCormac claims he has “been extremely influential in the Russian 
military and foreign policy establishment.”78 Foundations, Dugin's opus, has been used as a 
primer in top-level military academies in Russia, and the former speaker of the Duma called for 
his works to be included in the national school curriculum.79 Dugin himself, in a 2007 interview, 
was even more self-aggrandizing, declaring that “My thought prevails, my discourse reigns.”80 
While some have doubted his actual influence on the philosophical discourse, arguing that 
politicians may see his affiliations with occultism as too risky to publicly endorse, for instance 
Neumann and Laruelle, few have questioned his impact as a pundit. Neumann claims his main 
influence lies in his unification of the various threads of irredentist nationalism, and that his 
biography reads like a who's who of radical right figures.81 He clearly stands as a figurehead for 
a movement that slowly has been chipping away at the Atlanticist foothold in public discourse. 
Neumann, writing in 2014, claims that Atlanticism has become a “marginalized view” in the 
public debate,82 a claim echoed by Mikheyeva.83
78 Sean MacCormac, “Aleksandr Dugin: Putin's Rasputin?” Center for Security Policy, April 27, 2015. 
Accessed September 19, 2018.
https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/03/04/aleksandr-dugin-putins-rasputin/
79 Schmidt, Is Putin pursuing, 91
80 Clover, Black Wind, 296
81 Iver B. Neumann "Russia's Europe, 1991-2016: Inferiority to Superiority." International Affairs 92, no. 6 (2016): 
1381-1399. Accessed December 3, 2018. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12752.
82 Neumann, Russia's Europe, 1396
83 Irina Mikheeyeva. “‘Konservativnye isledovaniya v politicheskom i intellektual'nom pole sovremennoi Rossii.” 
(“Conservative Studies” in the political and intellectual fields in modern Russia”) Palatochnii Sphere, no. 15 (2): 
125. Accessed September 5, 2018.
An interesting and understudied facet of Dugin's legacy is his driving commitment to 
establishing institutions oriented towards longer term influence. Even among Eurasianists, Dugin 
seems uniquely committed to institutionalizing his long-term vision of the Eurasianist project, 
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having established his own publishing house, Arctogaia, which produces Russian translations of 
New Right and fascist thinkers. He also founded the Eurasian Youth Movement, which was 
especially active in Ukraine and Turkey, and founded the Center for Conservative Studies at the 
prominent Lomonosov State University in Moscow. Although he was dismissed from his 
position at Lomonosov in 2014 (for a polemic against the Ukrainian people), his Center for 
Conservative Studies remains, dedicated to “the development and establishment of conservative 
ideology in academics.”84 Mikheyeva, a Russian scholar, sees a larger pattern of the 
consolidation and institutionalization of right wing ideologies which, “previously regarded as 
latent, marginal and informal, take advantage of their new status and lay claim to the 
development of state strategic political programs.”85 Although professors at the Center for 
Conservative Studies do not hold government positions, the elite “defers to the ideas suggested 
by the leaders of the Center” and “transmits the most radical version of its foreign policy through 
them.”86 Most scholars seem to agree that there has been an undeniable rightward shift in the 
public discourse, so much so that even pro-Western Atlanticists have been influenced by Dugin's 
imperial conceptions of Russia,87 especially foreign policy elite, regardless of political 
leanings.88 In any case, this institutionalization of Eurasianism, which the original Eurasianists 
were never able to achieve, has the ability to affect policy well into the future.
84 Center for Conservative Studies. “About” Accessed 9/19/2018. konservatism.org/about
85 Mikheeyeva, Konservativnye isledovaniya, 125.
86 Mikheyeva, Konservativnye isledovaniya, 86
87 Dmitry V. Shlapentokh, “Eurasianism: Past and Present.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, no. 2: 384
88 Shlapentokh, Eurasianism, 394
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2.4.2 Aleksandr Panarin
Alexander Panarin, the other of the “Two Faces of Contemporary Eurasianism”89 
alongside Dugin, is the more bookish and more philosophical theoretician of Neo-Eurasianism. 
Born in 1940, he holds a teaching position in political science at Lomonosov State University 
and has published several influential books on the Eurasian mission. He is a strong advocate of 
the differentiation between the West and Eurasia, and a staunch and biting critic of the West. 
This critique has brought his ideas to prominence in the public discourse. As Laruelle explains 
“the founding postulate of Panarin's Eurasianism is a condemnation of the West,”90 and Panarin 
has presented this view more clarity and nuance than most.
89 Marlene Laruelle. “The Two Faces of Contemporary Eurasianism: An Imperial Version of Russian Nationalism.” 
Nationalities Papers 32, no. 1 (March 2004): 115-36. Accessed September 25, 2018. 
doi:10.1080/0090599042000186197.2004
90 Laruelle, Two Faces, 120
91 Alexander Panarin. Pravoslavnaya tsivilizatsiya v globalnom mirye. (Orthodox Civilization in a Global World). 
Moscow: Eksmo, 2002. 59. Accessed October 13, 2018. http://rusinst.ru/docs/books/A.S.Panarin- 
Pravoslavnaya_civilizaciya.pdf
92 Panarin, Pravoslavnaya tsivilizatsiya, 67
“The problems of modernity,” writes Panarin in the introduction to his most famous 
work, Orthodox Civilization in the Globalized World, “lie in the West's nihilistic-destructive 
relationships to nature, culture, and morality.”91 To Panarin, Europe and the United States' 
influence--and threat--is like a parasite insidiously infecting non-dominant cultures from within 
to cause the gradual eradication of their national identity as it seeks to unite the world in 
universal commitment to “one-dimensional” liberal democracy, which Panarin sees as essentially 
capitalistic, money-grubbing, and racist, since their elevation of individuals over groups 
necessarily will stamp out any minority cultures.92 “‘Free and open society' as the West 
interprets it really means open Social Darwinism,” he writes, “in which the weak cultures, 
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economies and ethnoi are doomed to die, giving up the plane to the strong.”93 Europe's success, 
he writes, is “based on enslaving the rest of the world. Europe stands for a democratic racism”94 
in the sense that it only empowers the view of the majority. This attack on the “moral health”95 
of non-European civilizations can only be stopped through fighting the cultural hegemony of 
Europe over Russia, which, he argues, should close itself off to Europe's influence to allow its 
own culture to develop and flourish in a way that celebrates the diversity of the Eurasian 
superethnos. Russia/Eurasia can then organically develop its own spiritual fortitude and become 
the antipode of the West.
93 Panarin, Pravoslavnaya tsivilizatsiya, 62
94 Quoted in Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism, 89
95 Laruelle, Two Faces, 120
Panarin pays special attention to the West's treatment of minority cultures. As mentioned 
above, Panarin views Europe and the U.S. as essentially extinguishing the diverse peoples of the 
world in a cultural genocide that will result in a worldwide universalism centered on a 
commitment to economic freedom. Whereas Russia's commitment to a traditional and spiritual 
society is inclusive, the West's model rests on survival-of-the-fittest philosophy. The U.S., which 
inhabits a territory formerly occupied by multitudinous and diverse peoples, did not practice 
genocide of its Indigenous Peoples merely to gain territory as it colonized the West; it continues 
to practice a cultural genocide against them that will snuff out any ethnic identity. It would be the 
natural inclination of Indigenous Peoples to fight for recognition of their collective identity, but 
because they are victims of the West's “social Darwinism” they are unable to.
Panarin further criticizes the European idea of a “nation-state” and ethnic nationalism, 
which he sees as empowering separatists who fight the natural order in their effort to fragment 
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organic civilizations such as Eurasia. To Panarin, Europe's ethnic nationalism results from an 
insistence on individual rights over what he sees as the “pre-eminence of collective identity”96 
that naturally occurs in Eurasia. Europe ignores the rights of the collective identity while 
privileging the individual identity; Eurasia must do the opposite and empower the collective 
identity (Gumilev's ethnos), sometimes at the cost of individual rights or freedoms. This point is 
essential to understanding how Eurasianism might be applied to Russia's conception of its 
Indigenous Peoples. While Eurasianism does not necessarily strip individuals of their rights, it 
subordinates their individual rights to those of their ethnos, which it subjects to the will of the 
superethnos of Eurasia. Thus, a reindeer herder's being stripped of his grazing rights does not 
constitute a human tragedy that requires compensation and rectification--it is an inevitable 
misfortune that is the cost of the collective's advancement towards a united, biologically-based 
civilizational mission. The ethnoi thus takes place within the citizenry as the locus of civilization, 
while the individual is made significant only as a part of the ethnos.
96 Laruelle, Two Faces, 122
97 Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism, 97
98 Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism, 97
In line with other Eurasianists, Panarin views empire as the ideal form of government. As 
Laruelle explains, the empire in Panarin's view “promotes awareness of civilizations in a world 
divided along regional and ethnic lines and provides an ideology of order against the chaos of the 
modern world.”97 Panarin seems to have predicted the resurgence of tribalism and nationalist 
ideologies that have sprung up in Europe and the U.S. in recent years and offered an alternative 
form of government, based on an authoritarian center that unites a people who “do not have any 
other basis for a set of universal norms and a legal order,”98 by instilling a common idea. The 
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uniting idea of the Eurasian empire is a high value of spirituality and a “renewal of asceticism 
and repentance in the industrial world,”99 an idea that Russia's 2015 National Security Concept 
adopted almost verbatim. The National Security Concept adopts Panarin's position that Russia's 
telos is not to become a wealthy economic powerhouse like the United States, but rather to 
develop its essential spirituality and become a beacon to other countries worldwide. Panarin also 
emphasizes Russia's inclusivity, noting that the Russian state, even at its Muscovite founding, 
was not an “ethnocentric” state but a multi-ethnic one whose natural inclusivity was centered on 
the idea of a kingdom of heaven in a secular Orthodoxy. 100
99 Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism, 98
100 Panarin, Pravoslavnaya tsivilizatsiya, 42.
101101 Vladimir Putin. “Annual Address to Federal Assembly” April 26, 2007. Accessed October 23, 2018. 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24203
2.5 Analysis of Eurasianism
Eurasianism is hard to pin down. If it is a science, as Trubetskoy, Savitsky, and Gumilev 
claimed, that explained the linguistic, geographic, and economic inevitability of the Eurasian 
polity, its foundations are weak. Despite Trubetskoy's invaluable contribution to the discipline of 
linguistics, his suggestion of a convergence of language and culture within the Eurasian 
supercontinent today seems bizarre, and in any case seems to have been subsumed by an often 
used assertion that the Russian language is the uniting factor in the Russian project.101 Likewise 
Savitsky's claim of an archetypal symmetry in Eurasia's geographic composition resembles 
mythology more than natural science. Meanwhile, his claim of a historic economic union 
between the fur trappers and herders of the Far North and Siberia and the agriculturalists of the 
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South, while undeniable, does not demonstrate that Eurasia must be a whole political entity, only 
that it was. Gumilev's suggestion of a cosmic lightning bolt from the sun that invigorates a group 
with a world-conquering passionarity is equally fanciful, and the fact that his “laws” of social 
organization including ethnos, subethnos, and superethnos have not been adopted outside of the 
former Soviet countries suggests that their resonance owes more to their storytelling power than 
their sociological legitimacy. Dugin and Panarin's sharp transitions to geopolitics are equally 
confounding. While legitimizing their theories with the works of renowned social theorists, they 
present Eurasianism more as a plan of action motivated in unwavering self-interest.
Nor does Clover's suggestion that Eurasianism was “more therapy than scholarship,” for 
early theorists adequately convey the power of the ideas Eurasianism contained. While early 
Eurasianists experienced a tragic feeling of dismemberment from their motherlands, this 
national-psychoanalytical interpretation does not adequately explain the vicissitudes of the 
ideology, nor does it account for an expansion of the ethnic boundaries of Eurasia as opposed to 
a reversion to racial-based chauvinism. The national-psychoanalytical approach also fails to 
account for the two very different circumstances in which Eurasianism grew: the first among 
patriotic, aristocratic, intellectuals in exile from a country that was poised to become an 
international superpower, and the second among rudderless ex-Soviets who sought a national 
identity in their post-Leninist country. The concept is further confounded by other former Soviet 
countries' adoption of Gumilevean Eurasianism after their national liberation from the Soviet 
Union.
A third interpretation of Eurasianism as a political movement also has shortcomings. 
Aleksandr Dugin most prominently espouses this view through his founding of a short-lived
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Eurasianist Party in Russia, as well as an international Eurasian Youth Movement and his 
founding of Moscow State University's Center for Conservative Studies. Dugin and his allies 
seek to institutionalize a view of Russia based in Schmittian understandings of geopolitics 
mostly through a foreign policy agenda rooted in ideological and physical attacks on the 
proverbial “West.” Duginians can point to Crimea as a manifestation of this ever-expanding 
movement, but Dugin's view focuses more on opposition to the West in response to a very 
specific geopolitical situation of twenty-first century Russia, than it provides an explanation for 
the vast territory of Russia. The political dimension also downplays the influential ideological 
foundations of Eurasianism which seem to be widespread in Russian society, from primary 
school to presidential speeches. Dugin's expansionism, as well as its adoption by the Russian 
ruling elite, can thus be attributed to a self-interested realpolitik as much as it can be considered 
a genuine political movement.
Perhaps a more fitting paradigm through which to understand Eurasianism lies in Roger 
Smith's theories of “people building,” presented in Stories of Peoplehood.102 Disregarding the 
Westphalian paradigm of nation-states, Smith instead focuses on the specific challenges of multi­
ethnic countries which must unite diverse peoples through what he calls “ethically constructed” 
stories that imbue the population with specific ethical characteristics. Smith argues for a 
constructivist view of peoplehood based primarily on stories or myths chosen in dialectic by the 
leaders and the people themselves. Analyzed in a political narrative-based framework, Gumilev's 
and the other Eurasianists' pseudo-scientific theories are part of the national mythology of 
Russia itself. By doing this, Trubetskoy's ostensible scientific “proof” of the linguistic 
102 Smith, Stories, 2003.
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convergence of peoples of Eurasia or Savitsky's geological proof of the symmetry of steppe and 
forest can be reimagined as stories in themselves instead of rigorous scientific endeavors. The 
Eurasianist story can thus be understood as an innovation on the traditional people building 
stories that date back at least to the chosen Israelites of the Old Testament, by modernizing it to 
include the powerful cache of “science.” Eurasianism is compelling and versatile precisely 
because of its pseudo-scientific claims of naturalness, which it combines with questionable 
commitment to traditional spirituality. Residents of Russia find in it the very justifications they 
are looking for: the nationalist finds a rationale for geopolitical expansionism; the religious 
believer sees spiritual unity of Eurasian peoples; the Liberal applauds the rejection of the global 
inequality resulting from Western hegemony; and the technocrat prizes the ostensible scientific 
proof of the inevitability of Eurasian expansion; for all Eurasianism provides a powerful 
narrative that explains Russian exceptionalism.
As for Indigenous Peoples, as Smith argues, narratives are successful tools of political 
legitimacy if they can instill a population with a sense of both worth (for example, an 
improvement in living or economic conditions) and trust (interpreted as belief for the narrative 
itself) for the subjects of a polity. To Eurasianists, the value provided Indigenous Peoples lies in 
the existential guarantee of survival and ethnic cultural development, while they can find worth 
in the act of being part of a superethnos that counterposes a large majority of global civilization. 
While a guarantee of survival seems like a meager morsel, for Indigenous Peoples worldwide, 
there is certainly a danger of the eradication of a culture, though perhaps not in the same, violent 
way that once lurked in colonialism. Still, it is unclear whether this guarantee should be enough 
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for Indigenous Peoples to endorse or internalize the Eurasianist narrative offered by the Putin 
regime.
Of course, the Putin regime itself does not need the approval of the 250,000 or so 
Indigenous Russians to gain support from a majority of the Russian constituency, as it 
increasingly appears to apply the Eurasianist narrative to his governance. In 2010 at a speech to 
the international forum “The Arctic: a Territory of Dialogue,” Putin repeated an argument similar 
to Savitsky's vision of historical economic interrelatedness. “It is difficult to survive in the 
Arctic when you are alone; it is a well-known time-tested fact,” he said, “Arctic nature itself 
makes individuals, groups of people and entire countries dependent on each other.”103 In 2015, at 
his annual address to the Federal Assembly, Putin publicly adopted Gumilev's term of 
passionarity for the first time before hundreds of dignitaries from the far-flung ethnic republics, 
and small-numbered peoples in their ethnic costumes. The regime's increasing public alliance 
with the Orthodox Church and its adoption of Church-supported anti-sodomy laws (despite the 
fact that relatively few Russians actually attend church) suggests that the Kremlin views its 
marriage with Orthodoxy as an important “people building” strategy, as opposed to just a 
politically convenient union.
103 Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin addresses the international forum, "The Arctic: Territory of 
Dialogue," September 23, 2010. Accessed October 16, 2018. http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/12304/
This thesis argues neither for nor against the plausibility of the Eurasianist vision but 
merely asserts that, more than anything else, it is a strategy for “people building” and not, as 
others have suggested, a “pseudo-science” that should be ignored because of its tenuous 
adherence to any scientific method, or a front for a racist and nationalist faction of Russia, or as a 
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teleological political movement akin to Marxism. Rather, it is a core element of Russia's modern 
self-identity that at its root is egalitarian and non-racialist. That is not to condone the 
homophobic, militaristic, or exclusivist actions that the Putin regime has justified using implicit 
Eurasianist theories. As Smith points out, “stories of peoplehood” inevitably exclude certain 
people despite the fact that in excluding these people, they forfeit a potential base of support. 
Thomas Jefferson, for example, disparaged the “merciless Indian Savages” in the Declaration of 
Independence. Indigenous Russians, on the other hand, find themselves in an honored position at 
the heart of the Eurasianist story of Russia as an integral part of the cultural, geographic and 
economic fabric of the Eurasian continent, a point that is underappreciated by Western scholars. 
While Russia has often failed to transmit this mythical egalitarianism into concrete steps for 
social improvement of its native people, Eurasianists have nonetheless offered a novel model of 
constructing its peoplehood.
From this review of a century of Eurasianist writings, several themes emerge as they 
relate to the Eurasianists' conception of their civilization and its role among the various minority 
ethnicities, as well as their perceptions of the West.
• There is a natural affinity among the people of the Eurasian continent borne of 
delineated geographic conditions. Therefore, the Indigenous Peoples of Russia are 
naturally drawn into the Russian state.
• Russia is the embodiment of superethnos binding the diverse people of the Eurasian 
landmass. Indigenous peoples are distinct and celebrated within the Russian state, but the 
Russian culture plays an essential role whereas other ethnicities are considered 
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constituent ethnoi or even subethnoi. Though the subethnoi strengthen the superethnos, 
their interests are subservient to the superethnos.
• The Eurasian civilization is committed to the empowerment of peoples without 
necessarily empowering individuals. Groups (including ethnoi, subethnoi, and 
superethnoi) are considered concrete entities that are just as “real” as individuals and are 
supported in the Eurasianist civilization.
• The West and its commitment to individual rights and Liberal universalism is 
destructive to minority cultural differences. The West has long practiced cultural and 
ethnic genocide, a point that is revealed in their treatment of Indigenous People. When 
Indigenous peoples in the West attempt to assert themselves, they are inevitably 
suppressed by the more dominant ethnos.
I will use these themes as the basis for a coding scheme to help guide an understanding of 
how Eurasianism functions as a framework in the Russian language media. As Roger Smith 
notes Stories of Peoplehood, “no one has ever engaged in ‘people building' using completely 
raw wood.”104 By this he means that stories are constantly refined built upon in what Smith 
describes as a dialectic process with the electorate. As in the philosophical parable of the Ship of 
Theseus, each individual part of the narrative is modified, kept, or replaced one piece at a time, 
until it is unclear whether it is in fact the same narrative. As mentioned previously, many of these 
themes are in many ways similar to Soviet narratives, which emphasized the preeminence of 
communitarianism in Eurasia and positioned the Soviet Union as the antipode to the US, but this 
project will seek to understand how the Kremlin uses these original foundations of Eurasianism 
104 Smith Stories 55
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to innovate its narrative. These themes will thus serve the purpose of establishing the more 
foundational principles of Eurasianism that can be used to determine the ways in which the 
Kremlin is using the narrative framework in the 21st century.
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Chapter 3: Russian Media Landscape: Development and Concepts
3.1 Introduction
The question for this project thus becomes: How does one determine exactly what the 
Kremlin's political narrative is? For any country, this could be a challenge, as narratives are not 
recorded in any official way, but exist nebulously in a variety of fields such as political speeches, 
foreign policy actions and national cultural programs. Especially in recent years, scholars have 
paid close attention to Eurasianism and its role in the political culture of Russia. Donald Clover's 
Black Wind, White Snow, for example, made much of Putin's adoption of the Gumilevean term 
passionarnost' to illustrate how Eurasianist ideas had been integrated into the official parlance, 
and Marlene Laruelle's Eurasianism: Ideology of Empire used a variety of foreign policy 
documents and policies to find Eurasianist influence.
These approaches are useful for understanding the role of Eurasianism, but fail to take 
into account the important ways that population plays in accepting this narrative, which is 
essential for understanding how the Putin regime has maintained power. Adopting Roger Smith's 
contention, I will adopt the view of political narratives as dialectic between the ruling elite and 
the people with the ruling elite proposing narratives which are alternatively accepted or rejected 
by the democratic public.105 While the media would be a useful tool for examining narratives in 
any country, Russia's unique landscape of government influence and self censorship make it a 
particularly good representative of the dialectic process described by Smith.
105 Roger Smith. Stories of Peoplehood: the politics and morals of political membership. (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 37-42.
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3.2 Development of Russian News Media Landscape
In the United States, the news media is often understood as a fourth branch of our federal 
government.106 The press's independence is enshrined in the Constitution's First Amendment, 
and has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court to include publishing of information related to 
national security, even when it can be damaging to the government. Journalists in the United 
States thus have relatively strong protections against government interference, as well as 
financial incentive to publish explosive political stories that will attract audiences and keep 
government in check. In Russia, the media plays a much different role. Lenin devoted a chapter 
in his famous pre-revolutionary collection “What is to be done?” to the topic of the creation of an 
All-Russian newspaper in order to synthesize the diverse interests of the regions. “In our time,” 
he writes, “when Social-Democratic tasks are being degraded, the only way ‘live political work' 
can begin is through live political agitation, which is impossible unless we have an all-Russia 
newspaper, frequently issued and regularly distributed.”107
106 Cater, Douglass. 1959. The Fourth Branch of Government. Boston, Houghton-Mifflin [1959].
107 Vladimir Lenin. “Plan obsche Rossiyskoi politicheskoi gazety,” (“The Plan for an All-Russia Political 
Newspaper,”) in Chto delat'? (What is to be Done?), 1902. Chapter 5, accessed October 25, 2018. 
https://www.marxists.org/russkij/lenin/1902/6-13-4.htm
108 Brian McNair. Glasnost, Perestroika, and Soviet Media. 1991. Ebook. Page 1.
Lenin's model of party-controlled media reigned throughout the twentieth century with a 
system of integrated messaging controlled by bureaucrats in Moscow, who oversaw the 
thousands of censors who made the Soviet Union's media system “unequalled in size and 
complexity anywhere in the world.”108 However, this stranglehold on information began to slip 
under perestroika and glasnost, and gave way to a wild west of free-market based media in the 
early 1990s. But the old Soviet habits were hard to break, and in the mid and late 1990s, media 
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companies were brought back under state influence, if not outright control. Even under the 
‘liberal' President Boris Yeltsin, the government devised new mechanisms of control by 
strategically controlling who was given broadcast licenses and renationalizing media.
In the mid-2000s, the Putin regime developed more active measures, creating most 
notably the public diplomacy channel RT, which many have suggested Russia used to 
strategically misinform its audiences as part of a new information strategy. In 2014, direct 
governmental influence reached a new height, as the Duma passed a ban on publication of 
“public calls to action violating the territorial integrity of the Russian federation,” which was 
used by the Russian government to prosecute journalists who reported that Crimea was part of 
Ukraine.109 Russian media in the twenty-first century has become a primary tool of the Putin 
regime to air narratives of specific issues, as was the case in Ukraine, but also broader 
ideological messages. In its 2009 National Security Concept, Russia asserts the need to protect 
its cultural security by “establishing government contracts for the creation of cinematographic 
and printed works, television and radio programmes and internet resources.”110 While this might 
seem like a tenuous connection to national security, the National Security Concept is explicit 
about when it sees the threats: “attempts to revise perspectives on Russia's history, its role and 
place in world history; and by the propagandizing of a lifestyle based on permissiveness and 
violence, or racial, national and religious intolerance.”111 This is a clear allusion to U.S. cultural 
hegemony, which Russia sees as undermining its inherent value system. The Strategy also
109 Human Rights Watch, Russia's assault on all fronts. July 18 2017. Accessed December 2 2018. 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/07/18/online-and-all-fronts/russias-assault-freedom-expression
110110 National Security Strategy to 2020, 2009, Section 83
111 National Security Strategy to 2020, 2009, Section 84
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directly links the value of “preserving and developing Indigenous cultures within Russia's 
multinational population,” as integral to national and cultural security. Russia's sense of security 
thus encompasses mass media and is explicitly tied to its essential spirit, which it defines as 
conservative, traditional, and ethnically inclusive. Russia's identity is also defined as territorial. 
In its Arctic Policy published in the same year it asserted an intention to “highlight in mass 
media the questions connected with national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, 
including organization of exhibitions, conferences, round tables, devoted to history of 
development of the Arctic by Russian explorers, with a view of formation of a positive image of 
Russia.”112 Mass media in Russia is directly tied with its Arctic, Indigenous Peoples, and 
national security and thus is a window into ideology of the ruling regime.
112 Russia's Arctic Policy. 2009, Part 5:10:d
113 Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 1977. Chapter 7 Article 51. Accessed October 3, 2018. 
https://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77cons02.html
114 Epp Lauk. “The Antithesis of the Anglo-American news paradigm: news practices in Soviet journalism,”
Diffusion of the News Paradigm 1850-2000, ed. Svennik Hoyer and Horst Pottker. (Goteborg, Sweden: 
NORDICOM, 2005), 175
3.3 Overview of media development: from Soviet Censorship to Putin's Self-Censorship
Despite a theoretical right to freedom of press, news media were strictly censored in the 
Soviet era. The 1977 Soviet Constitution, for example, states that “citizens of the USSR are 
guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, meetings, street processions and 
demonstrations.” However, this freedom was circumscribed by the open-ended qualifier that all 
speech must be “In accordance with the aims of building communism.”113 During the 1970s and 
80s, Glavlit, the official censorship agency, employed about 70,000 censors, who punished 
violators with sentences of up to seven years of labor.114 High-level bureaucrats in the Central
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Committee determined the ideological line, publishing a periodically updated guide called 
“Handbook of Classified Data” which banned reporting on the topics of “disasters with human 
losses, everything that concerned the armed forces, criminality and jails, cases of social unrest 
and protests, and of course, censorship itself,”115 while they themselves reveled in reading 
dissident literature and news from the West.116
115 Lauk, The Antithesis, 177
116 Pomerantsev and Weiss The Menace of Unreality, 10
117 Thomas C. Wolfe Governing Soviet Journalism : The Press and the Socialist Person after Stalin. (Bloomington 
IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 7
118 Sarah Oates Television, Democracy and Elections in Russia. (London: Routledge, 2006), 1-20
119 Wolfe, Governing Soviet Journalism, 7
Soviet journalists performed not as independent actors vying for the latest scoop, but as 
government functionaries whose primary purpose was to convey the message of Marxist 
socialism through mass media. Soviet media scholar Thomas Wolfe writes that Soviet journalism 
functioned to reinforce the party's view that the country was not “fractured into competing 
groups, but rather as pieces of a larger whole whose harmonious coordination it was the party's 
job to bring about.”117 News consumers likewise readily accepted the news media's role as 
government functionaries.118 Despite this larger social project, Soviet policy makers understood 
that regional audiences required different forms of media, and tailored newspapers to both 
national identities and economic classes that were supplied from Ekaterinburg to Vladivostok, in 
Udmurt and in Tatar.119
However, the bedrock of the Soviet mass communication system began to crumble 
during his implementation of glasnost in Soviet society. Gorbachev first mentioned the word in 
1984 as “an effective means of combating bureaucratic distortions and obliges people to take a 
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more thoughtful approach to [...] the rectification of shortcomings and deficiencies.”120 
According to McNair, Gorbachev himself was elected partly due to the positive response to this 
speech from members of the Central Committee.121 Though glasnost can be interpreted as a 
liberalizing reform, it was also a reaction to inevitable cultural and technological processes that 
were unstoppable in Soviet society. Samizdat, or unsanctioned publications, were increasingly 
accessible to Soviet citizens; Western information sources such as Voice of America were more 
widespread; and Soviet citizens were increasingly traveling abroad and gaining access to 
alternative news sources.122 Gorbachev understood that these processes were at play and that, 
one way or another, citizens would learn the truth. Gorbachev's program of glasnost can thus 
also be interpreted as a shrewd political move to adjust to evolving public opinion. In any case, 
glasnost represented a tectonic shift in the dissemination of information in the Soviet Union, as 
the focus of media changed from a celebration of the economic successes of communism to a 
blood sport of digging up its shortcomings.123
120120 Quoted in McNair, Glasnost, 44
121121 McNair, Glasnost, 44
122122 McNair, Glasnost, 43
123123 McNair, Glasnost, 46
Despite its positive connotations in the West, many Russians today see glasnost as a key 
factor that precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the floodgates of criticism open, 
Gorbachev himself became a victim of the new reality, which blamed him for the economic 
problems and increasing political chaos. When the Soviet Union was officially dissolved, state 
subsidies ended, and the news media had to adjust to a new reality based on free market 
economics. Instead of repeating a message to a captive audience, the media had to compete for 
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audiences by entertaining them, which led to the rise of “tabloid-style” journalism and of 
television as the primary source of media consumption. Politicians, most notably Boris Yeltsin, 
discovered in 1991 the power that live TV could have when CNN broadcasted his image atop a 
tank speaking in front of the Russian Parliament during the military coup attempt, while sweaty, 
apparently drunken Soviet apparatchiks discredited themselves as they fumbled through their 
explanations of the coup. The visceral contrast of images catapulted Yeltsin to the presidency 
and doomed the Supreme Soviet to infamy.
Russian society in the 1990s appeared to be developing a commitment to free press. In 
1990, as the USSR was collapsing, the Russian Parliament, headed by future-President Boris 
Yeltsin, adopted a new law On the Press and other Mass Media that established three principles 
of free press: complete abolishment of censorship, private ownership of the press for the first 
time, and journalists' independence from their owners.124 Legislators also clarified legal 
definitions of defamation and intellectual property, which allowed journalists to operate without 
fear of arbitrary crackdowns based on bureaucrats' political whims. After Yeltsin's election, the 
Constitution of 1993 established that “Everyone shall have the right to freely look for, receive, 
transmit, produce and distribute information by any legal way.”125 In general, the period 
suggested that the Russian media's development would align with the Western model as part of a 
larger Atlanticist movement towards universal, neo-liberal values. Soviet media scholar Andrei
124 Andrei Richter. “Media Regulation: Foundation laid for free speech.” Ed. Kaarle Nordenstreng,, Elena
Vartanova, and Yassen N. Zassoursky. Russian Media Challenge. (Helsinki: Kikimora Publications, 2002), 116.
125125Constitution of the Russian Federation. 1993. Article 45.1. Accessed October 3, 1993. 
http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm
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Richter wrote optimistically in 2002 that “Internal processes in society and in the media [...] 
make it impossible to reverse the flow of the free press back into the dictatorial river bed.”126
126 Richter, Media Regulation, 122
127 Richter, Media Regulation, 116
128 Richter, Media Regulation,116
129 Richter, Media Regulation, 150
Richter, Media Regulation, 151
Though Westernizers were optimistic, there were still indications that things had not 
really changed so much. One signal that the Westerizers had misread was the motivation of the 
new government, which was “governed more by an instrumental importance than by an idealistic 
approach to this value.”127 Richter explains that Yeltsin and his administration used promises of 
media freedom and protection to win the support of the press and of the international community 
in the hope that Russia would be accepted into the G-7 and other international fora.128 And 
despite federal protections for journalists, enforcement of rights was patchy and regional laws 
could be contradictory. Yeltsin's famous charge to the regions to “Take as much sovereignty as 
you can swallow” apparently had implications for media control as well. Bashkiria, an 
autonomous ethnic republic sitting at the Western edge of the Ural Mountains, for example, 
established strict permitting requirements for reporters from media outside its borders and 
prohibited journalism that would undermine the “unity and integrity of the region 
[Bashkiria].”129 Information was weaponized in the regions' fight for self-determination, and the 
federal government was too weak to respond, despite the fact that these regional power-grabs 
contradicted federal laws and statutes.130 This regionalization was of course anathema to the 
Eurasian tenet of continental political integrity, but it also enabled the development of regional 
130
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identities that had previously been suppressed by the monopoly of news from the center in 
Moscow.
Other signs indicated that the Soviet habits of government interference had not entirely 
died. Privatization, which was extolled by Westernizers, proved to cut both ways. In the early 
nineties, TV channels and newspapers were sold off to private investors--sometimes wholly and 
sometimes in part--in an attempt to shake the government chokehold on media production. But 
this opened the door for corruption, as the state apparatus granted licenses preferentially to those 
with whom it wished to gain concessions. For example, the Kremlin gave the Russian channel 
NTV, a full-time license to operate on a broadcast TV channel in return for its complimentary 
coverage of President Yeltsin's candidacy, in violation of laws that prevented that very kind of 
interference.131 The state also retained rights to cancel broadcast licenses by a secret committee 
vote, should media companies violate the criminal code by “spreading purposefully misleading 
information.”132 Writing in 2002, media scholar Zassoursky saw glimmers of a “corporate 
authoritarian” model--a precursor to Putin's more strong-armed consolidation of business and 
media that kept their power in return for allegiance to the president and obeyed certain unwritten 
rules--which he argued allowed the wealthy media moguls to monopolize information to re-elect 
Yeltsin in 1996.
131 Richter, Media Regulation, 120
132 Richter, Media Regulation, 137
Also during the late 1990s, western conceptions of PR (piar in Russian) began to take 
hold of media moguls and take the form of direct censorship. Marketers began to pay close 
attention to audiences' emotional responses first during the Yeltsin reelection campaign of 1996 
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and later during Putin's ascendancy in 1999-2000, when the latter's strongman image was 
developed. As Yeltsin's chosen successor and Prime Minister during the election campaign, 
Putin had certain advantages, but also a clear weakness: Nobody knew anything about him. 
Instead of a weakness, however, the rising Putin team used his anonymity as a strength to create 
his image from scratch. In this, they were aided by terrorist bombings of an apartment complex 
in Moscow on the eve of the election, which offered the perfect chance to define this new 
character to the electorate. Media coverage presented Putin as a masculine and energetic leader, 
who acted decisively in response to the bombings by sending Russian troops into Chechnya, the 
ostensible home region of the bombers. His approval rating shot up from 14 percent to 41 
percent in about a month, and had risen to 71 percent two months later.133 His election was all 
but assured, as was the new utility of television in manipulating voter preferences, while the 
theoretical regulatory mechanisms for non-bias were proven ineffective.134 Russian media 
scholar Andrei Raskin explains that news channels devoted up to 48 percent of their political 
coverage to Putin just prior to the election, while the next closest candidate received just over 11 
percent.135 Media images showed Putin piloting his own airplane to his next meeting, and 
shedding tears over lost servicemen in Chechnya, solidifying both sides of his patriarchal 
image.136 Since that time, scholars have noted the singularity of Putin and his team in controlling 
and responding to audience's perception of him, which involved a hybridization of new visual 
technologies with the Soviet Union's insistence on journalism's ideological mission. Russian 
133 Andrei Raskin. “Television: Medium to Elect the President.” In Nordenstreng et al. 2002, 102, 106
134 Raskin, Television, 114
135 Raskin, Television, 110
136 Raskin, Television, 110
62
media scholar Zassoursky calls this trend “manipulation using the laws of drama,”137 in which 
drab, overly-censored news media of the Soviet era was replaced by sensationalist stories whose 
power was redoubled by the use of the relatively new medium of television. New techniques, 
such as de-contextualizing events, changing foci, and even staging events, were developed and 
applied to the new paradigm.138
137 Ivan Zassoursky. “Media and Power: Russia in the Nineties”. In Nordenstreng et al. 2002, 87
138 Zassoursky, Media and Power, 80
139 Masha Gessen. "Fear and Self-Censorship in Vladimir Putin's Russia." Niemann Reports 59, no. 2 (Summer, 
2005) 115. Accessed October 8, 2018. https://search.proquest.com/docview/216752577?accountid=14470.115
140 Gessen, Fear, 121
141 Gessen, Fear, 115
142 Sarah Oates. "The Neo-Soviet Model of the Media." Europe-Asia Studies 59, no. 8 (2007): 1287. Accessed 
October 4. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20451453.
While there were similarities with Soviet times, the new landscape was more complex 
than a reversion to an essentially Soviet landscape as some claimed.139 Though he re-nationalized 
the ownership of the main media stations, Putin left large shares in private hands. Though he 
removed the editor of the prominent daily newspaper Izvestia, he apparently did so through 
behind-the-scenes pressuring on the newspaper's owners instead of through direct action,140 and 
while journalists were threatened with retribution for criticizing the government, the threats came 
through extra-legal means.141 Putin further availed himself of the general confusion regarding 
media laws and instead issued Presidential edicts to supersede them with wording that left them 
open to interpretation.142 Furthermore, the globalization of media, which was first evidenced by 
CNN's influential coverage of the breakup of the Soviet Union, added a new dynamic. Since 
news consumers had access to alternative media, news outlets had to be sure to cover what their 
competitors covered. The government primarily controlled the narratives and emphasized certain 
stories, rather than prohibiting stories entirely. As Damm and Cooley explain, “what becomes 
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truth is less about presenting facts (or even hiding them), and becomes much more about 
establishing and controlling the dominant narratives that take place through all the controlled 
media channels.”143
143 Emily Belle Damm and Skye Cooley. “Resurrection of the Russian Orthodox Church: Narrative of Analysis of 
the Russian National Myth.” Social Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell) 98 (3) (August 2017), 945 
doi:10.1111/ssqu.12429.
Russia's brief experience with a Western model of media left clear marks on the Russian 
media system. Glasnost precipitated an unraveling of the strictly controlled, ideological 
recitation of impressive statistics that characterized Soviet media and replaced it with a “wild 
west” of bright-lights and sensationalism that attracted and entertained audiences in ways that 
Lenin could never have imagined. But Putin harnessed the new market-based media and 
combined it with his new government's developing ideology.
3.4 How Self-Censorship feeds Eurasianism
Despite cases of direct government attacks on the press in Russia, scholars such as Sarah 
Oates generally agree that the most pernicious effects on Russian freedom of the press lie in the 
fear inspired by acts of intimidation on journalists, leads to “self-censorship” and a reincarnation 
of many of restrictions of the Soviet system. Such self-censorship produces the same effects as 
actual censorship, under official freedom of the press policies. In a 2005 article for Niemman 
Reports, opposition journalist Masha Gessen describes the fear that she and her editorial staff at 
Bolshoy Gorod felt after news broke of the arrest of well-known opposition politician. With her 
editorial board, Gessen was forced to determine whether or not to cover these arrests with a 
headlining article and in-depth analysis of what the arrests would mean for journalism and free 
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press in Russia, whether to include an oblique allusion to the arrests perceptible only to the close 
reader, or whether to omit the story entirely and continue to investigate other, less politically- 
charged topics. To Gessen, each option came with a cost to free press, since if she were silenced 
through some reprisal by the government, she could no longer write important stories that could 
affect her readers. Gessen writes:
This is how self-censorship works. One bargains with oneself. How much can I 
sacrifice before I lose respect for myself as a journalist? Can I respect myself if I don't 
give a story the play it deserves because I'm afraid? Can I respect myself if I kill a story 
because I'm afraid? Can I respect myself if I force the reader to look for the truth 
between the lines because I'm afraid?144
144 Gessen, Fear, 116
145 Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss. “The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, 
Culture and Money,” Interpreter, Special Report, November 22, 2014: 15, accessed October 13 2018. 
www.interpretermag.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/The_Menace_of_Unreality_Final.pdf.
For Gessen, who now writes for the New Yorker, these sorts of decisions are incompatible to her 
vision of her profession, and the media environment ultimately led her to leave Russia for the 
United States. Such self-exile, of course, only heightens the power of the original act of 
intimidation, since the reporters who choose to stay are more likely to be compliant to 
government wishes.145 In this way, both journalists and audiences subordinate their own 
individual freedoms to what they see as a larger mission whose goal the state accomplishes. Even 
for journalists unaware of direct media intimidation, doubts and rationalizations such as those 
Gessen describes inevitably work their way into subconscious decision-making and lead to a 
conformism that can be strategically crafted by the regime.
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Censorship and self-censorship nevertheless differ in important ways. In the latter, the 
individual reporter retains a voice and a theoretical freedom to report on whatever he or she 
wants. According to Schimpfossl and Yablokov's interview study of rank-and-file journalists in 
2015, “reporters enjoy relatively large leeway to develop their creativity, which is crucial for 
state-aligned television networks to keep audience ratings up.”146 To the state, the individual 
voice serves the purpose of keeping the conversation interesting and fighting back against the 
monotony of the Soviet-era media. Since certain topics are deemed off-limits, journalists redirect 
their energies at topics that are deemed acceptable. Through careful execution of limited 
violence, the regime can steer journalists towards topics that serve official ideology. As Igor 
Yakovenko of the Moscow State Institute for International Relations notes, “if previous 
authoritarian regimes were three parts violence and one part propaganda, this one is virtually all 
propaganda and relatively little violence. Putin only needs to make a few arrests—and then 
amplify the message through his total control of television.”147
146 Elizabeth Schimpfossl and Ilya Yablokov. “Coercion or Conformism? Censorship and Self-Censorship among 
Russian Media Personalities and Reporters in the 2010s.” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet 
Democratization 22(2): (January 2014), 295-311
147 Quoted in Pomeranstev, Menace, 10
148 Ilya Yablokov. “Conspiracy Theories as a Russian Public Diplomacy Tool: The Case of Russia Today (RT).” 
Politics 35 (3/4): 301-15. doi:10.1111/1467-9256.12097.
As the Putin inner-circle is off limits, investigative reporters can exercise their 
journalistic freedom by looking into failures of the U.S. or the UN, or investigating the 
inequalities of the Western economic system. Sometimes, such implicit censorship results in 
implausible stories: conspiracy theories about 9/11 being an inside job, UN cover-ups of health 
defects caused by unprotected uranium, or discrepancies in the Treaty of Cession of Alaska,148 
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while investigation into conspiracies by the Russian government are ignored. Through deliberate 
application of pressure, regimes can form a clear ideological agenda in the media.
Self-censorship perpetuates the tenets of Eurasianism through de facto prohibition of 
violations of three sacred assumptions: Vladimir Putin as the sole leader of the Russian state, the 
Russian Orthodox Church as an untarnished beacon of wholesome morals, and the Russian state 
as territorially sound without threats of fragmentation. Putin's image as a spiritual unifier of 
lands throughout the Russian Empire is unassailable, and even gaffes in his speech are not 
broadcast on television.149 Reporters are expected to substitute the word vlast (“power”) for Putin 
in any commentary that criticizes the government's conduct,150 so that journalists can air 
grievances without undermining Putin's absolute authority. Likewise, Putin's image is trumped 
up when state media shares photos of Putin tranquilizing tigers or recovering ancient Byzantine 
artifacts, which reinforce his fitness to be president as well as his understanding of the diverse 
regions and histories of the wide empire. This also reinforces a Eurasianist vision of a uniter-of- 
nations autocrat.
149 Schimpfossl, Coercion, 307
150 Schimpfossl, Coercion, 307
The Russian Orthodox Church, meanwhile, has risen in prominence since the legislated 
atheism of the Soviet Union. In 2012, just after Putin's return to the presidency, five members of 
the all-female punk band Pussy Riot tried to perform an impromptu concert in the Cathedral of 
Christ our Savior in downtown Moscow as a protest against the increasing cronyism between the 
church and the state. Instead of reporting it as a political protest, however, the state-aligned 
media developed a unanimous narrative implying that the members of the group were part of a 
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deep-rooted conspiracy against the entire Russian civilization. Ilya Yablokov writes that “the 
media presented the Russian Orthodox Church as the main marker of Russian identity and the 
key force binding Russian people,” and thus above criticism.151 The energy that could perhaps 
have gone into investigating the corruption of the church that Pussy Riot was protesting instead 
was redirected to innuendos of elaborate conspiracy theories in which the Orthodox Church was 
besieged by a liberal cabal of homosexuals, blasphemers, and provocateurs bent on destroying 
the Russian state.152
151 Ilya Yablokov. “Pussy Riot as agent provocateur: conspiracy theories and the media construction of nation in 
Putin's Russia.” The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity. 42 (2014), 623
152 Yablokov, Pussy Riot, 628-629
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The idea of a renaissance of the Orthodox Church even entered the 2015 National 
Security Strategy which calls for a reassertion of “traditional Russian spiritual and moral 
values.”153 While critics have accused the Russian Orthodox Church of being filled with corrupt 
charlatans masquerading as spiritual holy men, the mainstream media focuses on the leadership 
of the Orthodox Church in “protecting a greater shared history, culture, and language” of the 
Eurasian people.154 The government thus takes on an almost theocratic character in line with 
many of the Eurasianists' prescriptions, although the press usually portrays Putin as the dominant 
actor in the Church-State relationship.155
The taboo against reporting on any political disunity within the Russian state is most 
important. In contrast to the Yeltsin era's divestment of power to the regions, the Putin regime 
seems to be sensitive to slights against the unity of the nation and responds to any threats to 
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territorial integrity with violent, extra-governmental retribution. The most famous case is of 
journalist Anna Politkovskaya, whose critical coverage of the Chechen Uprising from 1999 to 
2005 led to international recognition and to her murder under mysterious circumstances in 2006 
near her apartment in Moscow. Politkovskaya wrote stories critical of the Chechnyan 
government, which many viewed as a puppet of the Russian government, given its inordinate 
loyalty to Moscow despite tenuous cultural ties and a history of oppression of its own citizens. 
The killing of Politkovskaya, which many have speculated was orchestrated by the Kremlin, sent 
a clear signal to journalists working in Russia that questioning Russia's hegemony over nations 
of the Eurasian continent would not be tolerated. Politkovskaya's killing, though never solved, 
undoubtedly discouraged others from investigating wartime abuses. In any case, Putin codified 
this insistence on territorial integrity when, on December 30, 2013, he signed a law criminalizing 
“calls for separatism.” The date was telling in a country where New Year is celebrated lavishly 
and symbols of rebirth and cleansing are tied to the holiday. Under the law violators face a fine 
of up to 306,700 rubles ($9,500) or jail terms of up to five years for making public calls for 
action aimed against the country's territorial integrity.156
156 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices February
27, 2014. Accessed October 5, 2018. https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2013/eur/220324.htm
The government enshrines the concept of territorial integrity in other ways as well. 
“Inter-ethnic journalism” (“mezh-etnicheskii zhurnalizm”) is a term developed in Russia in the 
1990s in response to the general mood of separatism that the nationalist-minded found 
objectionable. Just as in the Soviet Union, the Putin regime used the press as a tool to achieve 
political gains, and ‘inter-ethnic journalism' became a catchphrase for a journalistic style that 
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described various ethnicities in ways that celebrated differences while suggesting an immutable 
tie with the civic Russian state. However, this connection was depicted differently than in 
Western countries, where civic and ethnic identities are more or less siloed. In inter-ethnic 
journalism, the very distinctiveness of the ethnicity is couched within the banner of the Russian 
ethnic and civic mythology. Russian scholar Iskhakov writes in his 2002 analysis of inter-ethnic 
journalism that he finds the themes of “acknowledgement of oneself as a citizen of Russia (as a 
piece of the whole); acknowledgement of the national language of Russia as native; 
acknowledgement of one's own [ethnicity] as a composite of Russia; acknowledgement of the 
unity of Russia; and acknowledgement of the super-ethnic mythology (history) of the citizens of 
Russia.”157 A code of ethics for “inter-ethnic journalism,” released in 2013 by the Guild of Inter­
ethnic Journalism, is instructive. The preface to the Ethical Code for Journalists Concerning 
Inter-Ethnic Themes in the Russian Federation released in 2013 states that “the goal of the work 
of the journalist is not to suppress facts or problems, but to attract the Russian people's interest 
and respect for the history and culture of the people inhabiting Russia, building the audience for 
the creation of a stable and multi-ethnic society” [italics are my own]. Subsequently, the text 
states that reporting on inter-ethnic issues is “the most important condition for the existence and 
development of a unified Russian state” [italics are my own] that reporting on conflicts should 
encourage their ending “peacefully in a constructive, inter-ethnic dialogue” that “doesn't 
necessitate the interference of law-enforcement agencies” and that the journalist should strive for 
157 P. L. Iskhakov. “Etnicheskaya zhurnalistika kak faktor geopoliticheskoi rasvitiya Rossii” (“Ethnic Journalism as 
a factor in the geopolitical development of Russia.”) Problems of Geopolitical Security of Russia: Materials of the 
All-Russian Scientific Practical Conference. Yekaterinburg: Ural State University. September 25, 2009. 39. 
Accessed October 4, 2018.
http://elar.urfu.ru/bitstream/10995/28555/1/pogbr_2009_10.pdf
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the “harmonization of inter-ethnic relations in society.”158 In addition to clearly contradicting 
Western journalistic standards--which encourage journalists to put aside any agenda other than 
reporting facts--the Code very clearly excludes reporting on secessionist movements within 
Russia. The Code's suggestions clearly endorse a “unified Russian state” unmarred by ethnic 
tensions and seem to suggest that reporting must lead to “harmonization.” Any news piece that 
might provoke tension or conflict should not be published, the Code suggests. In this way, 
journalists reinforce the tenets of Eurasianism without any legal action from the Russian state.
Guild of Inter-ethnic Journalism. “Eticheskii kodeks zhurnalistov, osveschayushikh mezhetnicheskuyu 
tematiku v Rossiysskoi Federatsii” (“Ethical codex for journalists covering inter-ethnic themes in the Russian 
Federation.”). April 9 2012, accessed September 10 2018. https://nazaccent.ru/about/eticheskij-kodeks/
This code and the general concept of inter-ethnic journalism as it has developed in Russia 
raises interesting questions. If a group within Russia were to demand secession from the Russian 
state, would an inter-ethnic journalist be allowed to report on it? Does reporting on the 
democratic wishes of an ethnically defined sub-state further the cause of the “harmonization of 
inter-ethnic relations in society”? And what of inter-ethnic journalists working abroad in, say, the 
United States? The Code seems to apply only to “a unified Russian state,” not necessarily to 
other states, which can be read as an implicit endorsement of reporting on such movements 
elsewhere, i.e. the United States. Does that then make it wrong? In 2014, two years after the 
Code was released, the Federal Assembly passed a law that calls for jail time for those who 
publish "public calls for actions violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.” The 
Code, ostensibly composed by a guild of independent journalists, suggests support among the 
media for such a law. Media scholar Sarah Oates likewise finds public support in Russia for the 
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media as a “stabilizing” and “inspiring” force within society,159 as opposed to the western 
conception of the media as a “watchdog.” Should the law be interpreted then as an affirmation of 
Liberal democratic principles since it is enacting the people's will, or should it instead be viewed 
as a subversion of the Liberal democratic value of free press? The law also confounds 
understandings of who is leading in this social project of Russia: Is the regime leading through 
its establishment of laws and its surreptitious enforcement of censorship, or is it merely 
responding to the natural inclination of the passionaries of Eurasia to pursue a goal? The Putin 
regime seems to masterfully and intentionally confound these dynamics between the regime and 
the electorate.
Sarah Oates. Television, democracy, and elections in Russia. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 17
In either case, the dynamic indicates that there is a narrative of ethnic harmony within the 
continent of Eurasia that is condoned by both the regime and accepted by the majority of the 
population, since there is little pushback against these forms of media influence. The Russian 
media landscape is much more diverse--and critical--than it once was, with instances of 
government mismanagement, bureaucratic corruption and political neglect as acceptable subjects 
of news reporting. But reporting on ethnic tensions is still categorically excluded, which suggests 
the importance that good ethnic relations play in Russia's self-perception. The fact that 
Eurasianism is integrated into the code of conduct of Inter-ethnic journalism further provides 
evidence that the dynamics between majority and minority ethnic groups within Russia is an 
important component of the government and the population's perception of their civilization.
159
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3.5 Public Diplomacy and Soft Power
The 2008 Russo-Georgian War marked a turning point in the Putin regime's view of the 
media. In August 2008, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili appealed in fluent English for 
Western defense for his small, democracy-loving republic against the aggressive attacks of a 
bitterly wounded former superpower Russia that had stormed across the Georgian border in 
heavily armored tanks. Saakashvili and his country became a cause celebre for Western hawks 
searching for an enemy. Former Cold Warriors in the U.S. demanded solidarity with the 
seemingly defenseless Georgia, which had recently undergone some degree of liberalization, and 
shook their proverbial fingers at the bearish Russia, whom they accused of reverting to delusions 
of Soviet-era grandeur. Georgian public relations celebrated a triumph, despite Russia's 
clamping down even more forcefully in the disputed territory of South Ossetia. But the facts of 
the attack were murky and seemed to point at a different truth. A post-conflict UN investigation 
found that it had in fact been Georgia that had initiated a siege on the disputed breakaway region 
of South Ossetia, and that the Russians had only acted in response.160 While both sides were 
accused of war crimes, there was no indication that Russia had acted any worse than Georgia. 
Nevertheless, the Putin regime had been humiliated on an international stage. Despite winning 
the ground war, it seemed that Russia had lost a larger war. Russian leadership ascribed its public 
relations defeat to its aged associations with the Soviet Union and an unflattering image abroad. 
With this in mind, Russia launched a wide campaign to remake its image to the post-Cold War 
world.
160 Bruno Waterfield. “EU Blames Georgia for Starting War with Russia.” The Telegraph. September 30, 2009. 
Accessed October 4, 2018. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/6247620/EU-blames- 
Georgia-for-starting-war-with-Russia.html
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The Russian Federation refocused its efforts on “soft power.” Defined by Harvard scholar 
Joseph Nye in 1990 as “the ability to affect what other countries want [...] with intangible power 
resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions,”161 Nye's influential argument proved 
useful to the floundering twenty-first century Russia. Nye's article, published during the final 
breaths of the Soviet Union, argued that traditional military force was no longer the measure of 
political influence--that in an age of information, influencing the understandings and ideologies 
of foreign publics was the most effective way to produce change. Nye stated explicitly that the 
Soviet Union had benefited from its soft power through its “communist ideology, the myth of 
inevitability, and transnational communist institutions.”162 When the Communist Party collapsed 
shortly after the publication of his article, Soviet ideology also lost its appeal.
161 Joseph Nye “Soft Power.” Foreign Policy. (Autumn, 1990). 166-167
162 Nye, “Soft Power,” 167
163 Interestingly, the Concept accuses the U.S. of abusing “soft power” in the same section, stating that “At the same 
time, increasing global competition and the growing crisis potential sometimes creates a risk of destructive and 
unlawful use of "soft power" and human rights concepts to exert political pressure on sovereign states, interfere in 
their internal affairs, destabilize their political situation, manipulate public opinion, including under the pretext of 
financing cultural and human rights projects abroad”
After nearly two decades of a floundering economy and a general lack of patriotism, the 
2008 Russo-Georgian War provided a strong impetus for Russia to develop a soft power 
strategy. Its National Security Concept in 2013 (the first published after the Russo-Georgian 
War) explicitly endorsed soft power as a national security instrument. In Section 20, the Concept 
states that “Soft power is a comprehensive toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives 
building on civil society potential, information, cultural and other methods and technologies 
alternative to traditional diplomacy, is becoming an indispensable component of modern 
international relations.”163
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Russia's task was to shed the image of the injured, bitter former-super power that was 
over-eager to take out its resentment at having lost the Cold War on smaller, defenseless 
neighbors. But what was the new image to be? The question of the “Russian idea” has a long and 
fraught history extending back centuries, but after the Georgian War, the question became more 
explicitly linked to national security. The 2009 National Security Strategy, approved less than a 
year after the war with Georgia, included Article 84, which called for acknowledging Russia's 
“cultural-moral values, by reinforcing the spiritual unity of the multinational population of the 
Russian Federation and the international image of Russia as a country with a very rich traditional 
and dynamically developing contemporary culture.”164 Russia's international image was thus 
explicitly linked to its culture and religion. In 2011, Igor Yurgens, then Chairman of the Institute 
of Contemporary Development, published an influential op-ed entitled “Hard Call to Soft 
Power” in which he outlined Russia's two main points of attraction to the world as being 1) “the 
patron of Orthodox Slavs” and a “unique multi-ethnic alliance of nations”165 and 2) as an 
alternative ideology to Western liberalism's hegemony.166 Both ideas are foundational to 
Eurasianism but particularly reminiscent of Aleksandr Panarin's exposition on “Orthodox 
civilization” in a global world. Instead of aggressors, the new paradigm recast Russia a protector 
of its “unique multi-ethnic alliance” from the West's pernicious liberalism, embodied by 
Georgian President Saakashvili.
164 Russian Federation, 2009, “Strategia Natsional'noi Bezopastnosti Rossisskoi federatsia do 2020” (“National 
Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020”) May, 13, 2009. http://kremlin.ru/supplement/424
165Igor Yurgens. “Zhestkii Vysov ‘Myagkoi Sile'” (“Hard Call to ‘Soft Power,'”) Rossisskaya Gazeta. September 
16, 2011, accessed September 25, 2018. https://rg.ru/2011/09/16/yurgens.html
166 Greg Simons. “Russian public diplomacy in the 21st century: Structure, means and message.” Public Relations 
Review: 40 (2014), 445
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Russian leadership determined that a key shortcoming in its current strategy was the lack 
of news sources that could convey messages to an international audience. This was particularly 
crucial in a dynamic situation such as the one in Georgia, but also necessary in order to establish 
a new image of Russia during times of peace. As Nye states, with new technology, “Information 
becomes power, especially before it spreads.”167 The cable news channel Russia Today had been 
created in 2005 when the ideas about Russia's need to rebrand as a public diplomacy effort were 
in their infancy, but within a decade the network would become an international force. At its 
founding Russia Today was a standard medium for public diplomacy, akin to BBC or Deutsche 
Welle, which featured mostly general, human-interest stories about Russia that emphasized a 
softer face of the country, with coverage of quaint village life and scientific expeditions.168 Few 
paid attention. In the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian War, however, Russia Today took a turn 
that would have public diplomacy scholars scratching their heads. Rebranded as an ambiguous 
sounding RT, the network turned its focus away from promoting its own ideology and began 
sharply criticizing the West. Taking up stories of dissatisfied groups within the U.S., such as the 
Occupy Wall Street movement, which had been largely ignored by the Western media, RT found 
resonance with many Westerners who felt disenfranchised after the financial crisis of 2008. Its 
viewership grew exponentially. Today it claims a global audience of over one billion on 
YouTube through its five languages.169 While some of RT's practices have been denounced for 
journalistic violations, its coverage of the Occupy Wall Street movement earned the network an 
167 Nye, Soft Power, 164
168 Yablokov Conspiracy Theories, 305
169 “About RT.” Accessed September 24, 2018. Rt.com/about-us/
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International Emmy nomination in 2012, legitimizing its status as a news network that had 
previously been seen as a propaganda arm of the Russian government.
Although RT portrays itself as a state-funded but privately run business akin to the BBC, 
it exhibits several key differences. For instance, the BBC's board of directors is publicly known 
so that conflicts of interest can be identified, while RT keeps its board of directors secret. One of 
the former board members is reportedly Presidential Administration Deputy Chief of Staff 
Aleksey Gromov, who is said to oversee RT's political coverage and regularly meets with editor­
in-chief Simonyan to share classified information with her.170 The U.S. State Department's 
analysis also suggests that bureau managers are rotated from foreign service posts, “suggesting a 
close relationship between RT and Russia's foreign policy apparatus.”171 Finally, Simonyan 
herself has stated that the organization she oversees is subservient to the Kremlin: “since RT 
receives budget from the state, it must complete tasks given by the state.”172 RT sees itself as one 
tool pushing Russia's larger civilizational mission.
170 National Intelligence Council (U.S.). 2017. Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent Us Elections. 
Ica, 2017-01d. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Council: 10
171 National Intelligence Council, 2017, 10
172172 National Intelligence Council, 2017, 9
173 Pomerantsev and Weiss, 2014, 19
As Weiss and Pomerantsev note, RT's motto of “Question More” appeals to liberals who 
feel disenfranchised from Western capitalism economically, while its conservative religious 
leanings make it attractive to religious conservatives.173 To politically left-leaning viewers, RT 
frames Russia as a sort of representative of other emerging countries that had been oppressed by 
the West's economic hegemony in the post-Cold War landscape, by focusing on a general 
criticism of Western hegemony. On the right, RT's portrayal of Russia as a “traditional” and
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“religious” culture has garnered the endorsement of the likes of Pat Buchanan and Donald Trump 
(though as Pomerantsev and Weiss point out, it is a strange label for a country in which only 4 
percent of people attend church regularly).174 While its actual reach remains unclear, RT claims 
an impressive social media following, with three million unique views daily and fifty million 
monthly,175 suggesting that Russia has been successful in its public diplomacy effort.
174 Pomerantsev and Weiss, 2014, 19
175175 “About RT.” Accessed September 24, 2018. Rt.com/about-us/
176 Nuriya Mansurova MukhamedzhaHova. “Informatsionnaya voina kak tip mezhtsivilatsionogo vzaimodeistvie.” 
(“Information War as a type of inter-civilizational interaction.”) Gramota: 2(64) (2016), 117
3.6 Information Warfare
While Russia's “public diplomacy” influences audiences through attraction, “information 
warfare” describes a more adversarial approach to media framing. The West had preferred 
“public diplomacy,” at least since the end of the Cold War to attract adherents to their bright 
vision of global liberal democracy. In Russia, however, the term “information war” has found 
renewed popularity parallel with Russia's more assertive foreign policy. Beginning with Putin's 
rise, Russian pundits and scholars in the 2000s have been hammering alarmism about the 
information war between Russia and the West that is not only active but has been un-interrupted 
since the Cold War. Acknowledging Russia's lag in the information arena, one Russian scholar 
proclaims that “modern researchers call this a ‘psychological war,' insofar as it is aimed at the 
destruction of traditional social order, at the destruction of the bonds that unite people and their 
society in a hierarchical system,”176 implying that the United States consciously aims to disrupt 
Eurasia's teleological mission. Another Russian scholar states that “These wars are 
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acknowledged to be no less dangerous than armed conflicts in that they may result in an 
irreparable harm to the object of the action (e.g. a country, people, individuals, etc.) or even to 
outright annihilation.”177 The Eurasianist Dugin boldly proclaims that just as technology has 
forced a shift from a commodity economy to an information economy, so too has the main 
battleground in civilizational conflict shifted from the military to the informational sphere.178
177 I.V. Kultysheva and P. V. Vishnyakova “Information warfare against modern Russia.” Odin poyas--Odin put': 
Linguistika vzaimodeistwiya: materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii. (One zone--one path. Linguistics of 
Interactions: Materials of the International Scientific Conference.) Ed. A.P Chudinov and Sun Yoikhua. 
Yekaterinburg, (October 16-21 2017.) 80. Accessed October 3, 2018. 
http://politlinguist.ru/materials/conf/2017.pdf#page=96
178 Dugin, Geopolitics of Post-Modernism, Chapter 6
179 Alexander Bogomolov and Oleksandr Lytvynyenko. “Ghost in the Mirror: Russian Soft Power in Ukraine.” 
Chatham House, January, 2012: 10. Accessed October 3 2018. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/181667
180 Bogomolov, Ghost in the Mirror, 10
Ukraine in 2014 was a testing ground for these new theories of war. Though unmarked 
Russian troops did not set foot on the ground until 2014, the groundwork for the invasion was 
being laid well before that. In 2009 in response to Russian channels operating in Ukraine that 
Kiev's pro-Western government labeled fascist and Nazi-sympathetic, President Viktor 
Yuschenko signed laws clamping down on media outlets critical of the national culture of 
Ukraine and asked translators to stop broadcasting these stations.179 While intended to stop 
dissemination of Russian news sources, the law in fact empowered them through reinforcing 
their narrative of an authoritarian crackdown on ethnic Russians. Yuschenko's move was also 
ineffectual, because the Eastern part of Ukraine is predominantly ethnic Russians who 
themselves could claim to be part of the national culture of the geographically defined 
Ukraine.180 These Russian media, presumably with state support, developed a narrative that 
aligned pro-Western Ukrainians with fascism and implied that Kiev was preparing for a 
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crackdown on non-Ukrainian ethnicities, including Russians, that would be reminiscent of the 
Holocaust.181 As Pomerantsev and Weiss describe it, Russia's model assumes that “information 
precedes essence;”182 that is, the narrative groundwork that was set prior to the conflict makes 
news consumers more likely to fill gaps in line with their own confirmation biases, while 
ignoring facts that contradict the biases. As the conflict escalated and Russian media 
consolidated control over news media in the disputed Eastern regions of Ukraine, news stations 
intensified their narrative, using tactics to dehumanize the pro-Western Maidan protesters by 
showing them in bandanas and masks, committing acts of violence, and by omitting personal 
interviews with them that could have given them a human face.183 The media even repeated 
unsubstantiated reports of atrocities against Russian nationals by Ukrainians.184 The U.S. House 
of Representatives convened hearings on the Ukraine crisis in 2015 during which a witness 
called Russia's actions the “the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg since the Supreme 
Allied Commander General Philip Breedlove after the annexation of Crimea.”185
181 Bogomolov, Ghost in the Mirror, 10
182 Pomerantsev and Weiss, How the Kremlin Weaponizes, 30
183 Sergei A. Samoilenko, Elina Erzikova, Sergey Davydov, and Alexander Laskin. “Different Media, Same 
Messages: Character Assassination in the Television News during the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis.” International 
Communication Research Journal, no. 2 (2017): 35. Accessed December 2 2018.
184 Werner, Gregory. “What Americans can learn from fake news in Ukraine.” Rough Translation. August, 17, 
2017. Accessed October 3, 2018. https://www.npr.org/2017/08/21/544952989/rough-translation-what-americans- 
can-learn-from-fake-news-in-ukraine
185 Confronting Russia's Weaponization of Information : Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House 
of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, First Session April 15, 2015. Washington : U.S. 
Government Publishing Office, 2015. Accessed October 3 2018. 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20150415/103320/HHRG-114-FA00-Transcript-20150415.pdf
The most recent U.S. presidential elections again evidenced Russia's larger strategic 
offensive. The election prompted the CIA to issue the report entitled “Assessing Russian 
Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections” outlining the actions taken by Russian media 
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operating in the U.S. The report highlighted RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan's repeated 
use of the term information war to describe her network's efforts in Ukraine and Georgia and 
more broadly.186 One witness who testified at the hearing, a former American RT employee also 
called for retaliation, stating that “We shouldn't let it slide. We need to take notice and take 
action.” Russia's information warfare has thus provoked a response--or at least calls for 
response--that feed into an Eurasianist narrative of a clash of civilizations.
186 Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in 
Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution,” January 6, 2017: 17. Accessed 
October 10, 2018. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf
Tellingly, the most prominent Eurasianists today seem to have been at the vanguard of 
this new style of media interventionism. Though the West responded only recently, the 
Eurasianist Aleksandr Dugin called for an all-out information war based on what he calls the 
“network centric” methods to be conducted against the U.S. at least since 2007. Dugin claims 
that Russia's capacity to wage information war was crippled during the Post-Soviet nineties and 
that in 2007 it still used “agrarian” techniques compared to the technologically sophisticated 
West. The U.S., meanwhile, had a decade-long head start during the Russian Federation's early 
years, and had been implanting pernicious ideas about democracy and universal human rights in 
Russian society over the past few decades. Dugin's call for a sophisticated, large-scale project 
aimed at disrupting American society resembles what was seen in the 2016 U.S. election, in 
which troll farms in Russia used fake social media accounts to spread false information from 
media outlets like RT to exploit deep-seated rifts in American society. While the U.S. political 
establishment was taken off guard, Dugin's 2007 book provides a theoretical basis for the 
actions:
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This calls for the creation of a special group which should include separate, high-ranking 
officials, the best passionary [adopting Gumilev's term] cadres of different special 
forces, intellectuals, academics, engineers, political scientists, a corpus of patriotically- 
minded journalists, and creators of culture. The task of this group would be the formation 
of a model for a Eurasian network, using the foundational elements of American post-
modernism and approach to information, but aimed symmetrically against the vector of 
the Americans' actions.187
187 Aleksandr Dugin. Geopolitiki Postmoderna (Geopolitics of Post-Modernism.) Ebook. Saint Petersburg: Amfora, 
2007. Accessed September 20, 2018 http://propagandahistory.ru/books/Aleksandr-Dugin Geopolitika- 
postmoderna/35
188 Igor Panarin. Informatsionnaya voina i geopolitka (Information War and Geopolitics). Ebook.
Moscow: Pokolenie, 2006. Chapter 21. Accessed September 24, 2018. https://public.wikireading.ru/77143
It is unclear whether this book inspired the Kremlin's election campaign but clearly Dugin was 
thinking along parallel lines of the officials who instigated the campaign.
Igor Panarin, (not to be confused with the aforementioned Aleksandr Panarin), another 
prominent Eurasianist and member of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, is even more 
explicit in combining Eurasianism with information warfare. In Information Warfare and 
Geopolitics (2006), he writes that “it is expedient to intensify and strengthen information and 
analytical support for the ongoing policy of accelerating the construction of Eurasian Rus',” and 
that “the key moment in today's World development can be formulated thus: Eurasian Rus' 
against the New Britannic Empire. Victory in this information war can only be achieved through 
the integration of all the countries of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States, a voluntary 
council made up of former Soviet Republics], and the construction of a Continental Arc.”188 To 
do this, he recommends intensifying the Russian language broadcasts in the territory of the 
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former Soviet Union, particularly in Ukraine. He suggests building a broadcasting station in 
Southern Russia that could translate Russian channels to all of the areas of southern Ukraine and 
Crimea that would cost a mere $300,000.189 While it is unclear whether this project materialized, 
clearly the Russian invaders prioritized the dissemination of Russian news during the invasion 
itself and during the ensuing referendum on joining Russia.190 As the conflict in Ukraine 
escalated, the pro-Russian government in Crimea refused to acknowledge the new, pro-Western 
government in Kiev and shut down all Ukrainian news channels on the peninsula and even 
blocked access to Ukrainian news websites.191 When unmarked Russian soldiers marched into 
Crimea, one of the first things they did was seize television stations.192
189 Panarin, Informatsionnaya voina, Chapter 21.
190 Margarita Jaitner. “Russian Information Warfare: Lessons from Ukraine.”
Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine. Ed. Kenneth Geers. (Tallinn, Estonia: NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence: 2015), 91.
191 Reporters Without Borders. “Summary of attacks on media.” August 31, 2015. Accessed October 3, 2018. 
https://rsf.org/en/news/summary-attacks-media
192 Reporters Without Borders. “Reporters at centre of media storm in Eastern Ukraine.” August 31, 2015, accessed
October, 3, 2018. https://rsf.org/en/news/reporters-and-media-centre-storm-eastern-ukraine
3.7 Conclusion
Although the media landscape has changed in the wake of Soviet collapse, in that it now 
allows for more individual freedom and creativity, the mass media still plays a different role in 
Russia than they do in the West. Both producers and consumers see Russian news media as a 
tool for promoting an ideological mission instead of as unbiased purveyors of objective 
information. Though some, such as Weiss and Pomerantsev, argue that the most pernicious 
effects are the strategic obfuscation of the very concept of truth, they also acknowledge an 
underlying ideological narrative that endorses some of the most contentious tenets of
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Eurasianism. This ideology has been molded through self-censorship, as well as occasional 
violent extra-judicial physical intimidation and murders, which has made questioning territorial 
unity, the authority of President Putin, or the sanctity of the Orthodox Church particularly taboo 
topics, in turn perpetuating Eurasianist worldviews to mass audiences. Public diplomacy efforts, 
spearheaded by the Kremlin, have also been used to advance a view of Russia as a special 
civilization of deep spiritual and traditional values to the Russian diaspora abroad, where it has 
also seeped into the larger Western public, despite the questionable nature of Russia's 
“conservatism.” The concept of “information warfare” has also been reintroduced into 
mainstream Russian discourse and advanced by Western media and government, reinforcing 
predictions of the Eurasianists about civilizational confrontations. As Damm and Cooley (2017) 
suggest, the global media environment does not suppress stories outright, but emphasizes certain 
stories to craft a cohesive narrative.193 Russian and even American audiences have recognized 
manifestations of Eurasianism on issues of foreign policy, suggesting that the Russian effort has 
been successful. While the aforementioned Eurasianist themes have been perpetuated owing to 
their alignment with larger geopolitical dynamics, Eurasianism as an ideology is much broader 
than just geopolitics. As discussed in Chapter 2, the ideology pays particular attention to the 
interactions between various ethnicities or ethnoi. Indigenous peoples' rights and welfare are a 
less politically-charged topic than the war in Ukraine or the 2016 presidential election, and thus 
less studied, but can offer an equally fruitful focus of study to glean insights into how the 
Russian state-media apparatus develops a narrative concerning a particular issue.
193 Damm, Resurrection of Russian Orthodox Church, 245
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Chapter 4 Research Design
4.1 Introduction
As Eurasianism has become a prominent narrative of modern Russian discourse, the 
question arises of exactly how Eurasianism functions to legitimize Russia's sovereignty over its 
non-majority population. As the media serves as a representation of both the Kremlin's ideology 
and the public's reaction to it, it offers a medium through which to sharpen understanding of 
Eurasianism's role. Of course, the media of any country is vast, and an analysis of all of the 
relevant articles would be impossible, so the first task is winnowing down the scope of the 
potential data to something manageable.
4.1.1 Media Content Analysis
Kimberley Neuendorf, a prominent content analysis researcher, defines media content 
analysis as “the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics” that can 
include “written text or transcribed speech, as well as techniques that focus on non-textual 
message content, including pictorial images, graphical elements, moving images, nonverbal 
behaviors, music, and sounds.”194 Harold Lasswell, former president of the American Political 
Science Association, first developed the methods in the 1920s, to study propaganda messaging 
during the First World War; the field has continued to grow since then. Neuendorf reports that 
“in the field of mass communication research, content analysis has been the fastest-growing 
technique over the past 20 years or so.”195 As Neuendorf explains, one of the primary--though 
contested--distinctions of media content analysis is whether it is qualitative or quantitative in 
194 Kimberley Neuendorf and Anup Kumar. The International Encyclopedia of Political Communication. First 
Edition. Ed, by Gianpietro Mazzoleni. (John Wiley & Sons, Inc: 2002), 2.
195 Kimberley Neuendorf. The Content Analysis Guidebook. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002), 1.
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nature. Neuendorf writes that “the distinction between quantitative and qualitative analyses of 
message content is sometimes contested, varying between (a) whether the constructs of interest 
are principally quantitative or qualitative in nature, and (b) whether the measures of these 
constructs result in quantifications or more qualitative (either microscopic or holistic) 
descriptions of the messages.”196 Often quantitative and qualitative analysis is used in 
complementary ways, which will be the case for this project.
196 Neuendorf, International Encyclopedia, 2
197 Neuendorf, Content Analysis, 10
198 Neuendorf, Content Analysis, 53
199 Neuendorf, Content Analysis, 53
Neuendorf calls for analysis based in the scientific method with “attention to objectivity- 
intersubjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, generalizability, replicability, and 
hypothesis testing,”197 but also emphasizes that media content analysis can be 1) descriptive, 2) 
inferential, 3) psychometric, and 4) predictive.198 This project will be most concerned with the 
descriptive and inferential components of the Kremlin-aligned media's portrayal of Indigenous 
Peoples using the framework of Eurasianism for more implicit analysis. Of course, as Neuendorf 
points out, the predictive and inferential roles are subject to the researcher's interpretation, and 
thus the descriptive data gathered are used to facilitate conclusions, and cannot be conclusive.199
Due to its national security importance, Russian media has been relatively well-studied in 
recent years. Previous content analysis of Russian media has focused on contentious political 
issues, such as the Russo Georgian War, the 2016 presidential election, or the annexation of 
Crimea. For example, Pavel Slutskiy and Dimitrii Gavra use media content analysis to assess 
Donald Trump's popularity in Russia. Slutsky and Gavra selected 91 texts from Kremlin-
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affiliated media that included television (NTV, 1TV Channel, Rossiya TV), print (Rossiyskaya
Gazeta, Vzglyad, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moskovskii Komsomolets, Sobesednik,
Izvestia), and online sources (lenta.ru, dni.ru, fb.ru, gazeta.ru).200 The authors notably omitted 
RT, despite its large international reach, likely because they focused on perceptions within 
Russia and not on the Russian diaspora or the international public. Slutsky and Gavra attributed 
Trump's popularity in Russia to the lexical framing of the candidate during the election. Russian 
media often referred to Trump with words such as honest, sincere, billionaire, entrepreneur, and 
popular TV host, while the media demonized his opponent Clinton as an explicitly anti-Russia 
candidate. The authors found that 93.5 percent of references to Trump in the selected media were 
positive toward the Republican candidate, and 100 percent of Trump's quotations about Russian 
foreign policy were positive.201
200 Pavel Slutskiy and Dimitrii Gavra. “The Phenomenon of Trump's Popularity in Russia: a Media Analysis 
Perspective.” American Behavioral Scientist vol. 61(3) (2017), 336. Accessed November 2 2018. DOI: 
10.1177/0002764217693281
201 Slutskiy and Gavra, Phenomenon of Trump's popularity, 342
202Sultan Alzahrani, Nyunsu Kim, Scott W. Ruston, Jason Schlachter, Steve R. Corman. “Framing shifts of the 
Ukraine Conflict in Pro-Russia News Media.” International Conference on Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural 
Modeling and Prediction and Behavior Representation in Modeling and Simulation. July, 2018. Accessed 
September 25, 2018. https://link.springer.com/conference/sbp
Alzahrani and colleagues' 2018 analysis of Russian media framing of the Ukraine crisis 
of 2014 offers another useful example of how Russian media has been analyzed. The authors 
collected data from a defined timeframe, inductively developed a set of framing categories, 
coded the data, and then conducted a time series analysis, which they cross-referenced with 
significant phases of the Ukrainian operation in Russia.202 The paper identified five frames the 
Russian state-aligned media used that served to justify incursion into Ukraine: 1) association of 
pro-Western Kievan government with fascism and Nazism, 2) discrimination against ethnic
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Russians by Ukrainian government, 3) derogation of the history of the Soviet Union, 4) general 
criticism of the Kievan government, and 5) justification of the invasion of Crimea. In this 
project, researchers eventually trained computers to conduct the coding. While Alzahrani et al.'s 
project considers a much larger scale (372 media outlets and 100,000 articles) the inductive 
principles for determining coding frameworks resemble those of my project. Alzahrani et al. 
sought to identify the exact time of the change in media framing or intensity that would allow 
them to hypothesize the general rules of a supposed Russian “playbook” for an armed takeover 
of a sovereign country based on the principles of hybrid warfare, and so they focused their 
analysis on time scale down to the day of publication. Because my project focuses on general 
theories of Eurasianism and how they apply, the articles collected in my project will be coded by 
year.
Perhaps the most relevant research method to my topic is Emily Belle Damm and Skye 
Cooley's 2018 narrative analysis of the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russian 
society.203 The authors collected 622 news items that contained the keyword “Orthodox Church” 
that aired between 2014 and 2015. After a preliminary analysis, the coders developed four 
thematic categories--the reconciliation of the church and the Russian state, the church as a unifier 
of Slavic people, the church as a moral authority, and the church's relationship to Russian 
citizens--which they then applied to the larger dataset. The authors then analyzed the articles 
referring to each thematic category to depict the narrative put forth by the Russian state in 
203 Emily Belle Damm and Skye Cooley. “Resurrection of the Russian Orthodox Church: Narrative of Analysis of 
the Russian National Myth.” Social Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell) 98 (3) (August 2017), 945 
doi:10.1111/ssqu.12429.
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relation to the Russian Orthodox Church. Damm and Cooley's relates close to this study, owing 
to its focus on the narrative aspect of the media content, a focus that this project shares.
As mentioned previously, the theoretical framework of Eurasianism is the basis for the 
coding scheme. As the research question is “To what extent does Eurasianism inform the 
Russian media's coverage of Indigenous Peoples in Russia and the United States?” the concepts 
previously developed about the Eurasianism's view on the relationship between the central 
government and Indigenous Peoples is paramount. The comparative nature of the project--i.e. the 
Russian media's portrayal of Native Americans vis-a-vis its portrayal of Indigenous Russians-- 
necessitates the division of the project into two sections because of the complicated interplay 
between the histories of colonization and Eurasianism. These sections will henceforth be called 
the Section 1: Indigenous Russians and Section 2: Native American History
4.1.2 Coding
The basic coding began with rating each news article as taking either a positive, negative, 
or neutral tone in its description of the relationship between the Indigenous Peoples and the 
federal government. I decided to narrow it down to the focus on the Federal-Indigenous 
relationship since that was what best illustrated the power relationship within the country as 
related to the subethnos-superethnos paradigm. As the subethnos was a unit of the superthnos, 
which is embodied by Moscow and Putin, focusing on this relationship--as opposed to the 
overall living conditions of the Indigenous Peoples--served to turn uncover the way that the 
Eurasianist theme of an organic political union of peoples manifests. For example, some articles 
were focused on the rectification of a problem of Indigenous Peoples being denied subsistence 
privileges because of faulty documentation. Even though this made Indigenous Peoples lives 
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difficult, the articles often portrayed them as working closely with the federal government to 
rectify the problem. In other words, instead of focusing on the fact that the government had 
created the problem originally, the articles focused on the government's role in fixing the 
problem. These articles were thus coded as positive, since they portrayed a positive working 
relationship between Indigenous groups and the government. Most articles were coded as 
neutral, since they didn't portray any sort of relationship between the federal government and the 
Indigenous Peoples, and a few were coded as negative. These were articles that clearly indicated 
a tense relationship between the federal government and Indigenous Peoples, such as protesters 
at the Standing Rock calling the government's approval of Keystone XL Pipeline “ecological 
genocide.” This preliminary coding scheme helped verify my original contention of a Eurasianist 
influence in the news media.
Next, I established a coding scheme for each section in response to the question: “How 
are Eurasianist themes manifested in the Russian media's portrayal of Indigenous Peoples?” As 
Eurasianism addresses the relationship of the periphery (Indigenous Peoples) to the center (U.S. 
federal government or Russia), the analysis focuses on Indigenous Peoples' relationships with 
their respective federal governments. Based on a preliminary analysis and common sense, one 
would predict that, in general, a Eurasianist influence on the news media's coverage would 
assume that the Russian-Indigenous Peoples relationships will be portrayed in a positive light, 
since Eurasianism assumes an organic fusion of the people of Eurasia, while the U.S.-Indigenous 
Peoples relationships will more often be portrayed as fraught, since Eurasianism posits 
oppression of minorities in the Western paradigm. I will use my own interpretation to evaluate 
each article as portraying either a positive, negative or neutral overall tone in its portrayal of the 
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federal-Indigenous government. This allowed a baseline of quantitative data that served as an 
entry point to more detailed analysis.
Based on a summary of the tenets of Eurasianism as they relate to nationalities in Chapter 
2, I constructed a rough prediction of what themes might arise and be highlighted in the Russian 
news media. I tested the themes for falsifiability by including contra-positives for each code. For 
example, if one of the codes was Native Americans' discontent with federal government I created 
the corresponding falsified code Native Americans' satisfaction with federal government. In 
addition to the deductive testing, I used an inductive component to the coding process to add 
certain codes during the data analysis. While there are certainly predictions about the way that 
Eurasianism would manifest itself in coverage of Indigenous Peoples, the philosophy is broad, 
and its complexities multiply when applying abstract philosophical ideas to frame real-life 
events. Some events may easily be categorized within the frame of Eurasianism, while others 
may be more elusive. This inductive classification allows a more nuanced view of the way that 
Eurasianism is--or is not--manifested in the data. As Ji Young Cho and Eun-Hee Lee note, a 
“unique characteristic of qualitative content analysis is the flexibility of using inductive or 
deductive approaches or a combination of both approaches in data analysis.”204 
For Section 1 Indigenous Russians, I identified two major themes. The first was:
204 Ji Young Cho and Lee Eun-Hee. “Reducing confusion about grounded theory and qualitative data analysis: 
similarities and differences.” The Qualitative Report 19 no. 32 (August 2014), 4. Accessed on December 2 2018. 
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol19/iss32/2
• Forces Uniting Eurasia and includes:
o Civilizational unity which refers to mentions of an ineffable force 
that unites the diverse communities within Russia;
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o Geographic unity which refers to Savitsky's notion of a natural 
symmetry of the Eurasian continent that economically binds 
diverse peoples;
o Linguistic unity, which refers to Trubetskoy's contention that the 
various language groups have converging features that suggest a 
common direction; and
o Spiritual unity, which refers to either common belief in the Russian 
Orthodox Church, or more general feelings of spiritual unity.
The second category was Russian state as a benevolent patriarch to Indigenous Peoples, 
arranged to include the subthemes.
• Russian State as a benevolent patriarch to Indigenous Peoples
o Cultural stewardship by the Russian government in nurturing the 
cultures of its Indigenous peoples through government ;
o Defense of traditional lifestyles, referring to protection of 
subsistence and other forms of cultural expressions;
o Economic development, which refers to both developing traditional 
and modern economic activities;
o Educational development, which includes traditional forms of 
education, as well as educational conferences or museum 
construction;
o Protection of environment on which the Indigenous peoples live;
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o Equitable resolution of territorial disputes, as opposed to unfair, 
exploitative resolutions as Russia views those in the United States;
o Funds granted to Indigenous Peoples from the federal government 
for any purpose;
o Stewardship of Indigenous health, including expanding health 
insurance and services;
o Language stewardship, referring to government initiatives to 
preserve Indigenous languages through education or other means;
o Political empowerment of Indigenous groups, including the 
organization of conferences and meetings with federal officials;
o Improvement of social conditions'” which refers to a wide variety 
of aid from the federal government to reduce unemployment, 
homelessness, or social prestige;
o Special rights or privileges granted to Indigenous groups, which 
refers to various government allowances to different Indigenous 
groups that acknowledge their distinctiveness from the majority 
culture.
The contrapositive codes were made based on this code list. For example, the counter 
code for Russia as a benevolent patriarch to Indigenous Peoples was coded as Russia as a 
malevolent/negligent steward to Indigenous Peoples.
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For the Native American Section of this project, I identified three general framing 
themes. The first was
• Native Americans' discontent with the U.S. Government. This theme takes a 
variety of forms based largely on Neo-Eurasianist interpretations of the Eurasian 
mission, which denigrates the West. Subthemes identified in this category 
include:
o Avarice of the West in dealing with Native People (i.e. how a soulless
capitalism drives disrespect for minority groups);
o Cultural or spiritual suppression of Native American groups;
o Environmental pollution or degradation of native lands;
o Lack of recognition of legal rights of Native Americans;
o Mentions of Genocide including “cultural genocide,” and “linguistic 
genocide”;
o Political suppression or lack of self-government by Native Americans; 
Language suppression of Indigenous languages;
o Excessive violence in engaging with Native Americans;
o Social problems including social pathologies such as alcoholism, drug 
abuse, suicide, depression, as well as hunger, poor healthcare, poverty and 
unemployment among Native Americans;
o Fragmentation of democratic governments caused by Native Americans 
pursuing their rights outside of normal national legal avenues, such as 
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street protests outside of normal legal avenues, lawsuits, and appeals to 
international organizations;
o Racism on the part of the West or Western institutions towards Native 
American minorities;
o Territorial disputes between Native American groups and the U.S. or state 
governments;
o Treachery of the U.S. government in Treaties and Contracts with Native 
American governments; and
o Violence towards the U.S. Government perpetrated by dissatisfied Native 
Americans. As in the Indigenous Russians Section, I also created a list of 
contrapositive codes from the Eurasianist codes.
The second theme I identified in Russian media articles about Native Americans was that 
of Russia as a benevolent alternative to the West. Sub themes included:
o Appeals by Native Americans to Russia for help in problem 
solving;
o mentions of the Inherent egalitarianism of Russian culture in 
articles about Native Americans;
o mentions of Russian interest in Native American culture with 
implicit references to Americans' general disinterest in minority 
cultures;
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o mentions of Eurasians as guardians of natives in their own country 
or in their exploration of the Americas;
o Honesty of Eurasians in treaty or deal-making with Indigenous 
Peoples;
o Interest from Native Americans in a Eurasian model of political 
organization;
o Empowerment of Indigenous language by Russia;
o Pacifism of Russia in its treatment of Indigenous Peoples;
o Russia as an equitable trading partner to Indigenous Peoples; 
o and Spiritual development of Indigenous Peoples by Russia and 
Orthodox missionaries.
The third major theme comprises the natural Affinity between Eurasia and American 
Indians. This refers to suggestions that Eurasians share one or more characteristics with Native 
Americans that they do not share with non-Native Americans. Within this category, I identified 
several sub-themes related to the ways the media express this affinity. These included:
o Cultural affinities, or general cultural similarities between various 
Eurasian groups and Native Americans and based on Trubetskoy's idea of 
a convergence of cultural markers;
o Genetic affinities, or the common genetic origin of Eurasians and Native 
Americans;
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o Linguistic affinities, based on Trubetskoy's linguistically-rooted idea of 
Eurasia; and
o Spiritual affinities, based on the Duginian ideas of the Russian Orthodox 
Church as a cornerstone of Eurasian identity and Panarin's suggestion that 
all civic Russians share a “high degree of spirituality.”
As with previous sections, I created codes for the contrapositives of this list to capture 
explicit mentions of cultural, genetic, linguistic, or spiritual differences.
I developed these schemata with only preliminary review of the actual content of the 
articles and without in-depth knowledge of the pressing on-the-ground issues covered in the 
national media. As such, the results of the study depend on the elaboration of these two schemata 
into more specific themes to reveal more about how the media portray Indigenous Peoples within 
Russian society and whether the narratives align with Eurasianist ideology.
4.1.3 Data Source Selection
I selected news outlets based on their reach and diversity within the mainstream public 
discourse. I evaluated each media outlet's reach based on available numbers of distribution, and 
then used these numbers to select five prominent outlets that represented different ideological 
strains within the Russian media landscape. This decision, of course, was subjective to my own 
biases and understandings, though I will be able to tease out diverging narratives of the different 
news outlets (should there be any) after I completed coding. The decision to limit the media 
sources to five was made to roughly represent some of the different political and economic 
interests within mainstream Russian discourse, without becoming too bogged down with data. I 
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determined that the data sources would be limited to print media available online, as television-- 
though it is considered the most consumed and trusted media in Russia--would have to be 
transcribed, necessarily reducing the quantity of data I could analyze without unlimited means. I 
also assumed that self-censorship would reduce the variability between print and television 
journalism, making print an effective stand-in for television. With these considerations, I 
selected the following news sites, which I refer to as “Kremlin-aligned media.”
1. Argumenty i Fakty (Arguments and Facts)--AIF.ru
Argumenty i Fakty has the largest readership of any weekly newspaper in Russia 
with 6.5 million readers weekly.205 It is also the most popular Russian newspaper 
outside of Russia with retailers in 60 countries and claims to be one of the top-10 
most popular media sites in Russia.206 It was purchased by the Moscow City 
Government in 2014.
205 “Corporation.” Accessed October 3, 2018 http://corp.aif.ru/page/4
206 “Corporation.” Accessed October 3, 2018. http://corp.aif.ru/page/4
207 “About.” Accessed October 3, 2018. https://www.rt.com/about-us/
2. RT--RT.com
RT, whose role has been described extensively in section 3.3, is a growing 
network with lots of international and online reach. Its website claims that it 
receives 50 million unique views monthly (in its five different languages) and its 
YouTube channel is reportedly the first news channel to receive 1 billion views 
(which it did in 2013).207 RT is one of the Russian government's tools for public 
diplomacy and information warfare and its programing is sometimes carefully 
coordinated with high-level government officials. While its reach is perhaps more 
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significant to English-speaking audiences who were affected by RT's 
dissemination of “fake news,” it also significantly broadcasts to the Russian­
speaking diaspora across the world. RT thus provides an invaluable perspective on 
the worldview of the Russian ruling elite.
3. Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Russian Newspaper)--RG.ru
Rossiyskaya Gazeta is the Russian government's official news outlet. Though 
often dry, it is invaluable in that it provides an official government line and its 
origins date back to the early Soviet Union. It has a circulation of 144,000 copies 
per day and states on its website that “according to polls, most of our readers are 
even-tempered adults inclined to hold conservative views.”208
208 “About.” Accessed October 3, 2018. https://rg.ru/about/
209 “History.” Accessed December 1, 2018. https://tass.ru/spec/tass-history
4. Komsomolskaya Pravda--KP.ru
Komsomolskaya Pravda also dates back to the 1920s and is probably the largest 
daily newspaper in Russia as of 2008, with a daily circulation of 660,000, 
according to TNS Gallup Media. It was also the most visited website that year. 
Komsomolskaya Pravda was originally founded as a revolutionary, left-wing 
paper, but has been part of the red-brown (Communist-Fascist) alliance of the 
post-Soviet era, and has been known to publish radical anti-American views.
5. TASS--TASS.ru
TASS is the official Russian news wire service that has been in operation for 114 
years.209 TASS produces news in English and Russian and has bureaus across the 
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country and the world. Its broad geographical presence across Russia and 
coverage of diverse, global topics, including American ones, make it useful for 
our analysis.
In addition to these five “Kremlin aligned media,” I selected two control media outlets to 
establish a standard with which I could compare coverage.
1. BBC Russia--BBC.com/russia
A service of the British Broadcasting Corporation, which despite its biases, can safely be 
assumed not to have a Eurasianist bias. BBC Russia has both translations of English- 
language articles, as well as original articles written in Russian. BBC Russia has a strong 
focus on the West, which makes it a good source for articles about Native Americans, but 
is not subject to pressures by the Kremlin as it is owned by the British public, as opposed 
to being held by private investors with Kremlin ties. Because it had poor coverage of 
Russian Indigenous people, I substituted Novaya Gazeta for it in Section 1.
2. Novaya Gazeta--Novayagazeta.ru
The strongest independent opposition newspaper in Russia was founded by former Soviet 
Premier Mikhail Gorbachev in 1993 with the money he earned from the Nobel Peace 
Prize. It has become a force of opposition to the ruling government despite overt and 
covert threats to its journalists. It has an average daily print readership of 50,000, 
according to the National Circulation Service,210 and many more online. It is one of the 
few newspapers in Russia that covers Indigenous Peoples' issues.
210 Natsional'naya tirazhnaya sluzhba. (National Circulation Service.) “Reestr Sertifitsirovannykh Izdanniya” 
(“Register of Certified Publications.”) October 29, 2018, accessed November 16 2018. http://pressaudit.ru/reestr/
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4.1.4 Data Collection
I collected data through a Google search between April 15 and May 29 of 2018. I divided 
the search terms by Section 1 and Section 2.
I conducted Section 1: Indigenous Russians in the same way, but using different search 
terms. The primary search term for this section will be “коренные малочисленные народы 
севера” (“Small Numbered People of the North”). Hits with missing links or repeated articles 
will be ignored. Secondary and tertiary search terms which were used in the case that the primary 
term does not yield sufficient results are “РАЙПОН” (RAIPON), and “Ассоциация коренных 
малочисленных народов Севера, Сибири и Дальнего Востока Российской Федерации” 
(Association of Indigenous, small numbered people of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the 
Russian Federation). These terms both refer to the non-profit advocacy organization chartered by 
the Russian government that has enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy in the past decade. In this 
manner, over fifty results were collected from the six news outlets (excluding BBC Russia).
I decided to use the blanket organization's term as opposed to individual ethnonyms, due 
to the focus of this study. Another research design may have included a search of individual 
ethnonyms--Even, Chukchi, Nenets, Tungus, etc.--but this would have either skewed the focus 
towards the groups selected or necessitated a larger data pool, which was beyond the constraints 
of this project. I concluded that since the study's purpose was to analyze the media's presentation 
of the federal-Indigenous relationship, focusing on RAIPON was appropriate, because RAIPON 
is the primary interface between the federal government in Moscow and the Indigenous peoples 
spread across Eurasia.
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Section 2: Native Americans used the Russian terms for Native Americans, “коренные 
жители Америки” (“Indigenous residents of American”), “коренные американцы” (“Native 
Americans”), and “индейцы” (“Indians”). These terms returned thousands of results. Articles 
were printed and saved as PDF files. One problem encountered was with an inaccurate use of the 
term “коренные жители Америки” (“Indigenous resident of America”), which was 
occasionally used in recent years to refer to non-immigrant whites who were dissatisfied with 
illegal immigrants from Latin America. I decided to discard any results in which the term was 
used in this definition. The context of these references clarified when they were “false hits.”
In this way about 55 articles were gathered from each of the six (excluding Novaya 
Gazeta) aforementioned news outlets. Though my aim was to acquire 50 articles, I determined 
that the possibility of finding duplicate articles or “false hits” required additional culling of data 
during the analysis. For some outlets, 50 results were not found for the first search term 
“коренные жители Америки” (“Indigenous residents of America”) in which case I used the 
same procedure to search with the term “коренные американцы” (Native Americans”) and 
gleaned any previously unsaved articles with relevant use of the term. Except in one case, this 
yielded enough results. In that case I entered the term “индейцы” (“Indians”), which yielded the 
goal of 50 relevant results.
4.1.5 Limitations
This study has many limitations, the most primary of which comprises the difficulty in 
establishing a control to account for what one would expect from a relatively unbiased or 
independent media outlet without any ideological influence. Damm and Cooley's analysis of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, while valuable, did not consider whether the themes they found in
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their analysis were in fact more emphasized in Kremlin-aligned versus independent media, and 
thus they left open the possibility that another narrative was in place, hidden behind the themes 
they were predisposed to search for. While the use of a control media aims to strengthen the 
methodology, any control media may be influenced by other internalized narratives or political 
pressures. BBC Russia, the control media for the “Native American Section,” is a service funded 
by the British government. While some journalists are of foreign origin and may be susceptible 
to ongoing social or political narratives in their countries of residence, others are Russian and are 
presumably somewhat influenced by the predominant Eurasianist narrative. Though I attempted 
to code for this difference, many of the articles had no byline, so the sample size would have 
been much too small to establish any pattern.
Another limitation of the study concerns data collection. As mentioned previously, the 
study was limited to written journalism because of the complications of transcribing large 
amounts of television stories, even though television is the most consumed form of media in 
Russia. Although I believe that the stories in print generally resemble those broadcast via 
television, the latter has the added component of images, which could be coded to establish more 
nuanced themes, as well as more visceral drama. Another potential direction to expand the study 
would be to consider more media outlets to achieve a broader view of what themes are 
emphasized. However, just as with coding for television, expanding the scope of media outlets 
would have expanded the time and resources required for this project. The data collection was 
also limited by Google's search algorithm. I selected the Google Site Search tool as opposed to a 
comprehensive survey of one or more news outlets as a way to limit the data in a way that would 
emphasize the most influential articles. Of course, whatever method I might use to determine 
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“influence” of an article will be imperfect. The Google Site Search is subject to the variables of 
its algorithm, which include the number of sites linked to the original article, prevalence of 
keywords, and the amount of time that the site has existed. None of these factors explicitly 
measure how often they were read in Russia, and thus serve as imperfect substitutions for actual 
influence.
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Chapter 5: Data Analysis
5.1 Indigenous Russian Section
Despite the prevalence of international reports that find a persistence of human rights 
abuses, racial discrimination, and poor living conditions,211 the Kremlin-aligned media paint an 
overwhelmingly positive portrait of Indigenous-Russian government relations.
211 For example, see Johannes Rohr. “Indigenous Peoples in the Russian Federation,” or Cultural Survival. 
“Observations on the State of Indigenous Human Rights in the Russian Federation Prepared for: The 30th Session of 
the United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review May 2017.” Accessed October 2018. 
https://www.culturalsurvival.org/sites/default/files/UPR-Report-Russian-Federation-2017.pdf
Table 5.1: Positive v. Negative Portrayals of Kremlin-Indigenous Relationships
AIF, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, RT and TASS all contained a striking dearth 
of critical representations of the federal-Indigenous relationship, with Komsomolskaya Pravda, 
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which is known for its nationalist bias, having a dramatic 1:30 ratio of negative to positive 
articles in its coverage of Indigenous Peoples. The data collection itself revealed a strange 
phenomenon of Russia's media coverage by Kremlin-aligned sources: the data collection 
protocol did not yield fifty news items in RT's reporting. Several factors may explain the 
disproportionate coverage of Native American stories versus articles addressing Russian 
government-Indigenous relations. RT serves as a tool for public diplomacy for the Russian 
diaspora living abroad (as well as for non-Russians) as opposed to being directed at citizens 
living within Russia. Perhaps stories regarding Indigenous-state relations in Russia would not 
interest its readers. Alternatively, RT may avoid mentioning its own people because of a 
preponderance of human rights abuses of Indigenous peoples within Russia. Perhaps RT would 
struggle to find positive, news-worthy stories regarding its own Indigenous peoples, and thus 
chooses to emphasize the systematic oppression of Indigenous Peoples in the United States. As 
Damm and Cooley explain in their narrative analysis of Kremlin-aligned media coverage of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, the Kremlin cannot manufacture stories from thin air. Instead, they 
emphasize certain stories, while ignoring those that do not align with their narrative.212
Damm, Resurrection of the Russian Orthodox Church, 91.
Despite a clear preference for “positive” articles among all of the Kremlin-aligned news 
sources, the coding scheme identified many articles with a “negative” tone. But many of these 
articles coded as “negative” tend to offer strange explanations for the negative dynamic between 
the federal government and Indigenous Peoples. An article in Komsomolskaya Pravda, for 
example, details several problems stemming from the elimination of a stamp on the passports of 
members of officially recognized Indigenous groups. The stamp had historically served as a 
212
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guarantee for Indigenous peoples to engage in certain subsistence activities from which the 
general public was barred, but was removed in the 1990s during westernization. However, this 
led to a spate of bureaucratic dysfunctions, since Indigenous no longer had a document to prove 
they belonged to the group they claimed, and thus were being denied subsistence rights that were 
guaranteed in the federal constitution. Following a lengthy interview with a local Indigenous 
rights advocate in which he extensively explains the problems caused by the elimination of this 
stamp, the article concludes with strange allusion to separatist movements within Russia.
“... the associate director of the Miklukho-Maklay Institute of Ethnology and 
Anthropology Vladimir Zorin expressed his discomfort with the ‘separatist feelings' that 
in his mind threaten the wholeness of Russia. ‘In contrast to the 1990s, these movements 
contain not just a purely ethnic character, but a regional-economic one.' He added that a 
law is necessary to protect against the propaganda of separatism.”213
213 Igor Morosov. “Malye narody Khabarovskogo kraya prosyat vernut im natsional'nost.” (“Little people of the 
Khabarovsk Krai ask to have their nationalities returned.”) Komsomolskaya Pravda. December 25, 2011. Accessed 
May 20, 2018. https://www.hab.kp.ru/daily/25810.5/2789635/
The article thus attributes the elimination of the passport seals to separatist agitation, rather than 
insufficient attention, resources, or protection offered to Indigenous peoples by the Kremlin. 
This brings us to a second factor that explains the sometimes negative portrayal of Indigenous 
peoples and their living conditions: the Eurasianist tenet of the rights of peoples as more valuable 
than the rights of individuals. The previous excerpt from Komsomolskaya Pravda elevates the 
struggle for survival of the larger ethnos of Russia/Eurasia against the threat of separatism, 
which the article implicitly links with Western forces, above the rights of individual hunters to 
their ancestral hunting and fishing grounds. Individual natives might be suffering through pangs 
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of hunger, the ravishes of poverty, the cold of winter, or even the loss of subsistence rights, but 
their doing so will allow their ethnos to survive. Recall Gumilev's great insight in the history of 
Eurasianist thought that a superethnos can only come about when the constituent ethnoi and 
subethnoi, touched with the supernatural power of passionarity, are willing to sacrifice their 
wellbeing for future glory. Such exclusive emphasis on the superethnos may harm them in the 
short term, but it promises to achieve lasting glory in the form of a great empire. Likewise, 
journalists writing about the small-numbered people in Russia seem to accept a fair amount of 
suffering by the Indigenous peoples as part of a larger Eurasian social project, as long as this 
suffering is not referencing any political tensions.
Many negatively-coded articles reference poor social conditions including the inability to 
access subsistence resources (n=41), poor economic opportunities for natives (n=40), or 
insufficient federal funding for native education (n=11). Suggestions of territorial and ethnic 
fragmentation, on the other hand, are virtually absent from Kremlin-aligned media (n=6). When 
they appear, they are couched in implicit criticism of the West, as in the previously noted 
Komsomolskaya Pravda article. The article suggests that liberalism, the ruling philosophy of 
Russia in the 1990s, caused the ethnic and political tensions. Now that liberalism has faded from 
the mainstream dialogue, the only danger of separatism is from “regional-economic” forces. In 
other words, ethnic separatism no longer threatens Russia, because its various ethnic groups are 
now reintegrated into the organic Eurasian state, and it is economics that is driving any sort of 
fragmentation.
Coverage of Indigenous issues differs strikingly in the control media, Novaya Gazeta. 
Not only do multiple suggestions of animosity between RAIPON and the federal government 
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(RAIPON is called a “nail in the boot” of the Russian government) appear,214 but its reporting 
includes more explicit suggestions of territorial disunity and secessionist impulses (n=19).215 For 
example, in contrast to the Kremlin-aligned media's portrayal of rosy festivals of inter-ethnic 
unity, Novaya Gazeta quotes a survey study that finds that “of the 28 countries of Europe, Russia 
has the lowest level of civil solidarity and mutual (‘horizontal') trust.”216 Even more explicitly, 
Novaya Gazeta attributes the charges of espionage against one Indigenous rights leader of the 
Pomor people in Northwest Russia to his efforts “to recognize the Pomors as Indigenous small- 
numbered people of the North, and including their territory under the jurisdiction of international 
law, which could lead to the fragmentation of the territorial wholeness of Russia.”217 Unlike the 
Kremlin-aligned sources, Novaya Gazeta suggests the Russian state is teetering at the edge of 
disintegration due to secessionism of its native people and their wish for greater protections 
which they believe they can achieve through intergovernmental bodies or foreign states.
214 “Narod tol'ko meshaet,” (“The people are just a nuisance,”) Novaya Gazeta. November 16, 2012, accessed May 
25, 2018. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2012/11/15/52362-narod-tolko-meshaet-vpervye-ob-etom- 
zayavleno-otkrytonovayagazeta.ru/articles/2012/11/15/52362-narod-tolko-meshaet-vpervye-ob-etom-zayavleno- 
otkryto
215 Adjusted for the smaller sample size of the control media, the number is 144.
216 “Nevol'niki Obschin.” (“Unwilling of the community.”) Novaya Gazeta. March 16, 2011, accessed May 20, 
2018.
217 “Narod tol'ko meshaet,” (“The people are just a nuisance,”) Novaya Gazeta, November 16, 2012
5.1.1 Civilizational Unity in media coverage
The Kremlin-aligned news media repeatedly emphasized the Eurasianist theme of 
Civilizational unity. This theme appeared in 15 percent (n=37) of the Kremlin-aligned media 
outlets, while escaping mention in Novaya Gazeta. The theme refers to the Eurasian idea of a 
wholeness of the diverse civilizations of the Eurasian continent and avoids mention or 
celebration of an ethnic group's distinctiveness. Civilizational unity refers to the characteristic
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Eurasian idea that despite the diversity of the ethnic groups across the vast Eurasian steppe and 
boreal taiga, an underlying, naturally occurring force unites these peoples. Civilizational unity in 
the Russian Indigenous context refers to a general feeling of unity, but at the same time suggests 
that the Russian language plays a uniting role in the cohesion of civilization.
Table 5.2: Sample-size adjusted comparison of thematic emphasis: The chart shows the relative prevalence of the 
various Eurasionist themes in Kremlin-aligned compared to independent media.
Table 5.2 illustrates the preference for Eurasianist themes among the Kremlin-aligned 
media, particularly when considered in comparison to the massive preponderance of 
contrapositive themes in the independent control group. The table also suggests that this 
somewhat vague notion of “civilizational” unity is the most pervasive justification for the 
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wholeness of Russia (n=33), followed by mentions of “spiritual” (“dukhovnoe”) (n=10) 
connections or similarities that unite the people of Russia.
As examples of the celebration of the unity of the Russian civilization, many articles refer 
to literal celebrations. Russia celebrates the Day of National Unity on November 4, a holiday 
president Vladimir Putin reestablished by decree in 2005 to replace a memorial of the October 
Revolution of 1917, thereby symbolically replacing Marxist with Eurasianist ideology. The day 
in fact originated with a celebration of Russia's expulsion of Polish and Lithuanian invaders 
from Moscow in 1612, a mythic foundation of the Russian state akin to July 4th in the United 
States. Unlike America's Independence Day, however, Indigenous peoples are clearly woven 
into the fabric of the Day of National Unity, particularly in Kremlin-aligned media coverage. 
One article in TASS about the holiday quotes Grigorii Ledkov, the current president of the 
RAIPON, describing the festivities: “Russia is perhaps the most multi-national country in the 
world. We will celebrate this holiday, devoted to the unity of our people and our country 
widely."218 In Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Sergei Kharyuchi, a representative of the legislature of the 
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, asserts that “our strength is in our diversity, not in our 
uniformity. The unity of the Russia is achieved, among other things, by the balancing of interests 
of the diverse peoples and ethnoi. On the regional level, this is being reaffirmed.”219 An article in 
Argumenty i Fakty quotes the now-exiled former RAIPON leader Pavel Sulyandzinga praising a 
veteran's day parade: “My ancestors came from many nationalities: Ukrainians, Ossetians,
218 “Predstaviteli korennykh narodov severa shiroko otmetyat Den' narodnogo edinstva.” (“Representatives of 
Indigenous peoples of the North widely celebrate the Day of National Unity,”) TASS. November 3, 2017, accessed 
May 20, 2018. Tass.ru/obschestvo/4701838
219 “Predsedatel' Zaksobraniya raskazal o zhizny korennykh narodov Yamala.” (“Legislator talks about the life of 
the Indigenous people of Yamal.”) Rossiyskaya Gazeta, July 11, 2013, accessed May 19 2018. rg.ru/2013/07/11/reg- 
urfo/harjuchi.html
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Kazakhs. And all of them considered themselves Russians.”220 While Sulyandzinga was forced 
into exile in the United States just months later for protesting a resource development project on 
Indigenous territory,221 his being cited in this article reaffirms the importance of the small 
numbered people to the national patriotic identity of Russia. Sulyandzinga is not mentioned 
again in these Kremlin-aligned media.
220 “Marsh Pamyati” (“Memorial March”) Argumenty i Fakty, May 4 2016, accessed May 25 2018. 
vl.aif.ru/society/marsh_pamyati
221 “Proch' iz rossii: Zashitnik korennykh narodov...o begstve v sesha'a.” (“Away with you from Russia: Defender 
of Indigenous people...on his exile to the USA) BBC Russia, June 8 2017, accessed November 27 2018. 
https://www.BBC.com/russian/features-40194010
Despite these clear assertions of an inherent inter-ethnic unity, however, language plays a 
more complicated role in the media's narrative construction. Despite some mentions of linguistic 
diversity in the Kremlin-aligned media, just as often, the Russian language as playing a uniquely 
binding role in Russian civilization in a way that can feel patriarchal to Western audiences. In an 
article about the election of a new president of RAIPON, one bureaucrat notes in a speech that 
“President Putin has placed enormous emphasis on the realization of rights of Indigenous small- 
numbered people of the North.” He continues to claim that “he is pleased with the understanding 
by native people that they are all united by the Russian language.” While paternalistic overtones 
silence an actual Native voice, the article claims that the elders of several Indigenous groups 
backed up this assertion, thus legitimating the consensual basis of the Russian state. Another 
article in Rossiyskaya Gazeta about a nationwide seminar in Moscow on language preservation 
again asserts a central role of Russian vis-a-vis other Indigenous languages in Eurasia. 
“Language is the foundation of identity, and the Russian language is a powerful instrument in 
sub-ethnic integration,” the article quotes the chair of the Federal Agency for Nationalities Igor 
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Barinov. “It gives us a chance for a peaceful future, and thus we must develop both Russian as 
well as the languages of the multi-national Russia.”222 The Russian media thus emphasizes the 
importance of Russian at the cost of Indigenous languages despite the previously discussed 
celebration of the role of the diverse peoples in the creation of a multi-ethnic Russia.
222 “Yazyky soglasiya.” (“Languages of agreement.”) Rossiyskaya Gazeta, October 26 2016, accessed May 20 2018. 
https://rg.ru/2016/10/26/reg-cfo/v-moskve-otkrylsia-seminar-po-sohraneniiu-iazykov-rossii.html
223 Olga Kuporova. “Na Donu svyshe 700 chelovek napisali «Bol'shoi etnograficheski diktant» (“On the Don, over 
700 people wrote ‘the Great Ethnographic Dictant'”). Komsomolskaya Pravda, September 17 2010, accessed May 
25, 2018. https://www.kp.ru/daily/26759/3794793/#print
224 Sasha Pyatnitskaya. “Patriarkh: Segodnya takoe vremya, kogda Rossiya dolzhna podderzhivat' malye narody 
Severa,” (“Patriarch says that now is the time for Russia to support the small-numbered people of the North,”) 
Komsomolskaya Pravda. September 17, 2010, accessed May 5, 2018. https://www.kp.ru/online/news/741394/#print
While the disparity between Kremlin-aligned and independent media is not as strong for 
the code Spiritual affinities as it is for Civilizational unity, several articles are revealing. They 
mention and inherent “spiritual unity” (“dukhovnoe edinstvo”) of the ethnically diverse Russian 
people in a vague sense, as well as the “high level of spirituality” (“vysokaya dukhovnost'”)223 
that unites the diverse people of Russia. This conforms to Eurasianist notions of Eurasia as a 
traditional and spiritual society in opposition to the vacuous capitalists of the West. Several 
articles also celebrate the Russian Orthodox Church and its particular role as a moral beacon for 
the Russian state. An article in Komsomolskaya Pravda entitled “Patriarch says that now is the 
time for Russia to support the small-numbered people of the North,” explains that during the 
Patriarch of All-Russia's visit to a Kamchatkan native village, he called on the federal 
government to “cherish, nourish, and develop” the “distinct culture, people, and language” there, 
which is the “greatest treasure.”224 The article thus places Kirill as a moral advocate and 
protector for the Indigenous peoples of Russia, a finding that is supported by Damm and 
Cooley's narrative analysis of the Russian Orthodox Church.
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5.1.2 Dismantling of RAIPON
Perhaps the most significant event in the post-Soviet history of Indigenous peoples and 
rights was the dismantling of RAIPON from November 1, 2012, until April 20, 2013. Divergent 
coverage patterns from Kremlin-aligned versus non-Kremlin aligned media reveal much about 
how Indigenous peoples fit into Russia's civilizational narrative. RAIPON is an umbrella 
advocacy group that represents 41 Indigenous groups and 250,000 people from across Russia. As 
a registered Russia-wide social organization, it can submit proposed legislation to the federal 
assembly. RAIPON is also visible internationally as one of six Permanent Participants of the 
Arctic Council and has a special consultative status at the Economic and Social Council of the 
UN.225
225 “Obshaya informatsiya ob korennykh malochislennykh narodov severa, Sibirii, i dal'nego vostoka Rossisskoi 
Federatsii,” (General information on the Association of Indigenous, small-numbered people of the North, Siberia, 
and the Far East of the Russian Federation.”) Accessed November 28 2018. http://www.raipon.info/about/
Beginning in 2010, Russian lawmakers began an increasingly obstructionist policy 
towards RAIPON, which had existed since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990. In 2010, the 
Ministry of Justice launched an audit of RAIPON's non-compliance with federal legislation for 
its failure to register its logo and what it saw as insufficient registration of its regional branches. 
Russian law requires that every “national organization” have a certain number of regional offices 
in a certain number of Russia's federal subjects (oblasts, republics, and okrugs). The Ministry of 
Justice claimed that RAIPON had not properly listed the locations of its regional offices in its 
charter, despite the fact that the most recent review in 2005 had found no such issue. Despite not 
having a meeting scheduled for several years, RAIPON convened a special congress with 
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representatives from across the country to remedy the problems so that it could continue its 
work, which it accomplished in mid-2012. Subsequently, however, the Ministry of Justice 
asserted that the meeting had not followed proper minute-taking protocol, and in November 2012 
an official suspended RAIPON's activities, preventing it from meeting and proposing legislation 
to the federal Duma. Dismissing these trivial assertions of legal non-compliance, Indigenous 
advocates asserted that the underlying reason for the feud lay in disputes over territorial and 
subsistence rights between developers and Indigenous collectives, according to activists working 
for RAIPON. These activists, apparently, had been critical of the former Deputy of the Regional 
Development Ministry, Maxim Travnikov, for failing to implement federal protections of 
Indigenous Peoples when he was responsible for implementing these rights from 2008 until 
2012. Just one month after Travnikov was promoted to Deputy Minister of Justice in September 
2012, he disbanded RAIPON, in retaliation against his former critics.226
226 Dimitry Berezhkov. “The study of the Indigenous peoples' participation in decision making in Russia 
Federation.” Center of Northern People: 2002. Annex E: 29-30.
The opposition newspaper and the control media for this study, Novaya Gazeta, covered 
the suspension of RAIPON in a way that was very critical of the Kremlin. In an article from 
October 31 just after the suspension of the organization, Novaya Gazeta claimed that RAIPON 
had always been a “nail in the boot of the Russian business-government partnership.” The article 
claimed that in the present climate, any non-profit organization operating in Russia needs, “if not 
love for the Kremlin, then at least unbounded loyalty.” The article quoted Vice President of 
RAIPON Rodion Sulyandziga saying, “Indigenous peoples are one of the last barriers on the 
path of corporations and governments in the acquisition of these resources, and it is easier for 
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them to make use of force, using the electoral justice, so that they don't divert unnecessary 
energy, time, and resources in dialogue with those Indigenous.”227 In essence, the article painted 
an adversarial relationship between the Indigenous Peoples and the federal government (whom it 
equated with the oil companies), in which the latter disregard human rights in their avarice for 
more and more resources. The article suggested that the federal government was in alliance with 
the rapacious oil companies in a mutually enriching scheme that would give the unholy alliance 
unfettered reign over the mineral resources that once belonged to the Natives.
227 Andrei Tarasov. “Narod tol'ko meshaet.”
228 Andrei Tarasov. “Korrenye Interesy,” (“Native interests,”) Novaya Gazeta, March 17, 2013, accessed May 15, 
2018.
229 Tarasov. “Korrenye Interesy,” Novaya Gazeta.
When RAIPON was re-established in March of 2013, a Novaya Gazeta story developed 
this theme further and suggested that not only the federal government, but the general Russian 
public was largely ignorant of and unconcerned with the plight of Indigenous peoples in its own 
country. “What is happening in the majority of the territory of our country--in the Asiatic part, as 
well as the European North--is at the periphery of attention,”228 the author claimed. In other 
words, according to Novaya Gazeta's narrative about the event, the entire fiasco was made 
possible by the fact that Russians are in fact not concerned with Indigenous peoples, but instead 
are busy ogling the West's riches. The article also states that the “conservation of this fragile, 
boreal environment and the equally fragile--at least in contrast with the oil companies-- 
ethnicities have few in Russia who will protect them. RAIPON is one of these few.”229 Again, 
this suggestion belies Eurasianists' vision of Russia as a natural protector of minority ethnicities 
and that this protector-protected relationship is an integral part of the Russian/Eurasian state.
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The Kremlin-aligned media responded to the dismantling of RAIPON differently: they 
ignored it almost completely. Of the 228 articles coded from the Kremlin-aligned media, only 
one covered the suspension of RAIPON. That article, dated on November 14, 2012, was gleaned 
from a search of RT following the data collection protocols, but appeared in the InoTV section of 
RT, which publishes summaries of foreign news related to Russia in Russian. In this case, the 
story, taken from a Barents Observer article, quoted a Norwegian official as describing the 
Ministry of Justice's act as the “silencing of an ‘entire political voice' and its ability to resolve 
questions on a federal level.” The Norwegian official described the act as “the next blow to the 
non-profit non-governmental organizations” that will affect relations between Russia and 
Norway. Despite its coverage of the event, the tone it takes towards the Barents Observer article 
makes this article the exception that proves the rule. While it acknowledged that RAIPON was 
shuttered, it sidestepped the official rationale and implied that the suspension related to 
RAIPON's foreign contacts. The InoTV summary of the article writes that, “In the opinion of 
observers in the Norwegian press, this step can be seen as the next blow to the non-profit, non­
governmental organizations, but on the other hand, it is unclear which factors--alongside the 
officially stated reasons, could darken the relationships between the government and RAIPON.” 
This statement, combined with an earlier one that RAIPON “supported official contacts with the 
Norwegian Barents secretariat and played a key role in the cooperation between the Indigenous 
peoples and other countries in the Arctic,” seems to feed on a hysteria at the time in Russia 
concerning “foreign agents.” While RAIPON was never officially accused of being a foreign 
agent, the open-ended statements in this InoTV article seem to invite the readers to connect the 
dots. Notice the suggestion that RAIPON is cooperating with “other countries in the Arctic,” not 
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with other Indigenous organizations. This simple manipulation of words perhaps serves as a dog­
whistle for a Russian, xenophobic anti-American readership, who would read “NATO” into 
“other countries in the Arctic.” The readership may thus perceive RAIPON as a front for a 
Western-supported information warfare type operation, rather than a representative body of the 
Eurasian subethnoi.
When the government reinstated RAIPON, its former leader, Pavel Sulyandzinga, was 
ousted in favor of a more obsequious president, Grigorii Ledkov, at an official RAIPON 
meeting. According to Thomas Nilson,230 a reporter for the Barents Observer out of Kirkenes, 
Norway, Pavel Sulyandzinga, who had a history of vocal opposition to resource development 
projects on Indigenous land, won the first two rounds of voting for a new president decisively. 
However, after a closed-door meeting with Russian officials before the last round of voting, 
Sulyandzinga emerged and announced the withdrawal of his candidacy amidst cries of 
disapproval by delegates.231 If the episode was a test of whether an independent Indigenous 
people's organization could exist within the framework of a centralized, economically-oriented 
Kremlin, the Putin regime certainly failed. Indigenous people's concerns were relegated to the 
voice of a Kremlin-appointed puppet who could advocate for Indigenous interests, but would not 
stand up to the Putin regime in a meaningful way. Western observers suggested that, despite its 
public kowtowing to international standards of respect towards Indigenous peoples, the Kremlin 
showed that it held no such respect for Indigenous Peoples as independent voices in civil society.
230 Nilson was denied further entry into Russia as of March 2017. Amy Martin. “An environmental newspaper fights 
for press freedom in the Russian arctic,” The World, November 26 2018. Accessed November 27, 2018. 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-11-26/environmental-newspaper-fights-press-freedom-russian-arctic
231 Thomas Nilson. “Moscow Staged Raipon election thriller,” Barents Observer. April 3, 2013. Accessed October 
25, 2018. https://arcticconsulteng.wordpress.com/2018/04/24/2013-04-barents-observer-moscow-staged-raipon- 
election-thriller/
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The Kremlin-aligned media's silence throughout the campaign illustrates the incongruity of the 
episode with a Eurasianist vision of the relationship between the federal government and 
minority peoples of Russia. Instead of reporting on it and demonizing RAIPON or Indigenous 
peoples, the Kremlin-aligned media chose to ignore the event entirely, and by doing so reaffirm 
that there was no political tensions between the federal government and Indigenous groups. 
Unlike some of the critical stories represented in the Kremlin-aligned media regarding 
challenging social or economic conditions among Natives, the story of the federal government 
forcibly silencing Native peoples contradicts assertions of natural, organic unity between the 
ethnicities of Eurasia; thus the Kremlin-aligned media ignored it.
5.2 Native American Section
5.2.1 Media portrayal of Native Americans
While Kremlin-aligned media coverage of Russian Indigenous Peoples' relationship with 
the federal government examined for this research project was largely positive, the coverage of 
the relationship between the U.S. government and Native Americans was strikingly negative. As 
shown below negative media portrayals far outnumbered positive portrayals across media 
outlets. This is unsurprising, considering the decades-old geopolitical and ideological animosity 
between the Soviet Union/Russia and the U.S.
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Table 5.3: Tone of Indigenous-Federal Relationship by Media Outlet in the United States
In general, all the media outlets provided more coverage of stories that portrayed Native 
Americans and Alaska Natives as having a fraught and contentious relationship with the U.S. 
federal government than those that portrayed a conciliatory or amicable relationship. RT 
coverage contains the most striking disparity, with thirty stories that I evaluated as portraying a 
negative Federal-Indigenous relationship, and only one story that could be considered positive. 
The tone of the single exception was in fact ambiguous and otherwise anomalous among the data 
collected. The short article, titled “Barack Obama restores the historic name of the highest peak 
in North America,” has no accompanying image and contains a glaring typographical error. After 
briefly describing the history of Mount McKinley and Alaska, the story says, “the event takes 
place as part of a three-day visit to Alaska by the American leader, on which he hopes to fix and 
strengthen [sic] with the local people.” This omission of a noun in Russian occurs at the end of
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the sentence, suggesting that a careless author or editor removed the words “his relationship” 
with the local people. Was this an honest mistake or was it a form of parapraxis, wherein the 
author cannot bring him/herself to recognize a relationship between locals and the federal 
government can be improved? In either case, the shortened sentence eliminates the prospect of a 
brighter future of the relationship between the federal government and Alaska Natives. While the 
story was coded as positive, because it addresses the restoration of the original Indigenous name 
to the landmark, it could have been coded as negative, given the suggestion that local (or 
Indigenous) people's relationship with the federal government was in a state of disrepair and 
needed to be fixed. The article also mentions a “forty-year battle” between the state and the 
federal government, suggesting that if the federal-Indigenous relationship is not poor, then at 
least the federal-state one is. Two articles from Rossiyskaya Gazeta and Komsomolskaya Pravda 
about the renaming of Mt. McKinley were also rated as “positive,” though they also both refer to 
a “battle” (“bor'ba”) between the federal and state governments, a choice of verbiage that 
suggests a contentious history, if not future.
Articles in other outlets that were coded as “positive” are likewise often ambiguous. For 
example, one article in Rossiyskaya Gazeta is entitled “Attorney General of the U.S. calls voter 
rights for natives ‘horrendous.'” While the article depicts a conciliatory federal government 
attempting to correct a human rights violation, it also contained many references to the poor 
condition of Native Americans with respect to their civil rights. Another Rossiyskaya Gazeta 
article entitled “Obama appoints lesbian to federal court,” contains a passing reference to two 
Native Americans serving in Obama's cabinet. The article states that Obama has been a leader in 
appointing minorities to high-level positions, but the reference also could be interpreted by the 
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cynical reader as portraying a “negative” tone of the federal-Indigenous relationship because it 
shows how few minorities are in the cabinet and that even fewer were in the cabinet previously. 
Another subcategory of the “positive”-rated articles addresses American-Russian cooperation at 
Fort Ross, a former Russian colony on the coast of California that has been much publicized in 
the Russian media during the bicentennial of its founding in 1812. Rossiyskaya Gazeta quotes 
the leader of the Society for the Preservation of Fort Ross as saying, “This place holds huge 
emotional meaning--there's an Orthodox temple, and that strengthens their [Russian expats'] 
spiritual connection with Russia.” While the article portrays Americans generously in their 
interactions with Kashai Indians, it also emphasizes Russia's lasting spiritual connection to the 
shores of North America. The quantitative portion of this analysis fails to capture relatively 
frequently occurring negative or ironic undertones in the articles.
While the control media, BBC Russia, contained a similar ratio of negative to positive 
stories (it had fewer negative stories than all but TASS), a different research protocol could have 
yielded a different result, since four of the sixteen articles coded as portraying a “negative” tone 
referred to Canada. If the data collection protocol had been established such that articles 
referring to Canada were omitted, the ratio would have been eleven negative to eight positive. 
TASS and other Kremlin-aligned media published almost no stories related to Canada. Given the 
perception of the United States as a more quintessential representative of Western corruption, the 
research design could have been improved by omitting Canada-related articles. Nonetheless, the 
data from BBC Russia is valuable in that it illustrates that Canada escapes the most critical 
coverage of federal-Indigenous relationships in both Kremlin-aligned media and in independent 
media. I can posit two explanations for this phenomenon. The first is that Russia does not 
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perceive Canada as the grand geopolitical enemy that the United States is, and it thus falls 
outside Russian media's grand, polarized narrative of a clash between East and West. Due to 
Canada's more submissive foreign policy to Russia, as well as Canada and Russia's mutual 
geopolitical interests in the Arctic, Canada does not embody the antipodal civilization to Eurasia 
that the United States and Great Britain do in the Russian imagination. A second explanation, 
however, could be that Russian media publish more positive stories of the Canadian federal- 
Indigenous relationship because Canada has been more progressive in correcting and reconciling 
historical wrongs among its Indigenous population in recent years. Particularly since 2008 with 
the official apology to its First Nations for their treatment in the residential school system and the 
establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Canada has publicly portrayed itself 
as a leader in protecting Indigenous rights. This explanation suggests that the general omission of 
news related to the Canadian-Indigenous relationship is a function of the Kremlin-aligned 
media's curation of stories that align with political narrative Moscow formulates, rather than the 
fabrication of stories.
Kremlin-aligned media thus overwhelmingly cover the U.S. federal-Indigenous 
relationship in negative terms, while those few that are positive are undermined by subtle choices 
in diction. Overall, this conclusion suggests a continuation of the Soviet-era ideology that 
suggests that minority groups in the U.S. are oppressed by the political structures of capitalism 
and democracy. This is not altogether surprising, but reaffirms the contention that the current 
Russian media landscape has ideological biases that predispose it to negative portrayals of the 
U.S. government's treatment of Indigenous Peoples and other minorities. The nuances of these 
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negative portrayals, however, have changed substantially as the ruling ideology has shifted from 
Marxism to Eurasianism.
5.2.2 American/Western fitness for Indigenous governance
What themes are emphasized in these negative portrayals of the federal-Indigenous 
relationship? The themes are wide-ranging, but fit into the general criticisms of the West 
inherent in Eurasianism.
One common point that the Russian media repeats is the allusion to the historic loss 
population decline of Native Americans, which the media often refer to as “genocide.” While it 
is sometimes referred to only implicitly, it nonetheless plays a grounding role in many of the 
historical references when referring to Native Americans (n=56), and is wielded as a trump card 
for framing any comparisons. Before discussing the coverage of genocide, it is worth looking at 
our control media outlet, BBC Russia. While BBC Russia mentioned genocide several times (n=7 
in 3 of the 50 articles or 6 percent), that news outlets' coverage about genocide differed 
significantly in tone, which points to limitations of my quantitative research method. Among the 
seven references to genocide in BBC Russia, three of the mentions concern Spanish colonizers--a 
nationality that does not embody “the West” as directly as the U.S. or Great Britain in the 
Eurasian imagination. Another mention in BBC Russia is ambiguous as to the agent of the 
genocide in referring to a population drop among Aleuts on the Aleutian Islands. “Today, there 
are only 3,800 Aleuts in all of Alaska and the Aleutian Chain,”232 a statement that does not 
accuse either side as the agent of responsibility for the population loss. Other articles in BBC
232 “Amerikanski Ostrov, Kotorii kogda-to byl russkim” (“American Island that once was Russian.”) BBC Russia,
August 4, 2018, accessed October 20, 2018. BBC.com/russian/vert-tra-45021763
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Russia only obliquely reference a Native American genocide. For example, one article states that 
“The population of Indigenous peoples in North America, which represent several exclusive 
groups, began to decrease after the arrival of immigrants, and now accounts for a minority of the 
population.”233 The most direct assertion of responsibility comes for a BBC Russia in the 
statement that “white people brought with them an array of diseases, among them smallpox, to 
which the Indians had no immunity.”234 The quote appears in an article about the canonization of 
a Native American woman, which generally portrayed very positively the relationship between 
the Anglo-Saxon colonizers and Native Americans. BBC Russia, while acknowledging the 
demographic facts of Native American population decline, usually obfuscates the group who 
bears responsibility.
233 “USA: Kratkaya Spravka” (“USA: Quick overview”) BBC Russia. September 18, 2009, Accessed May 20, 2018. 
BBC.com/russian/international/2009/09/090918_in_depth_usa
234 “U Amerikanskikh indeitsev poyavitsya pervaya svyataya.” (“Among Americans indians there will be a first 
Saint”). BBC Russian, October 20, 2012, accessed October 21, 2018.
Kremlin-aligned media sources take a much different tone when speaking of genocide, 
implying it was purposeful and malevolent, or at least an inevitable consequence of a capitalistic 
worldview. Israel Shamir outlines America's culpability in the annihilation of Native Americans 
explicitly in an opinion piece in Komsomolskaya Pravda.
The Russian approach to the small-numbered people was not at all the same as the 
Americans'--they were given the opportunity to build their own national culture, to 
preserve their language, and at the same time use all of the achievements of civilization. 
Russia never knew the monstrous genocide like America, and the local leaders were 
included in the imperial aristocracy. Some historians and sociologists doubt the wisdom 
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of this approach, saying that it would be better to impose a forceful “Russification” on the 
population. But it's not worth being ashamed of our benevolent actions, and today, 
Russia can support the demands of the Sioux Indians for their independence with a clear 
235conscience.
Shamir explicitly counterposes America's genocidal treatment of its Indigenous peoples during 
colonization to Russia's magnanimity during colonization in the 17th and 18th centuries and 
lasting until present. His comparative depiction of the treatment of the two continents' 
Indigenous Peoples thus illustrates one of the key differences in the way in which Russia's 
Eurasianists narrative contrasts Russian and American civilization. Shamir and other Eurasianists 
depict Russia as a country that presently and historically has been supportive of the development 
of Indigenous cultures, which is evidenced by the fact that, according to Shamir, no group of 
people in Russia has been exterminated.235 36 The conquest of Siberia itself in the 16th century by a 
group of Cossacks led by Yermak Timofeevich was far from peaceful, and in both Russia and 
America most historians believe that much of the loss of life resulted from diseases that preceded 
the arrival of the conquerors.237 Likewise, the status of Indigenous languages is perilous, despite 
Shamir's comments. According to the 2010 Census, in about thirty of the forty one groups of 
small numbered people, less than a quarter of the populations claim language fluency, and six of 
235 Israil Shamir. “Lavrov, Priznai Lakotu!” (“Lavrov, recognize the Lakotah!”). Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 
3, 2012, accessed October 20, 2018. https://www.kp.ru/daily/25960/2900248/
236 In fact, it is difficult to say whether groups were eliminated because of the complicated evolution of ethnography 
in tsarist Russia and later in the Soviet Union
237 It is estimated that up to 80% of some native populations may have been killed by smallpox and other diseases 
carried by the invading Cossacks; Despite numerous mentions in Russian media of about the culpability of 
Westerners in the for the genocide of Native Americans due to disease, the topic of a Russian genocide is 
categorically omitted from any media accounts.
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those groups claim native-language fluency of less than one percent.238 James Forsythe, the 
author of the definitive History of the Peoples of Siberia, writes that “the Soviet Union's 
treatment of the natives of the North is comparable with the annihilation of the North American 
Indians by the white man,”239 though some of the circumstances differed. Forsythe describes a 
colonization of Siberia led by greedy and cruel explorers who disregarded any orders from 
Moscow to treat the native inhabitants with respect. Using many of the tactics later adopted by 
the Americans, such as purposeful inebriation of the natives and mistranslation of treaties, Russia 
conquered the vast lands all the way to the Pacific coast in a relatively short time.
238 “Vladenie yazikami naseleniem korennykh malochislennykh narodov Rossiyskoi Federatsii.” (’’Fluency of 
language of Indigenous, small-numbered people of the Russian Federation,”) Russian Census 2010. 2120-2031. 
Accessed October 26, 2018. https://www.iwgia.org/images/publications//0695_HumanRights_report_18_Russia.pdf
239 Forsyth, History of the Peoples of Siberia, 398.
240 Forsyth, History, xvi-xvii
While Forsythe equates American and Russian subjugation of native people, Shamir calls 
the former a “monstrous genocide,” he suggests the latter as inclusive and egalitarian. Shamir 
suggests that America's maltreatment of Native Americans is out of the ordinary, describing 
intentional, malevolent genocide. A debate continues within the United States about the nature of 
the American conquest and the appropriateness of calling it a genocide, but Shamir's depiction 
of American history seems to be taken for granted within Russia. Indeed, several articles 
analyzed for this project describe an ongoing project to build a memorial to the Native American 
genocide opposite the American embassy in Moscow in response to a Russian project to 
memorialize murdered Russian dissident Sergei Magnitsky. On the other hand, the Kremlin- 
aligned media offer no discussion of a parallel genocide during the conquest of Siberia, despite 
the similar tactics and outcomes.240 Forsythe writes that is was not until glasnost that the 
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optimistic picture of the assimilation of Siberian natives was overturned, at least by Western 
scholars, 241 but Shamir's article reveals how the Eurasianist narrative in the twenty-first century 
has adopted the old Soviet propaganda designed to demonstrate the superiority of the Soviet 
economic model.
241 Forsyth, History
Shamir's statement that “local leaders were included in the imperial aristocracy” is also 
telling as it implies an egalitarian mindset of the Imperial conquerors. While Eurasianist writers 
hold contradictory views about the Imperial period of Russia -- some deriding it as a time that 
Russia was ruled by Western puppets who nefariously overturned true Eurasianist values, while 
others imply a utopian paradise of traditionalism -- Shamir implies an organic spiritual-political 
unity between the small-numbered peoples and the ruling aristocracy. Russia can thus, according 
to Shamir, demonstrate concern for its own native people, while holding its head high in defense 
of oppressed Indigenous peoples in other parts of the world. In the last sentence of the quoted 
passage, Shamir alludes to a movement that began in 2008 and led by Native American activist 
Russell Means for the Dakota nation to declare independence from the U.S. with the land it had 
been guaranteed in treaties. Shamir writes that “Russia can support the demands of the Sioux 
Indians for their independence with a clear conscience,” and suggests that Russia's Foreign 
Minister, Sergei Lavrov should offer geopolitical protection to the Lakota Sioux people through 
official recognition of their secession from the United States.
TASS presents this image of Russia as a benevolent protector of Indigenous peoples 
around the world even more poignantly in a news article about a call for self-determination made 
by a joint Alaskan and Hawaiian working group at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.
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According to the article, representatives asked the UN Human Rights Council to review the 
“illegal annexation” of Alaska, which, according Ronald Barnes, a Yupik Indigenous rights 
advocate who submitted the petition, was enacted following an insufficiently translated statehood 
referendum in 1959 that disenfranchised speakers of Alaska Native languages. While the first 
half of the article can be read as a straightforward denigration of American imperialism, the 
second half makes a strange non sequitur, beginning with an emboldened section header:
Residents of Alaska use Russian words to this day
In an interview with a TASS correspondent, Barnes emphasized that Alaska and 
Russia have a lot of history, culture, and religion that ties them together. “I am 
Orthodox,” he said in Russian. Continuing in English, he informed that many of his 
relatives have Russian last names and use Russian words such as “platok” and “maslo.” 
“We think that Russians can help us,” said Barnes, “In 2017 we will have the 150th 
anniversary of the sale of Alaska from Russia to the U.S. Working with the Russians, if 
we could present the truth about what really happened in history and overturn the 
corrupted concepts of Alaska and our people, I think that this would be a good way to 
remedy the situation.” In the opinion of Barnes, Alaska could become a ‘neutral territory' 
located in between Alaska and Russia.”242
242 “Representatives of Alaska and Hawaii ask the UN to support their rights to self-determination,” TASS, May 7 
2015, accessed May 20 2018. https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/195529
The transition in topic from the representatives' goals in the UN to an explanation of the cultural 
connections of Alaska and Russia confounds the Western reader. What, after all, does the fact 
that many Alaska Native languages use Russian words have to do with a petition at the UN
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Human Rights Council? The subtext seems clear: Russia can offer political support for the 
Alaskans' push for independence, and independence is a sort of alliance with Russia by virtue of 
Alaska's historical association with Russia. Alaska's secession, to the Eurasianist reading, is 
implied to be an implicit vindication of Eurasian expansionism. Of course, no evidence exists to 
suggest that Alaska would have any interest in re-joining Russia, but the construction of many of 
these articles seems to suggest such an interest. Nonetheless, innuendos about secession and 
reunification with Russia appear in articles across the Russian-speaking internet with such 
incendiary article titles as “The Spirit of Separatism grabs Alaska and Hawaii” (Riafan.ru), “The 
U.S.A may lose two states” (Obozrevatel.ua, Ukraine), and “Alaska and Hawaii want to live 
separately” (Tengrinews.kz Kazakhstan), many of them suggesting affinity between Alaska and 
Russia. BBC Russia did not cover the petition, nor did virtually any western media.
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Figure 5.1 Illustration included on EurAsia Daily article about Alaska and Hawaii activists' petition for UN 
recognition of illegal occupation of their territories showing a Native hugging an Orthodox Priest243
Despite the contrivance of the pro-Russian aspect of this story, the article nonetheless illustrates 
the manner that Russia can, through its media, incite outrage at injustices and stoke support for
its Eurasianist narrative. While Alaska Natives have expressed no credible desire to rejoin
243 . Representatives of aboriginals of Alaska and Hawaii address the UN on the topic of the ‘occupation by the 
US.'” Eurasia Daily, May 8, 2015, accessed November 18 2018. 
https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2015/05/08/predstaviteli-aborigenov-alyaski-i-gavayev-obratilis-v-oon-po-povodu-ih- 
okkupacii-ssha
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Russia, many express dissatisfaction with their historical and/or current status within the 
American federal system, related to violation of treaty rights, historical voter disenfranchisement, 
and spotty recognition of legal status, among other legitimate issues. Russia's media portrayal of 
these sentiments thus perverts actual dissatisfaction to create an imaginary feeling of political 
affinity with Russia, with no evidence to support that contention.
This aspect of the Kremlin-aligned media coverage of Native Americans is illustrated 
even more vividly under the coding section Affinities between Native Americans and Eurasians.
Table 5.4: Affinities between Native Americans and Eurasians
Theme
Occurrence in
Kremlin-aligned
Occurrence in 
control
Occurrence in 
control 
adjusted for 
smaller 
sample
Relative
Likelihood of 
mention in 
Kremlin-aligned 
vs. Control
General 
Affinities 13 1 5 61.54%
Cultural 31 1 5 83.87%
Genetic 47 0 0 100.00%
Linguistic 8 0 0 100.00%
Spiritual 20 3 15 25.00%
The most widespread overall affinity or similarity was coded for “Genetic” similarities. While 
this might seem like a surprising tactic to take in order to prove some sort of affinity between 
people of Eurasia and the original inhabitants of America, it tells much about the nature of the 
Eurasianist ideological worldview and the Russian media's role in perpetuating it. The articles 
coded for containing mentions of Genetic similarities all refer to a scientific study that suggested 
the ancestors of Native Americans were in Siberia, based on a DNA analysis. This is, of course, 
an objective, non-ideological scientific fact based on genetic analysis that does not necessarily 
suggest any sort of agenda. Interestingly, the original press release from the University of
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Pennsylvania focuses on the link to Asia, not to Siberia.244 Even more notable, however, is the 
great attention paid to this single study. Four individual media articles refer to the genetic origin 
of Native Americans in Argumenty i Fakty alone, and five in Komsomolskaya Pravda. In 
contrast, the articles in BBC Russia offered no coverage of this scientific study, although BBC 
Russia reported on other genetic studies about the populating of the Americas. This contrast 
between the independent and Kremlin-aligned media suggests that the story fell within the 
ideological narrative that the Kremlin promoted, i.e. Eurasianism, and thus was given inordinate 
airtime.
244 University of Pennsylvania. “Anthropologists clarify link between Asians and Native Americans.” January 26 
2012, accessed December 3 2018. https://phys.org/news/2012-01-genetic-footprints-africa.html
Exactly why Kremlin-aligned media judged this study to further the Eurasianist narrative 
is unclear. On one hand, Eurasianism asserts that the Eurasian continent itself holds the key to 
understanding Russian civilization, through its geology, economy, and cultural union or 
superethnos. The emphasis on this “genetic” expansionism of the Eurasianist idea is best 
explained by Aleksandr Dugin and his geopolitical expansionism. Dugin asserted that Eurasia is 
destined to expand its territory and to manifest its greatness through the acquisition and 
administration of territory. While the West tends to perceive Russia as a backwards country 
owing to its relatively anemic economy and illiberal political culture, Dugin and neo-Eurasians 
assert that these measures of success are Euro-centric. Neo-Eurasianists assert that territory, 
rather than GDP, marks success. By this measure, Russia is the greatest country in the world, 
since it has the largest territory. Yet Dugin nonetheless calls for continued expansion, first and 
foremost into Ukraine. But while geographic expansion is the most visible and therefore most 
133
malignant in the eyes of the West, it is also the least promising form of expansion, since there are 
few geographic locations with similar characteristics to Crimea, i.e. a majority population of 
Russians, historical ties to Russia, and a relatively weak government without NATO backing. 
Without substantial geographic potential for expansion, Russia must expand its influence in other 
ways.
Recall the neo-Eurasianists' advocacy of an information war as the next, primary 
battlefront in the modern era. Expansionism, by this understanding, can and does occur on an 
imaginary or psychological plain. The most publicized example of this is the 2009 North Pole 
expedition in which Russian scientists planted a flag on the seafloor of the central Arctic Ocean. 
While the exact motives or implications of this move were unclear, most scholars think that 
move aimed more at its internal audiences as a tool to stoke up patriotism, rather than foreign 
audiences, in an assertion of colonial ownership in the manner of Christopher Columbus in 1492. 
Russian officials denied that it had any sovereignty claims to the North Pole other than what was 
determined by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, the international 
commission charged with resolving maritime territorial disputes, and reiterated to international 
audiences that their claim should not be considered a true territorial claim, just as the USA's flag­
planting on the moon should not be considered a claim of territorial ownership. Despite harsh 
rebukes by other members of the Arctic Council on the flag planting stunt, Russia appears to be 
continuing its policy of Arctic cooperation by abiding with the rules of the Law of the Sea for 
determining the limits of its continental shelf, while playing to its irredentist impulses of its 
domestic population.
134
Opportunities to claim territory, symbolically, however, are rare, and Russia thus uses 
other mechanisms for imaginary expansionism, which broadens the perceived reach of the 
Eurasianist idea without physically expanding it. While the media perpetuates this imaginary 
expansionism, it is just one of the means within a broader Russian campaign. The “Russkiy Mir 
Foundation” also furthers this goal. By playing on the double meaning of “Mir” in Russian, 
which means both “peace” and “world,” the Kremlin-funded foundation seeks to spread 
recognition of Russian history and culture by “refocusing of attention on the importance and 
value of the Russian world, and not only to those who consider themselves participants of this 
world but also to modern civilization at large.”245 This agency, with a budget of 500 million 
rubles, has sixty five centers worldwide, including three in the United States which it uses to host 
cultural events and educational programs.246 The Russkiy Mir Foundation collaborates with the 
Russian Orthodox Church in promoting Russian culture.247 Another mechanism for imaginary 
expansion is Russia's information strategy based on the principles outlined in its National 
Security Concept that emphasizes Russia's duty to its compatriots living abroad (Part II Section 8 
2015). The so-called Compatriots Policy, which asserts that Russia had a right and an obligation 
to protect its Russian-speaking citizens outside its borders, has also allocated money for 
resettlement of Russian citizens back to Russia. Apparently, very few Russians accepted this 
offer, perhaps because the population that Russia deems its compatriots “often don't like the 
term and want nothing to do with the Kremlin's political project, or are at least ambivalent 
245 “About” Russkiy Mir. Accessed October 20, 2018. https://russkiymir.ru/en/fund/index.php
246About” Russkiy Mir. Accessed October 20, 2018. https://russkiymir.ru/en/fund/index.php
247About” Russkiy Mir. Accessed October 20, 2018. https://russkiymir.ru/en/fund/index.php
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towards it.”248 Russian expatriates often left Russia owing to unhappiness with Russia's feeble 
economy and its militant chauvinism. Despite promises of monetary support, apparently only 
17,000 people have resettled.249 In other words, the policy appears to be directed less towards 
actual goals of repatriating ethnic Russians back to Russia and more towards stoking up a feeling 
of nationalist pride for the grandiosity of the Russian project within the domestic Russian 
population. Russia thus must content itself with claiming imaginary sovereignty over foreign 
territories in which large number of Russians live, while many expatriate Russian populations 
themselves appear to be uninterested in strong ties with Russia. This outreach has the effect of 
stoking feelings of territorial acquisition without running the risk of armed confrontation with the 
West, a matter which Russia seems content to delay.
248 Agria Grigas. “Putin's ‘Compatriots'” American Interest. October 23, 2016, accessed October 20, 
2018.https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/10/23/putins-compatriots/
249 Oncel Sencerman “The Russian Diaspora as a means of Russian foreign policy,” Revista de Stiinte Politice . 
Issue 49 (2016), 45. Accessed November 3, 2018.
http://cis01.central.ucv.ro/revistadestiintepolitice/files/numarul49_2016/10.pdf
250 Smith Stories of Peoplehood, 88-89
The Russian media's focus on genetic similarities dovetails well with this sort of 
imaginary expansionism. While most Eurasianist thinkers emphasize the non-genetic or non- 
racial nature of Eurasia's mission, a racial exclusionist tone often underlies their commentary. 
Indeed, as Roger Smith notes, leaders' ethically based narratives often oscillate between 
universalism and xenophobic exclusion. More often, he says, these stories of peoplehood begin 
with an assertion of universal acceptance and transition into a more racially or ethnically 
exclusive narrative.250 Russia seems to be following this same trend, asserting a genetic 
exceptionalism of the many peoples of Eurasia while expressing anti-American or anti-Western 
sentiments outside of Russia. Native Americans represent another ally in the Eurasian expansion 
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narrative and in the resistance to Western imperialism through their deep historic/genetic 
connection with the civilizational Eurasian project. By asserting a genetic similarity, the Russian 
media expands the purview of its mission, conquering and integrating, at an imaginary level, 
new, Native American allies into its grand mission of opposing the Western hegemony. Russian 
audiences thus perceive an Indigenous population in the United States full of discontent at 
neoliberal hegemony, and Russia's long-oppressed kinsmen, the Native Americans are waiting to 
take up arms at the proper moment.
The control media, BBC Russia, rarely mentioned any sort of affinities between Native 
Americans and Russians. Indeed, for BBC Russia, the inverse was often true. While zero articles 
were coded for “Spiritual affinities between the West and Native Americans” in the Kremlin- 
aligned media, they were common in BBC Russia. These were mostly through mentions of 
Native Americans' ready acceptance of Christianity through Catholicism, including the 
canonization of an Indian woman, the first in the history of the Catholic Church. This article, 
about the canonization of the Mohawk nun Kateri Tekakwitha, states that “according to 
researcher Orenda Boucher, who lives among the Indians of Kahnawake, Kateri Tekakwitha was 
drawn to rituals, as the male Indians of the time hardened themselves before battle, so her Indian 
beliefs organically meshed with the Christian religion.”251 This suggests a positive interaction 
between the Western colonizers and the Native Americans, whose essential belief system was 
not incompatible with a Western worldview. Such an interpretation undermines a cornerstone 
Eurasianist idea that the Orthodox Church alone could claim a natural benevolent integration of
251 “U Amerikanskikh indeitsev poyavitsya pervaya svyataya.” (“Among Americans Indians there will be a first 
Saint”). BBC Russian, October 20, 2012, accessed October 21, 2018. 
https://www.BBC.com/russian/society/2012/10/121018_first_native_indian_saint
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Native Americans into the fold of the Eurasianist project. Another article from BBC's travel 
section about the spirit of Hawaii asserts that native Hawaiians' “Aloha Spirit is used to argue 
that everyone in Hawaii can ‘feel' and should accept the love for humanity... [and] says that the 
Aloha Spirit transcends race, differences and embraces togetherness or ‘equality.'”252 This 
suggests that just as Western Catholicism is compatible with Native Americans' traditional 
beliefs, so are Native Americans' beliefs and worldviews able to embrace Westerners. The 
Kremlin-oriented media's portrayal of Native Americans seem to allow no room for such an 
“organic” affinity between Native American and Western culture that BBC Russia portrays, 
which suggests that religious or spiritual cohesion plays a powerful role in the contemporary 
Eurasianist narrative.
252 Breena Kerr. “In Hawaii, being nice is the law.” BBC Travel. April 23, 2018, accessed October 21 2018. 
http://www.BBC.com/travel/story/20180422-in-hawaii-being-nice-is-the-law
5.3 Conclusion
In some ways, Russia's portrayal of Native Americans follows an old Soviet narrative 
that depicts the West as exploitative in its treatment of minority groups. The Kremlin-aligned 
media describe various Native American groups as lacking social services, failing to 
meaningfully contribute to the economy, and having no political recourse other than to attempt to 
secede from the nation. In the Soviet era, in accordance with a Marxist ideology, the media 
attributed Native Americans' poverty to class oppression that could be eliminated only through a 
proletarian revolution that would eventually sweep through the West. The Eurasianist narrative 
replaces this economic understanding of history with a broader cultural one that explains
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Russia's material poverty as the result of attempted subjugation by the West and proclaims 
Russia to harbor hidden spiritual wealth. This narrative asserts genetic ties between Native 
Americans and the Eurasian continent and thus to the Russian state. Evidence of this bond lies in 
modern genetic studies that prove that Native Americans originated in Siberia, and in cultural 
ties, including hints of language and culture that persist in the New World, latent beneath the 
now-eroding hegemony of western capitalism. Eurasianism's assertion of an immutable bond 
between Native Americans and their own continent illustrates the profundity of the mission 
Russia sees itself enacting. Russia's portrayal of Indigenous peoples in America allows the 
country to satisfy expansionist and irredentist desires without setting boots on the ground, 
perpetuating the feeling of a tantalizingly close “conservative revolution” that will bring 
Eurasia's essential importance to the fore. This imaginary expansion into America embellishes 
the deep, archetypal importance Eurasia will serve in the coming era without risking military 
confrontation with the West.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
6.1 How Eurasianism is used
To liberal Westerners, Russia's political system is confounding. Economically, Russian 
citizens are subject to high rates of poverty, stagnant wages, and extreme rates of income 
inequality,253 while politically Russia lacks safeguards for an independent press, open elections, 
and minority representation in government.254 Despite this, the Putin regime has retained 
remarkably high approval ratings. The question of how the current regime, with its poor 
economic and political record, has managed to hold power is central to this thesis, and I posit 
that an important reason for the paradox lies in the underlying story the Kremlin propounds 
about the roots of Russia's civilizational unity. This story emerges from the philosophical ideas 
of Eurasianism and is illustrated by the analysis of the Kremlin-aligned media's portrayal of 
Indigenous Peoples, which presents the Russian polity as a scientifically inevitable phenomenon 
rooted in its sociological and geological conditions. This story serves as a powerful legitimizing 
tool for the Russian regime, affirming its moral righteousness in the face of social, political, and 
economic problems. The Eurasianist story and its application to Indigenous Peoples is an 
effective legitimating tool for the Kremlin for three major reasons: it reuses and repurposes many 
familiar Soviet ideological tenets, it provides an ostensibly scientifically grounded justification 
for the existence of the sprawling multi-ethnic Russia, and it offers Russia as a clear counterpole 
to the perceived dominating tendencies of the United States.
253 Martin, Russell. European Parliamentary Research Service. Socioeconomic Inequality in Russia. April 2018. 
Accessed February 2019. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2018/620225/EPRS_ATA(2018)620225_EN.pdf
254 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018: Russia, accessed February 2019, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/russia.
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The roots of this portrayal lie in the Soviet Union's Marxist-Leninist ideology concerning 
the exploitative nature of capitalism and the progressive nature of history. To Soviet ideologists, 
Native Americans were exploited laborers whose lands were robbed for extraction and whose 
cultures were subsumed by destructive consumerism. On the other hand, the Soviet Union's own 
Indigenous Peoples have been portrayed as technologically backwards, but under the benevolent 
patronage of the ethnic Russians, capable of achieving their leap to classless socialism. This 
narrative emphasizes the economic reasons for Native Americans' relative poverty while 
offering Indigenous Russians the benefits of political patronage as they progress towards their 
economic emancipation. The narrative could explain away Indigenous Russians' relative poverty 
by offering faith in an egalitarian future, so long as they maintain faith in the Soviet Union's 
ability to direct their historical progression. The Soviet Union thus used its Marxist narrative to 
legitimize control over vast swathes of territory and peoples who were genetically and politically 
unrelated to their overlords in Moscow. When this narrative's legitimacy crumbled in the 1990s, 
it was hard for the far-flung provinces to feel affinity for an overbearing central government.
The Russia that lived through the chaos and political fragmentation of the 1990s needed a 
new legitimacy, and found it in the suppressed writings of its one-time exiles. Eurasianism, the 
new dominant narrative espoused by the Kremlin since the 2000s, reuses many of the same anti­
Western tropes of the Soviet Union familiar to the Russian citizenry. Native Americans were still 
an exploited and oppressed class, but Eurasianism emphasized the cultural destructiveness of 
Liberalism more than its exploitative economic nature. Eurasianists stressed the benevolent 
patronage of Moscow over provincial people and territories, but through supposedly natural, 
irreversible processes of biology and sociology, rather than through a quest for universal 
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economic progress. This tenet placed Indigenous peoples as subethnoi, whose essential role was 
to strengthen the higher magnitude bonds of the ethnos and superethnos. The Kremlin's role 
transitioned from pushing Indigenous Peoples towards “civilization” to maintaining their distinct 
cultural and economic usefulness, so that they could perpetuate their natural and historical role of 
binding the Eurasian superethnos. By repurposing the Soviet idea of a hierarchy of people that is 
reflected in different statuses of its constituent states, the Putin regime uses the Gumilevan 
hierarchy of peoplehood in a way that gives value to Indigenous Peoples and their role in 
Eurasian civilization without recognizing them as independent political entities.
The second main use of Eurasianism in the Kremlin's ideology is its self-fulfilling 
suggestion of a natural, sociological basis for the unity of the Russian polity. This justification 
positions the wholeness of Eurasia as a scientific inevitability, which, due to its natural 
foundation, can only be threatened by the destructive and unnatural West. Episodes such as the 
suspension of RAIPON are explained as the result of nefarious Westerners bent on sowing 
discord between the Kremlin and Indigenous People, rather than legitimate instances of political 
tension. Early Eurasianist thinkers laid the ostensibly scientific groundwork for this train of 
thought. Founding Eurasianist Nikolai Trubetskoy's suggestion of a phonemic drift within 
Eurasia that would eventually bring the people of Eurasia to a convergence of features has, 
ironically, been shifted to the Russian language's uniting role for Eurasia's Indigenous People. 
In the West, the media portray language loss among Indigenous Peoples with alarmism and 
regret, while in Russia, the media mention the topic casually alongside bugle-calls to the 
unifying power of the Russian language. Language convergence is thus one of the themes 
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through which the Russian media touts the appropriateness of the Russian state's dominion over 
Indigenous Peoples which it portrays as both a cause and an effect of the power of Eurasia.
Lev Gumilev's hierarchy of associations of people and his insistence on scientific, 
sociological laws to govern their rise and fall also play an implicit role in the way the media 
portray Indigenous Peoples. Within Russia, Kremlin-aligned media portray Indigenous groups as 
valuable subethnoi contributing to the great mission of the Russian superethnos. Gumilev posited 
the importance of the subethnoi in supporting “ethnic unity by way of internal, non-antagonist 
resistance.”255 The stronger and more numerous the subethnoi, the more powerful the 
superethnos. Gumilev argued that there was an ineffable energy of passionarity that led 
individual members of an ethnos to sacrifice themselves for the glory of the group. Passionarity, 
in Gumilev's understanding, was self-contained within an ethnos but could shift from member to 
member based on who would be able to achieve the most lasting effect. Thus individual 
members of Indigenous groups within Russia sometimes achieve prosperity, but are often 
portrayed as suffering for a greater good. In Soviet times, the media portrayed Indigenous 
Peoples (as well as the rest of the population) as achieving progressively better material 
conditions thanks to Marxist socialism. Today, the Kremlin-aligned media's portrayal of 
Indigenous Peoples still celebrates material prosperity,, but portrayals of native suffering are 
equally prominent, illustrating a triumph of the self-sacrificing spirit of passionarity in the 
contemporary Russian political narrative. In any case, the “scientific” nature of passionarity 
makes it not an aspirational goal for residents of Eurasia, but a fact of their existence.
Gumilev, Lev. Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere. http://gumilevica.kulichki.net/English/ebe.htm.255
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Finally, Eurasianism functions as a framework through which Russia can counterpose 
itself with the West, particularly in the way that it presents Indigenous Peoples. Neo­
Eurasianism's vehement disparagement of Western values, and its emphasis on the super­
political, uniting power of Orthodoxy, wields a clear influence in media portrayals of Indigenous 
Peoples. Stories that illustrate Native Americans' powerlessness and disenfranchisement vis-a­
vis the U.S. federal government are repeated regularly, manifested prominently in Kremlin- 
aligned media's thorough coverage of the Dakota Access Pipeline protests and other episodes of 
political fragmentation along ethnic lines. Meanwhile, stories that involve the mutual resolution 
of long-standing problems, such as state and federal recognition of native tribes, devolution of 
political power, or resolution of land claims, are never mentioned in Kremlin-aligned sources. In 
the Eurasianist narrative, Western governments are inherently oppressive to minority groups and 
indifferent to Indigenous Peoples' organic ties to the land.
This disparagement of the West also flips the Soviet paradigm of atheism in exchange for 
an insistence on Russia's deep-rooted spirituality. The media present the Russian Orthodox 
Church as a social force for good among native people, whose diverse spiritual beliefs are 
subsumed by a view of Orthodoxy that is patriarchal, but secular. Orthodoxy is construed as a 
broad, conservative force that serves as a spiritual glue for Eurasian peoples, without providing 
any transcendent moral commandments, as evangelical Christianity might in the West. The 
media emphasizes the Orthodox Church's role as a conscience for Russia's political 
establishment in its coverage of the Patriarch of Moscow's calls for better social and economic 
treatment of small-numbered peoples. Meanwhile, the Orthodox Church plays a surprisingly 
prominent role in the media's portrayal of Alaska Native peoples, through its coverage of the 
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history of Russian America. Kremin-aligned newspapers portray Orthodoxy as naturally fitting 
for the Native Americans, many of whom still profess the Orthodox faith. Alaska Natives' 
profession of Orthodoxy affirms the imaginary expansion of the Eurasianist idea. At the same 
time, the Kremlin-aligned media ignore any possibility of a similar Native American spiritual 
affinity to Catholicism or Protestantism. News events such as the canonization of a Native 
American women into Catholicism, which were celebrated in Western media, were ignored in 
Kremlin-aligned sources, suggesting an incongruity with the prevailing Eurasianist narrative in 
Russia.
6.2 Research Conclusions
The research component of this project served to highlight the ways that this narrative is 
applied in the Kremlin's information sphere in their portrayal of Indigenous People. The current 
media landscape in Russia shows that while outlets are free to make independent decisions about 
reporting and seek out interesting stories, the Kremlin-aligned media avoid certain themes.. I 
designed my research protocol to allow both quantitative and qualitative data analysis that could 
compare the Kremlin-aligned media to independent media to tease out the emphasis (measured 
quantitatively) of themes, as well as the qualitative aspects of how Eurasianism's development in 
the media.
Quantitatively, for example, I compared the amount of coverage that suggestions of 
genetic and cultural connections between Native Americans and Indigenous Russians received in 
Kremlin-aligned versus independent media to quantify the strong emphasis on this theme. 
Likewise, the Kremlin-aligned media's trumpeting of Orthodoxy among Alaska Natives and its 
146
ignoring of positive aspects of non-Orthodox Christians' role in the colonization of America 
showed how Orthodoxy is portrayed as an essential “Eurasian” inclination among Indigenous 
Peoples of America. Qualitatively, I analyzed exactly how the media developed these themes. 
The counterposing of Russia's treatment of Indigenous Peoples with America's “monstrous” 
genocide of Native Americans showed the use of the Eurasianist idea of the destructiveness of 
the West towards minority cultures. The qualitative portion also revealed a portrayal of Native 
Americans as having surreptitious affinities towards Russians as seen in their ostensible wish to 
have stable, spiritual cultures overseen by the benevolent patriarchy of Russia.
The limitations of my research component were several. The use of news media, while 
helpful, was limited by the quantity of outlets I could analyze, the fact that they were only print 
media, and the incomplete picture that mass media can paint in its formation of a narrative. The 
quantity of articles I could reasonably analyze also contributed to an incomplete knowledge of 
the story propounded by the Kremlin. Lack of available data from the 1990s and the Soviet 
period also prohibited a chronological analysis of how the narrative may (or may not) have 
changed. Finally, the focus on Eurasianist narrative precluded following other alternative 
explanations for how Indigenous Peoples are framed. Still, some of the limitations offered 
insight into how the Russian media function. Lack of sufficient data for RT, for example, 
illustrated the priority that disparagement of the West has over the formation of a cohesive model 
of Eurasian civilization, at least for that news outlet. Disparities between the presentation of 
federal-Indigenous relations in Canada and the United States by Kremlin-aligned media showed 
the focus on disparaging the U.S. treatment of Indigenous Peoples, while softening perceptions 
of Canada's past mistreatment. This variance perhaps illustrates Russia's wish to open the door 
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for more cooperation with Canada, for settlement of disputes over waterway rights in the 
Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Routes. Nonetheless, future research protocols could be 
changed to exclude Canadian-focused news so that the results are more focused on Russia's 
presentation of the United States. Other improvements might include expanding the range of 
news outlets and sharpening the coding procedures to reflect more nuance in the coding scheme. 
Lastly, avenues for future research based on this project could include expanding from just 
small-numbered peoples to include larger ethnic minorities such as Yakuts, Chechens, and 
Ukrainians, which serve similar roles for the Kremlin, but with more direct geopolitical 
implications. Such a project would require more resources to deal with the larger amounts of 
data. Another direction could be to analyze the portrayals of Western-oriented Kremlin-aligned 
media such as RBTH (Russia Behind the Headlines) and Sputnik to understand how Russia's 
information campaign differs when oriented towards international audiences. Finally, the data as 
analyzed do not yet reflect the perceptions of the Russian population; future research could 
include polling of Russian citizens to understand their perceptions of Indigenous Peoples and 
how they relate to the Eurasian model of civilization.
6.3 Theoretical significance
In a theoretical sense, I hope this project helps to sharpen understanding of how 
narratives can inspire people-building through non-racial and non-economic stories. The 
Eurasianist narrative conforms to what Roger Smith called “ethically constitutive stories” that 
emphasize a way of acting--an ethic--of a certain people that separates them from others. For 
Eurasians, this ethic is in harmony with nature, which has shaped the people of Eurasia through a 
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historical dialectic process that has imbued on them the qualities of rootedness, traditionalism 
and morality. This ethic is counterposed to the West's insistence on creative destruction, 
economic and historical progress, and an absence of universal morality. The Eurasian narrative 
gives the people of Eurasia a feeling of worth and of rootedness in a fast-changing, globalizing 
world that is attractive for many people within and outside of Russia. The country's success in 
garnering admirers in the Western far right attests to how these themes resonate with a global 
audience.
Related to this international outlook, the Eurasianist narrative also leaves room for further 
expansion. As shown through the study of portrayals of Indigenous Peoples, the narrative allows 
for a reintegration of long-lost genetic descendants of the ethical idea of Eurasianness, who live 
with the same predisposition towards spiritual living and moral righteousness. This trope was 
used during the annexation of Crimea to imply that Indigenous Tatars living on the peninsula had 
a suppressed desire to leave Ukraine and join the Russian Federation, which in turn vindicated 
the righteousness of that project. The Kremlin-aligned media similarly imply a hidden affinity 
towards Russia in Native Americans. Its emphasis on studies that genetically and culturally link 
the people of Eurasia with Native Americans suggests a rising Russia. It also opens the 
possibility of remaining cultural heritage in Russian America that suggests underlying political 
sympathies. The regime can thus project broad, latent support for its civilizational vision among 
minorities, legitimizing expansionist thinking in the hope of inspiring public support.
While this story has thus far been effective in shoring up support from domestic 
audiences, it comes with a dark side that can trouble Western audiences. While the population 
might feel patriotic, Russia's Indigenous Peoples suffer from poor social and political conditions. 
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The suspension of RAIPON sharply curtailed political representation of the interests of 
Indigenous Peoples in Russia, yet the Kremlin-aligned media ignored this incident. Indigenous 
leaders whose stories were even less reported were subjected to Mafioso-style violence and 
intimidation for standing up to industrial development in their homelands.256 As non-signatories 
to the major international Indigenous rights documents, the International Labor Convention 169 
and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, the Putin regime can posit its 
standing on moral high ground through its alternative paradigm that de-emphasizes human rights 
in favor of a naturalistic understanding of development of civilization. The Kremlin's media 
campaign often obfuscates real issues that relate to Indigenous Peoples in Russia.
256 Cultural Survival. “Observations on the State of Indigenous Human Rights in the Russian Federation,” 30th 
Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review May 2017, accessed October 24, 
2018. https://www.culturalsurvival.org/sites/default/files/UPR-Report-Russian-Federation-2017.pdf.
Most importantly, this project can help cultivate an appreciation of the diverse ways in 
which ideas and narratives resonate with peoples. The Eurasianist vision is intricate, complex, 
and compelling in a way that is usually oversimplified by Westerners who see the worst and 
most threatening part of it. By explicating the nuances of Eurasianism--and the ways that 
political stories are constructed in general--this project can contribute to acknowledgement of the 
complicated historical development of the ideas that shaped modern Russia, of which Indigenous 
Peoples are an important part.
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